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SUMMARY 
Until recently most accounts of the prisoner of war experience during the 
Second World War consisted of biographical accounts of the prisoners 
themselves. These works, however, present only one side of the picture 
and the voices of the wives and families waiting in Britain for news of 
their loved ones remained unrecorded. The main aim of this thesis has 
been to redress this imbalance by examining the relationship between 
the British State and prisoner of war families. 
In order to locate the particular financial problems faced by prisoner of 
war families, the first two chapters of the thesis address the general 
development of service allowances up to and during the Second World 
War. Chapters three and four then focus on the experience of prisoner of 
war families within this context. The remaining chapters move away from 
financial consideration to the equally important question of how 
information was disseminated to prisoner of war families through both 
official and unofficial sources. In the final chapter the impact of the 
Second World War on service allowances is reviewed. 
The thesis concludes that the Second World War had little impact on 
government treatment of prisoner of war families. At least in part, this is 
attributable to government perceptions of service families as a whole. 
During the course of the war, the need to ensure that servicemen 
performed as efficiently as possible led to a perceived duty on the part of 
the State to maintain their families. Once the conflict had ended, this 
responsibility devolved to the individual servicemen themselves. In 
addition, for prisoner of war families, the government had not encouraged 
servicemen to consider the possibility of being taken captive and make 
adequate financial provision for their families in this eventuality. Not until 
after the Korean War did the State acknowledge its responsibility to 
prepare both men and their families for the possibility of capture. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, most accounts of the prisoner of war experience during the 
Second World War consisted of autobiographical accounts of the 
prisoners themselves. These works, however, presented only one side of 
the picture and the voices of those wives and families waiting in Britain 
for news of their loved ones remain unrecorded. In an unpublished 
biography held at the Imperial War Museum, Vivienne Chatfield, the 
widow of a prisoner of war taken captive by the Japanese, notes that, 
despite the many books written by prisoners of war themselves, 'none 
has been written by the near relatives of these men who spent long years 
of waiting for news'. ' 
In all, 4,653,000 men joined the British armed services between 1939 
and 1945, of whom over 55% were probably married giving a total of 
somewhere in the region of 2.5m wives separated from their husbands by 
the exigencies of military service. 2 Out of the total number of men joining 
the services, 172,592 were captured during the period of hostilities; 
135,009 by Germany and Italy and 37,583 by the Japanese in the Far 
EaSt. 3 As a result, nearly 95,000 women became wives of prisoners of 
war yet, even now that the study of prisoners of war has taken on a more 
scholarly aspect, these women remain almost completely absent from the 
historiography of the Second World War. In fact, although the 
experiences of prisoner of war families impinge on a wide range of fields, 
including women's history, social history and military and political history, 
their history remains largely unwritten for any given war. McCubbin and 
Dahl, writing in 1972 in relation to the experience of American prisoner of 
war families during the Vietnam War, claimed that there was still 'a 
paucity of research answering questions about how POW families coped' 
-a claim which remains true to the present day 4 This study, in examining 
government and armed forces treatment of the families of prisoners of 
war during the Second World War, contributes to this overall 
historiography by raising important questions about the state's duty of 
care towards the families of those taken captive in the service of their 
country. 
At the outset the intention was to address this issue by locating the 
experiences of prisoner of war families at the hands of the British 
government within a broad framework of the overall treatment of service 
families during this period. During the Second World War, the state 
recognised the important part that families played in the upkeep of 
morale amongst servicemen. 5 However, this importance was largely 
attributed to the role that the certainty that their families were being 
adequately provided for played in ensuring the efficiency of servicemen 
as fighting un itS. 6 The Army Morale Report for November 1943 to 
January 1944 clearly states that'if his [the soldier's] family is in distress 
7 he cannot give his whole mind and heart to his soldiering'. Worries over 
wives and families in relation to adequate allowances, family ill health 
and marital fidelity were perceived by the services as distracting men 
from concentration on duty, thus causing decreased efficiency. 8 When 
captured, however, servicemen ostensibly ceased to have any further 
utility as fighting units. This, then, raises the question of how the British 
government actually viewed its servicemen who had been taken captive. 
Were they regarded as innocent victims of the fortunes of war or, in 
reality, did the government see captured servicemen as being of no 
further use to the war effort and, hence of little military importance? In the 
more particular instance of those taken captive by the Japanese in the 
Far East, further questions are raised regarding the extent to which the 
British government adhered to its own assertions that prisoners of war 
were not 'dishonoured' men. Crucially for this study, governmental 
attitudes towards prisoners of war themselves, would, inevitably, reflect in 
the treatment of their families. 
Within a short time however, it became apparent that attempting to locate 
the experience of prisoner of war families within an existing framework 
would not suffice. Not only were prisoner of war families absent from the 
general histories of the Second World War, service families as a whole 
figured only marginally in published works on the topic. 9 As a result, the 
first part of this study has had to be devoted to researching and recording 
a brief history of the development of governmental provision for service 
families as a whole. Only once this framework was in place was it 
possible to focus on government treatment of prisoner of war families as 
a separate entity and to begin to try to identify differences in their 
treatment at the hands of the state. 
TH Marshall argues that'total war obliges governments to assume new 
and heavier responsibilities for the welfare of their people'. 10 Given the 
necessity first to recruit servicemen and then, following the introduction of 
conscription in 1939, to retain them, the importance of service families for 
both political and social history is clear. However, within the general 
British historiography of twentieth century warfare, academic studies of 
service families are virtually non-existent and mention of their concerns 
within wider studies remains rare. General histories of the Army, Royal 
Air Force and Royal Navy rarely mention the families of servicemen 
although Maitland in a survey of the care provided for soldiers' families, 
claims that, by 1885, provision was well established within the army at 
least. " The few studies of service families which do exist remain largely 
narrative and anecdotal as the title of Bamfield's work, On the Strength. 
The Sto[y of the British Army Wife, shows. 12 This largely uncritical 
account of family life in the Victorian army emphasises the social and 
welfare roles played by both the regiment and its commanding officers 
whilst failing to include any analysis of the situation of army families in 
terms of overall political or economic policy or wider social issues. The 
study also contains a number of anomalies with respect to the level of 
welfare provided. For example, Bamfield states that 'No organisation of 
any kind anywhere can have fulfilled the needs, physical and emotional, 
of its members as has the army'whilst, at the same time, making the 
contradictory claim that wives knew thatprotesting about what they 
13 fancied to be their rights would get them nowhere'. No attempt is made 
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to reconcile these apparently disparate statements nor to analyse the 
motivations which underlie the existing welfare provision at regimental, 
service or national level. Although writing in the 1970s, Bamfield makes 
no mention of the way in which regimental welfare served to perpetuate a 
paternalistic pattern of service life. Through the development of welfare 
regulated and approved by the regimental commander, and often his 
wife, the army exercised a great deal of control not only over the every 
day life of servicemen themselves but also over the behaviour of their 
wives and families. 
However, there are exceptions to this general historiographical trend. 
Trustram's Women of the Regiment. Marriage and the Victorian Arm 
devotes time to detailing, and attempting to analyse, the position of army 
families in relation to wider contemporary social issues. In so doing it 
provides a comprehensive overview of the British Army in the Victorian 
period beginning with a review of army attitudes towards wives and 
families and giving an in-depth analysis of issues affecting army families 
during the period. Trustrarn not only charts the different attitudes to 'on' 
and 'off the strength'wives, that is those married with or without the 
express permission of the serviceman's commanding officer, but also 
locates the welfare of these families within the context of provision 
provided by the Poor Laws. The markedly different treatment of these two 
different categories of marriage meant thatoff the strength' families of 
this period often had to rely on the vagaries of Poor Law provision for 
their existence when regiments were posted abroad on active service. In 
addition, Trustrarn begins a process of tracing the gradual change of 
attitude within the army hierarchy towards an acceptance of responsibility 
for all families, suggesting that pressure for this change developed 
following changes to the Poor Laws in the early 1870s. However, 
although mention is made of pressure being brought to bear on the War 
Office to accept responsibility for'off the strength' families, no examples 
are provided for the sources of this pressure nor the forms it took. 14 
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Whilst these studies of British army families, with the exception of 
Trustram, may be regarded as more useful in providing a general 
overview rather than detailed historical evidence, they do help us to form 
an overall picture of provision for families within the British Army in the 
nineteenth century. No such overviews exist of family life within the Royal 
Navy. The absence of navy families within general histories is, in fact, 
precisely a reflection of contemporary attitudes within the Royal Navy 
itself, where no provision was made for the families of seamen until the 
start of the First World War. Prior to this, the very existence of wives 
remained unrecognised by both the Admiralty and Navy until men 
reached the rank of Admiral. Eleanor Rathbone, MP for the Combined 
British Universities, was told during a visit to the Admiralty in around 1917 
that'a sailor ought not to marry until he was an admiral when perhaps he 
would need a wife for purposes of hospitality. '15 
The first detailed investigation into financial support for families across 
the services as a whole does not appear until Gillian Thomas' 
unpublished PhD thesis of 1989, State Maintenance for Women During 
the First World War: The Case of Separation Allowances and Pensions. 16 
In this study, Thomas briefly reviews the development of both service 
welfare provision and philanthropic care of service families up to the 
outbreak of the First World War. From this date until 1919, she outlines 
the development of both allowances and pensions across the services. In 
terms of the historiography of service families, this study provides a rare 
example of a detailed, analytical investigation of governmental attitudes 
towards these dependants. Unlike Bamfield, Thomas leans heavily 
towards a feminist interpretation in her conclusion, concentrating on the 
continuation of women's economic dependence, the perpetuation of the 
primacy of a two-parent family model and the 'disposability' of a female 
labour force which could 'disappear into the family' once their usefulness 
to the State ended. 17 Nevertheless, many of Thomas' assertions remain 
valid throughout the inter-war period, into the 1940s and beyond. As an 
example, she highlights the fact that state maintenance never became an 
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unquestionable right of service wives, despite the fact that payments 
were made directly to them. Thomas'work also stresses the continued 
role of philanthropic organisations in the welfare of service families - 
again a factor that remained important throughout the period of this 
study. 18 Despite the existence at the time of a number of studies 
concerned with the development of the welfare state, Thomas calls for 
more research into the development of state assistance for families in 
Britain. 19 To some extent this call may have been fulfilled by more recent 
publications, however, it remains valid in terms of the development of 
allowances for service families. 20 Whilst isolated examples do exist of 
works which include some discussion of the development of these 
allowances in other European countries, as in Ute Daniel's The War 
From Within. German Workinq Class Women in the First World War, 
these remain few and far between. 
As already suggested, in Britain during the Second World War, the state 
and its military leaders only considered the welfare of service families as 
a whole where this impinged on the performance of servicemen 
themselves in matters of recruitment and where family considerations 
might distract a serviceman from the performance of duty. From 1938 
onwards references exist to families in these terms. In April 1939, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer weighed whether or not the age of eligibility 
for marriage allowance would have'adverse effectson recruitment 
campaigns and whether men ordered on foreign service will desert rather 
than leave their wives destitute . 
21 This highlights a contrast between 
contemporary perceptions of the importance of service family welfare in 
times of war and the neglect of this issue in general military, political and 
social histories. In official and general histories of the Second World War 
service families, if represented at all, only make fleeting appearances. 22 
By and large, the only official histories making mention of service families 
are those dealing with social policy and social services. Titmuss, for 
example, in Problems of Social Polic , part of the United Kingdom Civil 
Service Series, mentions allowances for children of servicemen in 
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comparison with those paid to foster families of evacuees. However, 
contemporary attitudes also lead to a possible reason for the lack of 
interest in the particular topic of this study - prisoner of war families - as a 
topic of interest for military historians. If interest in service families as a 
whole is located in their effect on recruitment and service, then once 
servicemen are taken out of active service by becoming captives, their 
families can have no further influence and hence no interest for military 
authorities. A review of the general literature, then, makes it clear that 
research in relation to British service families and particularly the families 
of those taken captive, has remained generally lacking. 
Indeed, until the past few decades, publications on prisoners of war 
themselves were largely been confined to biographical studies and 
autobiographical memoirs. The examples of Paul Brickhill's The Great 
Escape, later made into the best known prisoner of war film of all time, 
and Eric William's The Wooden Horse, serve to illustrate this point. 24 
Although a great many of the prisoners appearing in these memoirs 
undoubtedly had families, concerns for them are rarely expressed in 
these works. Instead the narratives concentrate on the immediate 
experiences of captor and prisoner, day to day survival and, especially, 
escape. Despite the fact that, since the 1970s an increasing number of 
more scholarly works have begun to appear dealing with various aspects 
of the prisoner of war experience, within the field of military history, 
prisoners of war remain anathema being 'no longer effective in the 
25 business of war and embarrassments to their captors'. As history is 
generally written by the victors, so military history concentrates on 
victory. 
Prisoners of war, by and large, only receive mention in connection with 
situations where they have strategic importance in economic terms to 
their captors or where reciprocity of treatment is involved. As Gerald 
Davis, in an article in the Journal of Contemporary History suggests, 
'hostages are only valuable when the other side is sensitive to the fate of 
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its personnel in enemy hand Sj. 26 Although this situation has been 
somewhat resolved by an increasing body of work on the economic 
27 
relevance of prisoners of war, it remains true for their families. 
As prisoners of war themselves often played an important part in the war 
economy of their captor nation much of their history may be accessed 
through foreign archives. However, studies based on foreign archives, 
whilst giving information regarding the captives themselves will not 
contain information regarding their families whose allowances affected 
the economy of their home nation. As a result, information regarding the 
families of prisoners of war may only be found in British archives. 
Even more general prisoner of war histories, however, contain few 
references to the families of those captured. Barker's Behind Barbed 
V\rire, published in 1974, provides an early example of an analytical 
appraisal of the broader experience. Barker treats the subject 
thematically, discussing chronologically experiences such as capture, 
transfer and settling into camp life. His approach, however, remains firmly 
centred on the men themselves and families are only mentioned in 
relation to the comfort provided to men by letters and parcels from 
home. 28 Similarly, Rolf s Prisoners of the Reich dealing with British 
prisoners and Foy's For You the War is Over, dealing specifically with the 
American experience, only mention families briefi Y. 29 Rolf, for example, in 
dealing with the British policy of holding the pay of prisoners of war in 
accounts against the time of their return home mentions that their wives 
and families could have made good use of this pay. 30 He does not 
enlarge this comment with any further details of how or why the families 
might need this extra income by giving any details of allowances 
available to the families at this time or the hardships they may have been 
suffering. MacKenzie, in his literature review on prisoner of war history 
notes that there is 'plenty of room for further researchwithin the field of 
prisoner of war history suggesting the differences in treatment of different 
ranks of prisoner and prisoner of war diplomacy as possible avenues for 
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this further research . 
31 The possibility of research into the treatment of 
their families is, once again, omitted. 
Although works such as MacKenzie's 'Treatment of Prisoners of War in 
World War I I' and Moore and Fedorowich's Prisoners of War and their 
Captors in World War 11 move away from the traditional approach of 
focusing solely on the prisoner's experience to a concern with captor 
policy and behaviour in a variety of situations, families remain 
neglected. 32 This is not to suggest that any of the above mentioned 
studies are lessened by this omission, their focus lies elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, it remains a fact that, in the whole and increasing range of 
prisoner of war history, and indeed military history of the Second World 
War in general, the issue of service dependants, regarded by the British 
government of the time as an important concern, appears to have been 
completely overlooked. Although a possible solution for this omission 
may be thought to exist in the possibility that the topic had, in fact, been 
dealt with in other fields of historical research, a survey of the existing 
historiography in social, political and women's history quickly discounts 
this possibility. 
In the realms of social and political history a vast number of works have 
examined the overall process of social change in the twentieth century 
33 
and the possible role of total war in this process. Yet social histories of 
the welfare state such as Thane's Foundations of the Welfare State and 
Hall, Land, Parker and Webb's Chanqe, Choice and Conflict in Social 
Polic , although dealing with at least one issue, that of the introduction of 
national Family Allowance, which specifically affected service families, 
make no mention of these families. 34 Similarly, political histories, such as 
Jeffrey's War and Reform: British Politics During the Second World War 
and Wooton's The Politics of Influence, refer only in passing to the 
importance attached by servicemen to state provision of care for their 
35 families whilst they were absent. Equally surprising is the absence of 
evidence of demands for greater provision for families in the post-war 
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army. The effect that family welfare was deemed to have on the morale 
of troops, combined with the fact that conscription would remain in force 
until well after 1945, should have made this a matter of concern for large 
numbers of the general public, even allowing for decreased levels of 
service personnel following the cessation of hostilities. Instead, questions 
regarding the treatment of service families in future wars, in the 
peacetime services and in relation to the increasing provisions of the 
welfare state seem to have been largely overlooked. As we shall see in 
Chapter 7, changes made to the regulations governing the administration 
of allowances following the experience of World War 11 were minimal, 
despite that fact that many families, especially those of servicemen taken 
prisoner in the Far East, had experienced severe hardships. 
In addition, a number of studies deal specifically with the experience of 
military service during the Second World War and problems associated 
with the reassimilation of servicemen into civilian and family life. 36 Reese, 
in Homecominq Heroes, provides a historical overview of the assistance 
provided to demobilised servicemen before concentrating more 
specifically on that provided following the two World Wars. Although 
mention is made of allowances provided for families and the work of 
various charitable organisations such as the Soldiers, Sailors and Air 
Force Association (SSAFA) during the First World War, the role of such 
organisations in World War 11 receives no mention. 37 Prisoners of war 
are, however, mentioned as a specific group in that they, together with 
those who served in the Far East, are seen as one of the few groups who 
might have 'lost touch completely with society at home' during World War 
11.38 However, the possible effects on families of this complete separation 
and lack of contact are not elaborated on. Turner and Rennell, in When 
Daddy Came Home, provide a much fuller account of the effects on both 
marriages and children of enforced separation. The study relies largely 
on interviews with prisoners of war themselves, their wives and children 
interspersed with statistical information on divorce and 'sexual 
aberrations'- largely infidel ity. 39 Whilst these testimonies do serve to 
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highlight the difficulties faced by returning servicemen and their families, 
there is no attempt to analyse the sources or to place them in the context 
of post-war government policy. 
The overall focus of studies such as When Daddy came Home, 
Homecominq Heroes and Wootton's The Politics of Influence, dealing 
with ex-service organisations, is the changes engendered as a result of 
the direct experience of the servicemen themselves without reference to 
the experiences of the wider faMily. 40 In fact, many of these studies 
concentrate on problems of adjustment associated with disability or 
prolonged ill-health as a result of service or with difficulties associated 
with finding civilian employment. Politically, the serviceman returning 
from World War 11 'believed that he had something to contribute to the 
peace he had helped to establish' and pressure groups created by ex- 
servicemen concentrated on rights for the ex-service community, often 
focusing on pension rights . 
41 Demobilisation and 'the return', however, 
are not a focus of this particular study. As such they are only referred to 
where they impinge on the way in which government departments dealt 
with prisoners of war and their families in the closing stages of the 
conflict. Despite the fact that, during the Second World War service 
allowances were paid directly to the wives of 'other ranks', there is an 
implicit assumption by returning servicemen that this practice would not 
be continued after the end of the war and that control of family finances 
would revert without question to the returned serviceman as head of the 
household. The experience of services wives and any influence this may 
have brought to bear on the administration of national Family Allowance, 
which was also given directly to women, remains unconsidered in 
histories of the development of the Welfare State. 42 
Within the field of social history there is, however, one major exception to 
these general comments, although not in the field of British social history. 
In, We Will Wait. Wives of French Prisoners of War, 1940-1945, Fishman 
uses interviews with prisoner of war wives backed by archival material to 
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present a comprehensive picture of both the personal, day to day life of 
these families and their treatment at the hands of the State. 43 Although 
dealing with similar topics, such as dissemination of information, financial 
matters and self-help groups, to those addressed in this study, Fishman's 
work is methodologically different. Whereas We Will Wait concentrates 
on oral testimony supported by government sources to give a wider 
context, this study focuses on government sources with individual case 
studies used to illustrate specific points. Oral history methods have not 
been utilised as the research focuses on government and Armed Forces 
perceptions of prisoner of war dependants. Where appropriate, personal 
testimony, often taken from the oral history archive of the Imperial War 
Museum, has been utilised to illustrate specific points although these 
sources must be treated with some reservations. In a number of the tape 
recordings of the testimony of prisoner of war wives, assertions are made 
regarding the behaviour and attitudes of government, which cannot be 
substantiated by other means. In the light of this, these sources are 
largely utilised to illustrate the women's perceptions of governmental 
attitude rather than as definitive evidence. 
In addition, circumstances for French prisoner of war families differed in 
a number of important respects from those of British families. For 
example, one of the issues dealt with in this study is the financially 
important one of delays in notification of status for men posted 'missing'. 
Although in some cases French families had to wait up to six months for 
such notification, their experience is in no way comparable with the 
experience of British families waiting for up to four years for notification 
from the Far East. In other respects, however, such as the compilation of 
next-of-kin parcels, We Will Wait provides valuable comparative material. 
In her conclusion, Fishman addresses the effects the return of these 
prisoners brought about in their families and, in particular, in the lifestyle 
of their wives, in a manner neglected by the aforementioned studies of 
returning British servicemen. 44 
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In the field of women's history too, although studies in the role and 
experience of women during the Second World War have proliferated in 
recent years, the history of service families remains neglected. 45These 
recent studies have ranged from works analysing the changing role of 
women during and between the two World Wars, such as Braybon and 
Summerfield's Out of the Cage, at one end of the scale through to 
narrative accounts of women's experiences told in their own words, such 
as Wartime Women, a Mass Observation anthology. 46 More recently 
Penny Summerfield's Reconstructinq Women's Wartime Lives has further 
sought to investigate and analyse the underlying factors which inform oral 
history of this period in particular. 47 In addition, an increasing number of 
works deal with specific wartime experiences of particular groupings of 
women often in relation to employment. Jolly's Dear Laughing Motorbyke 
recounts the experiences of a group of women welders in Sheffield whilst 
Tyler's Thev Fou_qht in the Fields investigates the experience of those 
who worked in the Women's Land Army. 48 These works often combine 
personal testimony from the women involved with an analysis of their 
situation in respect of various considerations such as general attitudes 
towards working women in the 1930s and 1940s. Whilst the estimated 
figure of 95,000 prisoner of war wives represents only a small percentage 
of the total female population of the British Isles in the period 1939-1945, 
it is, nevertheless, a figure comparable with other groups of whom 
separate studies have been made. Women involved in the manufacture 
of electric cables and apparatus, for example, who numbered in the 
region of 180,000, form part of a study by Wightman, More than 
Munitions. Women, Work and the Engineerinq Industries, 1900-1950 
whilst Jolly's study involved a small group out of the total 61,700 women 
involved in the iron and steel industries . 
49 Although mention is made in a 
number of these works of the husbands of individual women being held 
captive, this aspect of their wartime experience is not developed further. 
Agnes Helme and Joan Baines, in Dear Laughing Motorbyke, were both 
married to servicemen. Although one of their husbands was later taken 
prisoner, there is only fleeting mention of this fact. As earlier, this is not to 
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suggest that these works are necessarily lacking in that they fail to 
address this issue, merely to highlight the fact that the issue remains 
neglected and, perhaps, in the field of women's history, this may seem 
strangest of all as a significant section of the wartime female population 
to have completely escaped notice within the historiography. 
It is tempting to argue that service wives in general and prisoner of war 
wives in particular, hold few attractions as a subject for study for feminist 
historians. The very fact of their financial dependency on male 
dominated, and often patriarchal, institutions puts them at odds with a 
rationale wishing to show British women during the Second World War as 
gaining greater control of their own lives, branching out into new spheres 
of employment and enjoying greater self-fulfilment. Most anthologies of 
women's writing for this periods contain sections on employment and 
changing attitudes towards the role and status of women within society 
as a whole. The Mass Observation anthology, Wartime Women, for 
example, contains a section entitled 'Towards a new world for women? ' 
whilst Hartley's Hearts Undefeated has sections on 'The Women's 
Services' and 'Other War Work' . 
50 Although the latter also contains 
sections on 'Watching, Waiting and Praying' and 'Living through the War' 
these make only passing reference to the experience of families of 
prisoners of war. 51 If it is, indeed, the case that these women are 
regarded as being of little interest because their lives are controlled by 
male-regulated institutions, then they have been under-estimated. As we 
shall see in the course of this study, their efforts to secure information on 
missing menfolk together with the formation of self-help groups such as 
local Prisoner of War Committees and their efforts to secure improved 
treatment for those taken captive all suggest a highly motivated and 
articulate group. Rather than accepting a passive role, in many cases 
these women campaigned tirelessly, and at all levels, to achieve their 
aims. 
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Not all feminist studies, however, wish to stress the empowerment of 
women in the Second World War. We have already seen how, in the 
conclusion to her study of service allowances and pensions during the 
First World War, Thomas stressed the continuing economic dependence 
of women. Similarly Jolly suggests that the women welders in her study 
'shared a destiny'where they were expected to'support their heroesand 
'obey their fathers' and Braybon and Summerfield in their conclusion to 
Out of the Cage assert that 'After 1945 what was important in life was still 
emphatically male ... s. 
52 In the light of this, then it would seem that 
prisoner of war and service wives in general should form part of a general 
debate associated with continued paternalistic practices and economic 
dependence. Most importantly for this study, however, remains the fact 
that, rather than remaining anonymous, prisoner of war and service wives 
formed a distinct group, with a recognisable and discrete identity, which 
has nevertheless been overlooked in the historiography of women's 
wartime history. 
Not until the 1970s did the experiences of prisoner of war wives and their 
particular problems begin to be recognised as worthy of study in their 
own right, and then by a discipline other than history. In the USA during 
the1970s, psychologists, working as a result of the experience of the 
Vietnam War, began to investigate the effects of long-term separation on 
military marriages and the coping strategies employed by the wives of 
those missing in action or taken captive. The work of investigators such 
as McCubbin and Dahl, often in conjunction with the Centre for Prisoner 
of War Studies in San Diego, has proved useful in providing a potential 
framework within which to locate the activities of prisoner of war wives' 
'self-help' groups of the type investigated in Chapter 6 of this study. 53 
It is necessary at this stage to highlight the fact that the exact 
relationships between the various departments and agencies concerned 
with the welfare of and information relating to British prisoners of war 
during the Second World War are immensely complex. Although various 
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writers have attempted to reconcile the relationships of those directly 
involved in terms of their own fields of research, no attempt appears to 
have been made to produce an overall chart showing the working 
relationships of these various agencies. As, during the course of this 
study, some understanding of these overall relationships did become 
necessary, a table has been included in Chapter 5 which begins to 
address this omission in terms of the way in which information was 
disseminated to families. A number of sources were utilised in the 
compilation of this table including the Satow and S6e report on the work 
of the Prisoners of War Department, SHAEF tables of the organisation of 
the Prisoner of War Executive and information from the Imperial Prisoner 
of War Committee. 54 The table is, however, designed specifically to fulfil 
the needs of this study and can not be regarded in any way as a 
definitive resource showing the exact interrelationships between the 
different government agencies concerned with prisoner of war matters. 
The report on the work of the Prisoner of War Department of the Foreign 
office referred to in the compilation of the above table is one of two 
organisational histories of the Second World War. A second report, 
dealing with the work of the British Red Cross and St. John War 
Organisation between 1939 - 1945 was compiled by Cambray and 
55 Briggs in 1949. Both of these volumes investigate the specific workings 
of the particular agencies of their titles during the period of World War 11 
and, as they are compiled almost exclusively from primary source 
material, occupy a middle ground somewhere between the secondary 
and primary sources utilised in this study. The volume relating the work of 
the Red Cross Society and Order of St. John was compiled largely from 
weekly summaries of work, carried out by Cambray and Briggs, at the 
request of the Society whilst the Satow and S6e report was compiled at 
the instigation of the Foreign Office into one of its own departments. 
Consequently, neither can be regarded as unbiased. Indeed, in the case 
of the Prisoners of War Department, Sir Harold Satow, was at various 
times head of the organisation being reported on. Although this report 
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acknowledges in its introduction that there was no excuse for the need 
for the establishment of a POW Department not having been seen in 
1939, it goes on to state that, once the Department did become 
operational, relations between the Department, an agency of the Foreign 
Office, and the War Office werefriendly, intimate and efficient'. 56 This 
view is not, however, substantiated in more recent studies. Rolf in 'Blind 
Bureaucracy'for example, contends that the POW Department at the 
Foreign Office and the War Office's Directorate of Prisoners of War 
(DPW), 'failed at times to appreciate their respective spheres of 
influence'. 57 
The main body of the Satow and S6e report is divided into four sections. 
The first deals with prisoners of war in the European theatre and 
investigates adherence to various articles of the Geneva Convention in 
relation to both German and Italian captors. The second section details 
the work of the Department in relation to the treatment of captives in the 
Far East, where it considers that there was 'no attempt to conform to 
civilised standards'. 58 Sections three and four deal with treatment of the 
sick and wounded and methods for the general protection of both 
prisoners of war and civilians. From the above, it can be seen that the 
work largely confines itself to the treatment of the captives themselves 
and so is of limited use for this study. However, it does provide useful 
background information against which to locate the problems families 
faced in communicating with prisoners of war. 
The Cambray and Briggs report also deals firstly with prisoners of war 
held in Europe and then those taken captive by the Japanese in the Far 
East, in each case dealing firstly with issues associated with the sending 
and delivery of mail and parcels. This report, however, then contains 
more comprehensive sections covering information available to next of 
kin, including details of information leaflets and periodicals such as 
'Prisoner of War', provided to the families of those taken captive in 
Europe and 'Far East' distributed to the families of those taken captive by 
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the Japanese. In addition, some information is contained in the report of 
the work of the POW Department Correspondence and Enquiry Section 
and the Far East Bureau of Enquiry. Although by no means detailed, this 
information provides a useful starting point for further avenues of enquiry 
into the overall topic of information available to the families of prisoners of 
war. In addition, it gives some insights into the attitudes of government 
agencies towards these relatives in a sphere not solely connected with 
allowances and finance. 
Finally, one further 'quasi-official' history also needs consideration. The 
historical monograph 'Prisoners of War outlining the work of the Prisoner 
of War Directorate (DPW), prepared by Colonel HJ Phillimore, more 
commonly known as the Phillimore Report, although present in a bound 
edition within the War Office files at the Public Record Office, was never 
submitted for publication . 
59 This report, despite being prepared using 
information contained in official files, was written byan officer with no 
War Office experience outside the DPW and without experience in DPW 
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of the formative period at the beginning of the war'. In the light of this, 
the War Office took the decision that it should not be included in the 
official series of war histories . 
61 Although the report covers a similar 
range of topics to those covered by Cambray and Briggs and Satow and 
S6e, its use remains problematic. Rolf, whilst recognising its 
shortcomings, nevertheless regards it as a useful source whilst Moore 
and Fedorowich consider it too unreliable to provide any useful insights. 62 
Although the report has been utilised as a source for this study, where 
possible its information has not been accepted as reliable without further 
corroboration. 
From this review of the secondary sources available for this study, it 
becomes clear that information regarding the treatment of service 
dependants in general, and prisoner of war dependants in particular as a 
distinct sub-group, is distinctly lacking within the existing historiography. 
Consequently, in order to undertake this study, most information has had 
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to be gleaned directly from primary sources and to facilitate this, a 
number of archival collections have been utilised. 
From the Public Records Office (PRO) in Kew, evidence has come from 
a number of record groups. Besides those of the three services involved 
(War Office, Admiralty and Royal Air Force), information has also been 
taken from Foreign Office files, Unemployment Assistance Board files, 
Treasury files, Colonial Office files and those included in Prime Minster's 
Office files PREM 3 and 4. Where possible material taken from these 
official sources has been contextualised by more personal recollections, 
such as the private papers of Leslie Hoare-Belisha, held in the Churchill 
Archive Centre in Cambridge, which have been utilised to supplement the 
information contained in official files held at the PRO covering his time at 
the Treasury and as Secretary of State for War. 
Evidence on specific organisations has proved to be scattered through a 
wide range of record groups. Information relating to the Prisoner of War 
Relatives Association, for instance, was eventually found not only in War 
Office files but also in those of the Foreign and Colonial Offices. One 
notable exception to this, however, proved to be the record group relating 
to the work of the Unemployment Assistance Board (UAB). Here, in a run 
of thirty-five consecutive files, all but seven contained material of varying 
degrees of usefulness. Beginning with proof copies of a leaflet 
'Allowances for Families and Dependants of Men Serving in HM Forces 
During the Present War', presented to Parliament in November 1939, the 
files cover a period up to December 1946 following the administration of 
both family and dependants allowances and ending with a consideration 
of the effect of the National Insurance Act on service dependants' 
allowances. 63 These files, however, proved to be very much the 
exception rather than the rule. Other record groups and files, which 
initially appeared likely to contain useful information, proved on closer 
examination to be of limited use for the purposes of this study. Of the 
thirty-two files investigated in the Foreign Office group F0916 relating to 
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prisoners of war, only nine proved to contain information relevant to this 
study. 
In terms of establishing the parameters limiting the granting and 
administration of service allowances together with their development 
during both the inter-war period and throughout the course of the 
Second World War, information contained in Treasury and War Office 
files, together with those already mentioned from ASTI 1, proved to be 
the most important. As the army had by far the greatest number of 
personnel involved in the war, the War Office was able to exert some 
influence on both the Treasury and Foreign Office in a manner which the 
other services could not emulate. For example, in discussions on the 
issue of eligibility for Dependants' Allowances in 1940, although 
agreement was reached between the Treasury, Ministry of Pensions, 
Admiralty and Royal Air Force, it was still felt necessary to attempt to 
reach a unanimous decision rather that take the majority view which went 
against Army opinion. 64 As a further example of the pre-eminence of the 
War Office, the term 'soldier' is often used as a generic term for all 
servicemen as in UAB pamphlet DPA25, where it is noted that'the term 
"soldiers" should be regarded as including sailors and airmen'. 65 
Tracing the course of the discussions surrounding the eligibility of various 
dependants for allowances in 1940 also highlights a further problem 
encountered with the source material. In a number of cases the sources 
proved to be incomplete making it impossible to chart the full 
development of a particular issue. In these instances, where available, 
the final outcome has been reported or the discussion traced as far as 
possible. In addition a small number of files relating to appeals and 
disputes over the granting of allowances remain closed such as files 
contained within the record group PIN1 5 covering the years 1944 - 1948. 
Outside the PRO, archival sources such as those held by the Soldiers, 
Sailors and Air Force Families Association (SSAFA) and the British Red 
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Cross have proved useful in providing an alternative perspective to many 
aspects of both the historical development of service allowances and 
their administration during World War 11. As a charitable organisation 
involved with welfare matters affecting all three services, material from 
the SSAFA archives has proved invaluable in adding a more immediate, 
day to day perspective to the implementation of many of the decisions 
taken by government departments. That having been said, the material 
contained in these archives is not immediately accessible. Generally, it is 
recorded as minutes of meetings with no indexing as to the content. 
Material from the British Red Cross archive has also proved particularly 
important in extending the information available in PRO files in relation to 
the setting up of Information Centres and the issue of two periodicals 
'Prisoner of War' and 'Far East' to the next of kin of those taken prisoner. 
Attempts have also been made to locate archival sources relating to the 
work of the British Legion. Unfortunately the organisation has no central 
archive and information from local branches has generally been difficult 
to obtain. With many local committees, as we shall see later in relation to 
Prisoner of War Committees, documentation was often held by individual 
members and, consequently, has often since disappeared. For many of 
these committees, such as the Yorkshire Evening News Prisoner of War 
Club, although initial leads were identified, further investigations drew a 
blank. In these, and a number of other cases, further investigation 
proved too time consuming to merit the search for such material beyond 
a certain point and such attempts were abandoned. A relevant example 
here is that of the Barnsley and District Prisoner of War Fund. Founded in 
1918, primarily to 'provide for the needs of British Prisoners of War in the 
belligerent countries', the charity also had the express aim of providing 
grants or loans to the 'spouses and dependants [of prisoners of war] 
resident within the Metropolitan Borough of Barnsley who are in need of 
assistance'. 66 Although the Committee continues to meet on a regular 
basis to the present day, attempts to locate minutes of meetings or 
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correspondence from the period of the Second World War have proved 
unsuccessful. Despite the assistance of the Borough Secretary, it also 
proved impossible to establish contact with two members of the existing 
committee who were themselves prisoners of war during the Second 
World War. 
Similarly, although circumstantial evidence exists for a large number of 
local Prisoner of War Committees and Relatives Associations, attempts 
to find archival material relating to these committees have been largely 
fruitless. One example will serve to illustrate the general pattern of these 
enquiries. Reference exists within PRO files to a branch of the Prisoner 
of War Relatives Association operating in Leyton in 1943. Despite 
assistance from the archivist at Waltham Forest Archives involving a 
search of their catalogue, of the index of local newspapers of the time 
and of the index of Leyton Borough Council minutes of the period, only 
one reference was found to this Committee. The photographic collection 
of the archive holds an image of a Christmas Party held for children of 
prisoners of war in 1944. Attempts to trace records of Prisoner of War 
Relatives Association branches in Hendon, Liverpool, Manchester, 
Kingston upon Thames and Hertford also proved fruitless. However, 
where possible, information relating to the establishment of such 
committees has been taken from sources such as the Norfolk Record 
Office, Sheffield and Oxfordshire local archives and from local newspaper 
archives. In a number of cases, it has been possible to confirm the dates 
when such Committees were set up and some records of their 
fundraising activities in this way. 
One notable exception does exist to this generally bleak picture. The 
Yorkshire Archive Service's Kirklees Archive in Huddersfield holds a 
number of files relating to the Huddersfield Prisoner of War Committee. 
This Committee, founded in 1940 by the mother of one of the first 
Huddersfield men to be taken prisoner, met until November 1946 at 
which time funds were wound up by donating E8 to the relatives of all 
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local men who had died as a result of their captivity. The archive contains 
minute books, letters from next of kin and a copy of the booklet provided 
for the Daily Telegraph Prisoner of War Exhibition in May 1944. The 
same archive also holds copies of the local paper, the Huddersfield 
Weekly Examine , which carried a regular feature 'News of Some Local 
Soldiers' giving biographical details of local men reported missing, taken 
captive or killed in action together with reports of Committee fundraising 
activities. From these two sources it has been possible to re-create a 
relatively comprehensive picture of the work of this particular Committee. 
One possible reason for the existence of this archive lies in the fact that 
the first batch of Huddersfield prisoners of war included 2nd Lieutenant R 
B Smales of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry. Lieutenant Smales 
was the son of the Mayor of Huddersfield at the time and it was his 
mother who initiated the founding of the local POW Committee. Although 
not provable, it seems possible that, as a result, this particular Committee 
attained a higher profile than many in terms of local news coverage and 
that their records may have achieved a more 'official' status leading to 
their preservation within the archive. Whatever the reasons for their 
survival, the material proved a valuable and all-too-rare record of the 
workings of these local Committees, which provided much needed 
support, both emotional and financial, to the families of prisoners of war. 
In addition to records of Prisoner of War Associations and Committees, 
the archive of the British War Widows, now held at the University of 
Stafford, was also consulted for additional information. The archive 
consists of letters, newspaper cuttings and newsletters collected by one 
woman, Iris Strange, herself the widow of a prisoner of war captured by 
the Japanese, during her long campaign for pensions for war widows. 67 
As such, its focus is not directly related to this study, but it does provide a 
number of valuable insights into, and personal recollections of, the plight 
of prisoner of war families, particularly of those taken captive in the Far 
East. Iris Stange's husband was taken captive following the fall of 
Singapore in 1942 and, included in the collection, are her letters to her 
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husband, letters from wives of other prisoners and newsletters from the 
Far East Prisoner of War Association (FEPOW). 
As with local prisoner of war committees, evidence for help and support 
for families within the services themselves has proved difficult to locate. A 
number of official sources suggest that support groups were formed, 
possibly in locations such as Gosport which had strong links with one 
particular service, but the evidence for them remains circumstantial. An 
article, written in 1976, describing the support provided for naval wives in 
the USA provides a number of possible reasons for the scarcity of this 
evidence. 68 In this article KP O'Bierne, herself the wife of a USA Naval 
Commander, describes the support provided to naval wives in the 1960s 
and 70s. Generally this was of a social nature through communal 
barbecues and unofficial 'phone treeswhich remain informal and 
unrecorded. Indeed, Mrs O'Bierne suggests that it was often unofficial 
policy for such events not to be publicised so that wives did not become 
the target for exploitation by insurance companies and unscrupulous 
salesmen. 
The nature and availability of the sources themselves has, to a large 
extent, dictated the structure of this study. The development of service 
allowances in general is not the focus of this study, however, the lack of 
secondary sources covering this development in the inter-war period and 
during the Second World War made it impossible to place the particular 
case of prisoner of war allowances in perspective. Consequently the first 
two chapters have had to be devoted to establishing a general framework 
within which to locate government treatment of prisoner of war families as 
distinct from service families in general. Chapter 1 outlines the historical 
development of service allowances and their administration in the period 
to 1918, their further development during the inter-war period and the 
changes brought about by the advent of the Second World War. Chapter 
2 then concentrates on the changes in and administration of allowances 
during the course of the war itself, most notably the introduction of new 
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levels of allowances in 1942 and 1944. Only after this wider perspective 
had been established was it possible to focus on the particular problems 
encountered by the families of those taken captive. Chapters 3 and 4 
deal specifically with the problems associated with the administration of 
allowances for the families of servicemen taken captive by both the 
Germans and Italians in Europe, and by the Japanese in the Far East. 
Moving away from financial considerations, Chapter 5 then turns to the 
equally important provision of information, news and support to the 
families of prisoners of war through official channels, whilst Chapter 6 
deals with the information and support provided by charitable and 'self- 
help' agencies such as SSAFA and local Committees. The final chapter 
reviews changes to service allowances in the immediate post-war period 
and considers whether the experience of administering these allowances 
during the Second World War resulted in any significant changes in the 
existing administrative systems. In addition, this chapter considers 
changes in service allowances resulting from the introduction of national 
Family Allowances and the beginnings of the Welfare State. 
Bob Moore, in Prisoners of War and their Captors, has suggested that 
the existence of a substantial body of work already dealing with prisoners 
of war'should not be allowed to obscure the fact that there is still much 
about prisoners of war and their captors of which we have remained 
ignorant' 
. 
69 The research undertaken in the course of this study has 
proven, without doubt, that one of these aspects is government treatment 
of the families of those taken captive. To date we have remained ignorant 
of the modes of administration of allowances and dissemination of 
information to prisoner of war families and of the underlying government 
attitudes which informed this administration. In addition, we have also 
remained largely ignorant of the concerns and opinions of these families, 
focusing almost exclusively on the men themselves. For further prisoner 
of war studies, such as those relating their re-assimilation into family life, 
to be able to provide a balanced overview, the ways in which their 
families coped in their absence must be afforded equal weight to the 
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experience of the men themselves. To do this, the hitherto neglect topic 
of these families and their experiences during the Second World War 
must be taken into consideration. This study goes some way towards 
beginning to address this omission, nevertheless, there remains much 
work to be carried out on the topics of service families as a whole and 
prisoner of war families in particular. 
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CHAPTER1 
Service allowances before the start of the Second World War. 
As suggested in the introduction, before any study of Government 
treatment of British prisoner of war families during the Second World War 
can begin, it is first necessary to locate the topic within the broader 
framework of British Government treatment of service families as a 
whole. To facilitate this, Chapters 1 and 2 consider the development of 
service allowances as a whole across all three services together with the 
political and economic factors which affected this development. This first 
chapter specifically traces the growth of service allowances from their 
inception, though the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and 
includes a discussion of the changes effected by the introduction of 
conscription in 1939. 
From the beginning of the modern army in the seventeenth century, 
marriage for soldiers was discouraged and responsibility for the welfare 
and well being of servicemen's families was slow to be acknowledged 
even up until the end of nineteenth century. Wootton, in The Politics of 
Influence, argues that this responsibility was 'not so much evaded as 
unrecognised' and certainly, in the Navy at least, this appears to have 
been true. ' Until the late 1880s, the Navy officially recognised 'no such 
useless appendage or encumbrance' as a sailor's wife. Or at least not 
below the rank of Admiral, at which stage wives were acknowledged as 
2 being a useful accessory for social purposes. A similar attitude existed 
within the Army where 'subalterns must not marry, captains may marry, 
3 
majors should marry, colonels must marry'. In the Army, increased rank 
led to increased responsibility for men and a perceived need of a wife to 
augment the officer's work and 'contribute her special brand of feminine 
care'. 4 The Navy attitude may, however, have been attributable to a wish 
on the Admiralty's part to avoid any responsibility for the welfare of 
sailors' families. A responsibility which would have had to have been 
acknowledged if formal recognition had been granted; Cordingly, 
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throughout his study of women at sea in the age of sail, records that 
ships' captains routinely recognised the status of sailors'wives. 5 For 
example, many captains permitted wives to be ferried out to ships in the 
Pool of London to spend time with their husbands who were refused 
shoreleave. 6 Responsibility for the welfare of families was largely 
regarded by the services as being the province of the serviceman 
himself. The decision to allot money from pay to families, or not, was left 
to their discretion and there can be no doubt that a number of men 
deliberately joined the colours to escape from both financial and moral 
family responsibilities. The words of an eighteenth century army song tell 
of men leading happier lives 'by getting rid of brats and wives' as until 
1873, soldiers, unlike civilians, could not be charged under the Vagrancy 
Laws with failure to maintain their wives and families. 7 
Even in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the only existing 
provision for family welfare within the Armed Services was that for Army 
wives 'on the strength' -that is, married with the express permission of 
the soldier's commanding officer - legitimate children and legitimate step- 
8 children. However, in the late 1880s and early 1890s, only six men per 
company of hundred were granted permission to marry, and then rarely 
below the rank of Senior Non-commissioned Officer (NCO). 9 Figures for 
1861 show that 48.31 % of other ranks under the age of 40 were married 
compared to 82.59% in the general population. 10 The granting of 
permission to marry was not only limited by the discretion of commanding 
officers but also by individual regimental practice and the availability of 
accommodation. In some regiments more soldiers were granted 
permission to marry than in others. In the Guards, for example, who 
rarely moved establishments and who were only sent abroad in 
emergencies, more men were granted permission to marry than was the 
norm in other regiments who moved more frequently. " Sidney Herbert, 
Secretary of State for War in 1854 regarded wives as a 'serious evil for a 
marching army. s12 In the late nineteenth century, normal practice was still 
for a number of families, chosen by ballot, to travel with the regiment 
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whenever it was posted away from home, although the Crimea was the 
last war in which families actually followed their menfolk into a baffle 
zone. 13 The number of families allowed to travel differed with the actual 
destination. For regiments leaving for service in India, twelve families 
were allowed to travel per hundred men, for all other destinations the 
number of families was limited to six per hundred men. 14 Even 
recognised 'on the strength' families left behind were not encouraged to 
remain in the regimental town whilst their husbands were absent. Instead 
they were provided with a meagre allowance of 1 guinea, plus 5 shillings 
for every child, to allow them to return to their home parish. 15 Once there, 
however, there was no guarantee that their relatives would be able to 
provide for them. With increased industrialisation came a breaking down 
of the traditional family autonomy in providing care for the very young, 
the old and the destitute and the increasing mobility of labour meant that 
those remaining at home might, themselves, be in need of care. Many 
army wives then had to appeal to the Poor Law Commissioners for 
outdoor relief to allow them to survive until the regiment returned home. 16 
Unacknowledged 'off the strength'wives were not even granted this 
minimal allowance and so were forced to remain, without any means of 
support, in the regimental towns. 
By the latter part of the nineteenth century then, the only type of 
allowance granted to the families of servicemen when separated from 
their menfolk was a 'one ofr payment to allow them to return to their 
earlier homes. No provision was made, by means of an ongoing 
allowance, for them to maintain the home they had established with their 
husbands. Although the question of separation allowances had been 
raised within the War Office and a Board of General Officers set up in 
1810 to investigate the possibilities, no proposals for such allowances 
were devised for over fifty years. 17 Neither the government nor the 
services recognised any responsibility to provide continuing support for 
the families of those fighting to defend the country. Women were only 
recognised by the army through the men they were married to. As a 
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result, once the men were posted overseas, the women effectively 
disappeared. Where servicemen themselves had not made financial 
provision for their families or where this provision fell short of need or 
broke down completely, families faced destitution. Up until the mid- 
1800s, a soldiers pay was argued by the army to be intended solely for 
his own upkeep so that he could maintain himself as an efficient fighting 
member of the service. 18 Pay was not to be spent as the soldier wished, 
but to meet the demands of service. Compulsory stoppages from service 
pay to maintain wives and children were not introduced into the Army Act 
until 1878, and then only to give service wives parity with the non- 
maintenance claim available to civilians whose husbands did not provide 
for them. 19 
Given this minimal level of welfare provision, and the vagaries of Poor 
Law provision, it is clear that many families were forced to rely on 
philanthropic organisations to avoid hardship, if not actual starvation. 
Although within the army, some provision was made at regimental level, 
this was largely dependent on the sympathies and traditions of individual 
regiments. Guards' regiments, who had at their disposal an 'impressive 
array of funds'were, perhaps, the most solicitous of family welfare, 
setting up a Work Society to provide employment for'on the strength' 
wives left behind. 20 1n many other cases responsibility for family welfare 
was often left to the commanding officer of a regiment, and his wife. Even 
up to the end of the Second World War, officers were expected to adopt 
a paternalistic attitude to the men in their care and, by extension, to their 
families. However, the perceived need for the founding of the Soldiers' 
and Sailors' Family Association in 1885 (SSFA, after 1919, the Soldiers' 
Sailors and Air Force Families Association, SSAFA) suggests that in 
many cases this informal provision proved inadequate to meet the needs 
of the families concerned . 
21 Given the fact that the very existence of 
sailors'wives remained unrecognised, it is perhaps not surprising that no 
similar tradition of care existed in the Navy. However, some 
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organisations, such as the Royal British Female Orphan Asylum in 
Devonport offered care to the orphans of both soldiers and sailors. 
In fact, although service wives remained largely unrecognised, some 
provision for widows had existed since 1646. Barnfield records that in this 
year a committee of the House of Commons ordered that an allowance of 
E40 per week, originally paid to the Earl of Mulgrove was, following his 
death, to be made available for the use of soldiers' widows. 22 No further 
details of the administration of this allowance or any claims on it are 
given. Although this action does suggest some government 
acknowledgement of responsibility for army widows that did not exist for 
wives, at the same time it is worth noting that the committee considered 
that a sum previously allocated to one man was now sufficient to fulfil the 
needs of all army widows. Whilst husbands remained alive, however, 
both the government and the services themselves remained reluctant to 
become involved in what they continued up until the end of the Second 
World War to regard as domestic matters. This applied especially in the 
case of officers, where such action might be seen as casting doubt on 
the integrity of officers by suggesting that they had not made adequate 
arrangements for the care of their families. In fact, by the beginning of 
the eighteenth century, officers were themselves raising money both 
officially and unofficially for widows' pensions. All officers were obliged to 
pay a tax, which was directed into a regimental widows'fund. 23 
Additionally, many regiments instituted a 'Widows' Man', whereby a 
fictitious officer drew statutory pay which was then paid into a widows' 
fund. 24 For naval widows, however, pensions of any kind were not 
established in Britain until the late nineteenth century. In comparison, 
Paul Zumthor notes that in the Netherlands, the other major European 
seafaring nation at the time, pensions had been paid to the widows and 
orphans of all sailors from the seventeenth century onwardS. 25 
In 1854, following the outbreak of the Crimean War, there was, for the 
first time in Britain, an appreciation of 'the non-military factors involved in 
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victory in war', including a recognition that the morale and efficiency of an 
26 
army could be affected by the emotional state of the soldiers. The 
necessity to recruit an expeditionary force of some 27,000 men led, 
through sheer weight of numbers, to an increased visibility of service 
families and a concern that the families of those fighting in a patriotic 
cause should be seen to be cared for whilst their menfolk were absent. In 
1834 a Royal Commission on the Poor Laws and the resulting Poor Law 
Amendment Act had, in theory, abolished outdoor relief. 27 This abolition 
was intended to encourage more able-bodied, unemployed men, to 
persevere in their endeavours to find work by making the workhouse the 
only alternative. However, the Commission failed to take into account 
the question of destitute women who made up the major proportion of 
adult recipients. Service wives, in particular posed a problem in the light 
of this reform. On the one hand, as able-bodied adults they fell into the 
category of those expected to find work or only obtain relief in the 
workhouse. On the other hand, as wives of soldiers defending the 
Empire, they were seen as deserving of more dignified and considerate 
treatment than other paupers. In fact, the abolition of outdoor relief was 
largely ineffective and, between 1859 and 1874 most paupers were still 
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provided with relief outside the workhouse. Eventually, in the early 
1870s, the regulations were tightened still further sharpening the 
definition between 'undeserving' poor who could only find relief in the 
workhouses and the 'deserving' poor who were increasingly cared for by 
philanthropic agencies . 
2913y 1856,2,794 families of men serving in the 
Crimea were still able to claim outdoor relief. 30 Trustram claims that 'as 
helpmates of the defenders of the nation, separated wives and children 
were seen to be particularly deserving of aid'. 31 
For the first time a cyclical pattern, acknowledged up to the end of World 
War Two, becomes clear whereby provision for families became a matter 
for public concern when it might affect both recruitment and the efficiency 
of servicemen. Indeed, provision for families became a particularly 
important issue when length of service was taken into consideration. 
37 
Although after 1847 enlistment for life was no longer the norm, length of 
enlistment still remained at 21 years for the infantry and 24 years for 
32 
othercorps. In this length of service a man could expect to be posted 
overseas a number of times and so care of his family whilst he was away 
became especially important. However, this heightened public concern 
did not lead directly to demands for service welfare provision to become 
a government concern. Instead, coupled with a general Victorian interest 
in philanthropic causes, it led rather to an increase in charitable provision 
largely through the contemporary perception that philanthropic support 
arose from 'pure' motives and, as such, was acceptable to families. By 
contrast, support originating from institutional or governmental sources, 
be it central government such as the War Office or local government 
such as the Poor Law Commissioners, was regarded as having a stigma 
attached to it and was, therefore, less acceptable. 33 Philanthropic 
agencies claimed to spare families the degradation of accepting such 
demeaning and impersonal assistance. One must suspect, however, that 
many destitute and starving 'off the strength' families would have been 
grateful to receive support from any quarter. 
Both the Central Association for the Aid of Wives and Families of 
Soldiers Ordered to the East (CA), which operated from 1854 to 1957, 
and the Royal Patriotic Fund set up in 1854 to provide for widows and 
orphans of the Crimean War, grew from this concern to help service 
families who, for whatever reason, were unable to support themselves. 34 
At the same time, however, these institutions were at some pains not to 
undermine the self-help ethic of the period. Skelley records that 
allowances made by the Royal Patriotic Fund were 'ungenerous' and that 
most of its income 'went unspent because its Commissioners were so 
parsimonious'. 35 In addition, support was generally not given to families 
as a right. Instead the CA aimed to provide only temporary relief whilst 
women were helped to obtain work. 36 In this way families were 
encouraged to maintain their self-reliance and independence. In contrast, 
state allowances were viewed by these institutions as lessening the will 
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of families to help themselves and so robbing them of both their will to 
work and their independence. It should be noted, however, that in all 
cases, children were regarded as truly deserving and received 
unconditional relief regardless of whether or not their mothers were 
deemed worthy of support. 37 
As a further development of this concern, in 1885 Colonel James Gildea 
established SSFA to care for the families of both soldiers and sailors. 38 
The impetus for this decision was largely a response to the embarkation 
of large numbers of troops for Egypt following the siege of Khartoum, 
again raising the profile of service families. Although the principle of self- 
help remained operative, SSFA was the first organisation to view the 
poverty of service wives as an outcome of military service rather than as 
fault on their part. Gildea's particular concern focused on 'off the strength' 
wives and other dependants, especially aged parents, who had been 
economically dependent on their sons . 
39 That having been said, the 
Association continued to promote independence. All relief was granted 
temporarily and local committees carried out checks on how aid was 
spent . 
40 Again, officers'wives were encouraged to take part in this 
provision to help maintain links between the regiment and the families 
concerned. 
In all cases, however, the amount of aid that could be provided by 
charitable institutions was dependent on the amount of money donated 
by the public. In times of war, service families achieved a high profile 
through the need to increase recruitment figures and to ensure that men 
serving overseas were not rendered ineffective by concern for their 
families. For Britain, the only major European power without a 
conscripted army, the question of how to encourage men to volunteer 
was a critical one. 41 Other European powers, such as the German states, 
which conscripted men into their armies, were under some obligation to 
provide for their families as joining the army was not a matter of free 
choice or even conviction on the part of the men conscripted. 42 However, 
39 
Daniels suggests that even here the objective of Family Aid was to 'foster 
the soldiers' readiness for action through financial support of war 
families'. 43 
In Prussia, then, in the early part of the 19th century, although financial 
provision for service families was on a voluntary basis, it was not the 
responsibility of the men themselves. Instead it was the responsibility of 
local communities to provide assistance for the dependants of their 
44 conscripted soldiers. However, this provision, and that of private aid 
organisations which supplemented it, proved inadequate and, in 1850, a 
Prussian law ruled that administrative districts and free cities should pay 
a minimum financial contribution to the families of all conscripts in their 
charge. 45 In addition to the wives and children of Territorial Army troops 
or conscript reserves, other dependants such as siblings and children 
over 14 could receive aid if they could prove that the draftee had 
previously supported thern. 46 In 1867 this law was extended to the North 
German Confederation and, later, to a number of southern German 
states. 47 Generally, districts and states were not reimbursed by the Reich 
for their expenditure on Family Aid, causing conflict with Article 58 of the 
imperial constitution which stipulated that the Reich should bear the costs 
of waging war. 48 To correct this anomaly a new draft of the Family Aid 
Law, the Law Concerning the Support of Families of Conscripted Men, 
was passed inl 888 which recognised, in theory, the Reich's obligation to 
reimburse this aid. 49 In addition to increasing the minimum allowance 
paid to families, the law also increased the categories of dependants 
eligible for allowances to include parentless grandchildren and 
illegitimate children, not fathered by the conscript brought into the 
marriage by his wife. Largely, this Law remained unchanged throughout 
the period of the First World War although the minimum level was further 
increased. 50 In addition aid was also granted to the families of more 
marginal service personnel, such as cooks employed by the army. 51 In 
this way, Family Aid in Germany became a much more universal 
condition than Family Allowances ever were in Britain. Bessel in, 
40 
Germany after the First World War, gives a figure of 4 million families 
receiving war-related family support by the end of 1915 whilst Daniels, in 
The War from Within, suggests that, in 1917, almost one third of all 
German households were receiving government assistance. 52 On the 
face of it then, Britain was almost half a century late to acknowledge 
state responsibility for service families compared with her major 
protagonist in both World Wars. However, in Germany, Reich 
acknowledgement of a responsibility to provide Family Aid did 
necessarily directly translate into adequate financial support for the 
families concerned. The main problem was that, although the Reich had 
made the decision to grant Family Aid, it lacked the necessary 
administrative structure to be able to deliver the aid itself. Instead 
responsibility for raising the money required to pay allowances and their 
administration was devolved to the cities and districts concerned, who 
took every opportunity to reduce the expenditure required to meet this 
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commitment. Consequently levels of allowances, above the bare 
minimum laid down centrally, varied from area to area and in many cases 
service families still suffered severe deprivation as local communities 
pared down payments wherever possible. As a result, many soldiers felt 
that they had been betrayed by the state. That the implicit contract 
whereby the government agreed to provide adequately for their families 
whilst they, themselves, served their country, had been broken. 54 
In Britain, where men were free to volunteer or not, a decision to join the 
armed services must have been influenced by considerations of how 
their families would fare in their absence. As no governmental support in 
the form of established allowances for families existed in the nineteenth 
century, the role of philanthropic agencies remained crucial, if not always 
completely altruistic. As Trustram suggests, 'to help a soldier's 
dependant relatives was to help the soldier himself and to help the 
55 
country'. In this way, philanthropic impulses may be seen as somewhat 
self-serving. Such impulses served to ensure that those remaining in 
Britain were protected by an army who could concentrate their minds on 
41 
the task in hand. As we shall see in later chapters, the exact correlation 
between perceived state care of service families and the willingness of 
men to enlist continued to inform discussions surrounding service 
families well into the twentieth century. There is no accurate way of 
estimating the actual number of families, both 'on' and 'off the strength', 
who were aided by philanthropic relief nor of estimating the actual 
amount of funds distributed. However, at a time when responsibility for 
service dependants was gradually being hived off by the Poor Law 
Commissioners but not yet being fully accepted by the War Office, there 
can be little doubt that its role must have been substantial. By 1899, 
SSFA alone had provided assistance for 10,000 families and, with the 
start of the Boer War in October of that year, further demands were made 
on their resources as many soldiers about to leave on active service 
4 56 rushed into marriage. During the three years and three months of the 
war SSFA gave financial assistance amounting to over F-1.25m to 
206,438 dependants and widows. 57 
In general, this pattern of voluntary care remained operative throughout 
the early years of the 20th century. Lord Justice Henn Collins' Committee 
of Enquiry into charitable funds identified three general classes of funds 
operating at this time . 
58 First, came funds for the wives and dependents 
of living soldiers and sailors, with SSFA being the most important 
organisation operating in this sphere. The other two groups dealt with 
funds for the dependants of those who had died in service and with funds 
for the dependants of the sick and wounded who had been invalided or 
discharged home. Although, as we have already seen, these funds were 
dependant on public caprice, the scale of fundraising and the amounts 
raised in times of patriotic fervour should not be underestimated. In 
January 1901, when SSFA funds were running precariously low, the 
Princess of Wales made an appeal on their behalf and: E300,000 was 
subscribed . 
59 Again, the emphasis was placed on the peace of mind of 
the servicemen rather than on the needs of the families in their own right. 
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Field Marshall Earl Roberts, on his return from South Africa, commented 
that 
... nothing had cheered the hearts of our soldiers ... more than the knowledge that those who are nearest and dearest to them are 
being cared for in their absence by their fellow countrymen and 
women. 60 
By 1901, however, and largely as the result of alleged mismanagement 
of Royal Patriotic Fund Monies, recommendations were beginning to be 
made for the administration of funds to be put on a more formal basis 
answerable to central government 61; an action which can be regarded as 
laying the foundation for state welfare provision for service families. 
Despite this initiative, however, and despite the fact that Major D. 
Maitland of the Royal Army Medical Corps claims that the twentieth 
century'opened with a wide and soundly established measure of social 
care for the soldier's family', the scope of this provision remained 
severely limited . 
62 'Off the strength' army wives, dependant parents and 
all seamen's wives remained totally dependent on charitable provision. 
Throughout the Victorian period the relationship between the army and 
the wives of servicemen had remained a source of conflict. On the one 
hand wives and children were seen as a millstone around the army's 
neck. On the other, a wife and family provided a means of regularising 
sexual relations and promoting the Victorian domestic ideology. 63 With 
the recognition of the part played by families in influencing the morale 
and effectiveness of servicemen, the War Office were forced to 
reconsider their responsibilities to families as a means of promoting an 
efficient army. As a result, payments made to wives moved from the 
original granting of a minimal amount to allow them to return to their 
home parishes towards more formalised allowances in times of 
separation. In 1871 Separation Allowances were listed in regulations for 
the first time when wives were granted an allowance of 3d for themselves 
and a further small allowance for any children so that the family could 
64 
remain in barracks whilst the regiment moved for training. Still the army 
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remained reluctant to take over all responsibility for the welfare of 
families. In 1882, the need for men to allot a portion of their pay towards 
the maintenance of their families when separated by the necessities of 
65 service became a necessity before allowances could be granted. The 
initiating of allotment as a trigger for the granting of allowances remained 
in effect with the exception of two periods during the World Wars when 
the regulation was lifted. However, although families could increasingly 
look towards the army for welfare, in return the army used the granting of 
allowances as a way of regulating families' lives. Allowances were 
granted as 'privileges' and 'indulgences' rather than as a right of the 
family and could be withdrawn for perceived misconduct. For example, 
the 82nd Regiment of Foot kept a 'Wives Punishment Book' between 
66 1866 and 1895 where misconduct was listed. Although the most 
common offences were drunkeness, abusive language and creating a 
disturbance, allowances were also stopped for refusing to obey a 
sergeants' orders. In extreme cases, wives could be struck'off the 
strength' and forced to resort once again to philanthropic provision. 
In the ten years of peace following the end of the Second Anglo-Boer 
War, public attention moved away from service families. Although a 
number of regimental associations were established, by and large their 
concern was with ex-servicemen, rather than with the families of those 
still serving. Only with the advent of the First World War, and the 
necessity for large-scale recruitment, did service families again become 
an issue for public concern. In The Politics of Influence, Wootton 
suggests that the general unpreparedness of the country for the nature of 
this war was nowhere more evident that in the 'misfortunes of those 
families left high and dry by mobilisation. j67 
As the need to ensure recruitment increased governmental awareness 
once again focused on the barrier to enlistment created by the absence 
of welfare for the families left behind. Sir Arthur Markham, Labour MP for 
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Mansfield, speaking in the House of Commons in August 1914, made 
this concern explicit, stating that it was 
The duty of government to provide sufficient funds so that the 
wives and children of these men should be maintained in a state 
of citizenship while their husbands are fighting at the front. 68 
As a result of this concern, the distinction between 'on' and 'off the 
strength' army marriages was abolished on 10 August 1914 and, for the 
first time, both family and separation allowances were granted to 
seamen's wives. 69 
The problem now became one of administration rather than conviction. At 
the outbreak of war, 1,500 soldiers'wives were eligible for allowances; 
two weeks later this figure had risen to 250,000 for the army alone . 
70 By 
the beginning of September, this already overstretched pay system also 
had to further expand to include provision for Navy wives. In addition, 
payment of funds was often delayed by the fact that voluntary funds, 
administered by separate bodies, were needed to supplement these flat 
rate allowances. Indeed, by July 1916, no less than five official bodies 
were involved in this administration procedure, including the Old Age 
Pensions Committee, who had overall responsibility for assessing levels 
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of dependency for all dependants other than wives. Inthefirsttwo 
years of the war this administrative Gordian knot caused inevitable 
delays in payment of allowances with the result that a number of families 
remained totally dependant on charitable assistance. However, by 1917, 
the state was paying a total of 3.5 million separation allowances 
regularl y. 72 Of these, 90% were paid to soldiers' families - 47% to wives 
and 53% to other dependants, most often dependant mothers who were 
receiving allowances for the first time. 73 
In The Politics of Influence, Wootton suggests that, during a major war, 
areas regarded as 'proper' for government concern change with the 
result that people who had previously been ignored now come 'within the 
45 
ambit of government for the fi I rst timep. 74 Thomas also argues that a 
'relatively coherent system of state welfare' had been devised for 
soldiers'and sailors' families . 
75 However, inter-dependency still existed 
between state involvement and voluntary organisations. Contemporary 
critics argued that the use of the existing institutional structures of 
philanthropic organisations to administer an allowance scheme seemed 
to perpetuate the attitude that these were given as a charitable act rather 
than as an inalienable right. 76 A Ministry of Pensions warrant of 1917 
states that allowances and pensions 'shall not be claimed as a right but 
shall be given as a reward for service'. 77 The perception of Family 
Allowances in Germany again provides a useful comparison here. In 
Germany, the fact that the necessary finance to pay allowances was 
raised by the local community led, if anything, to an even closer 
monitoring of service wives' behaviour than in Britain. 78 Public opinion 
within these communities was particularly critical of any conspicuous 
spending and Daniels quotes an example from Saxony-Weimar where 
wives were criticised for going to the theatre as such spending was 'not 
compatible with the objectives of assistance' . 
79 At the same time, the 
State expressed the opinion that Family Aid was not a state charity but 
the 'fulfilment of a moral claim' and the wives concerned therefore came 
to regard such aid as an entitlement and developed a 'self-conscious and 
demanding attitude' towards the authorities granting it. 80 Daniels goes on 
to claim that, despite the fact that service wives may have found the 
investigations into their financial circumstances necessary for aid to be 
granted, humiliating, they nevertheless gained greater confidence from 
their status as war wives. 81 Although in Britain such financial 
investigations were unnecessary for wives to be able to claim Family 
Allowance, at the same time allowances never became a right and wives 
were never able to express dissatisfaction with allowances in a similarly 
forthright manner. 
Gradually, however, a slow change took place in public perception of 
where responsibility for the welfare of service families lay and public 
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perception of stigma attached to accepting state welfare shifted. 
Philanthropic relief, originally seen as more acceptable, now became less 
so, to the extent that families who, largely through administrative 
ineptitude and delays in the payments, had been dependant at some 
stage of the war on Poor Relief, were able to ask for their names to be 
removed from the recordS. 82 SSFA, who had previously stressed that 
their assistance should be viewed as 'help given by friends to friends' 
now recognised the danger that charitable funds were in danger of being 
regarded as being given for the benefit of one class 'at the discretion of a 
different class. 83 With the looming General Election of 1918, the whole 
question of state care of service families took on an extra importance. 
Politicians assumed that men returning from active service would not 
vote to retain a government which had failed in its promises to take care 
of their families whilst they were serving their country. As a result of this 
maintained post-war interest in service families, the level of allowances 
continued to increase until January 1919.84 This resulted in an overall 
increase for army wives without children of 12%, from 11 shillings in 1914 
to 12s 6d, with no distinction made between 'on' and 'off the strength' 
wives. 85 In real terms, however, these increases in no way allowed army 
families to keep pace with a rising cost of living. Between 1914 and 1919 
86 the purchasing power of the pound fell by over 50%. 
For navy wives without children the increase was, on the face of it, much 
more dramatic - from no allowances at all in the first part of 1914, to 11 
shillings per week in January 1919 although, as we have already seen, 
this level of allowances still did not provide for an adequate standard of 
87 living. Despite this, the government regarded itself as having been 
'exceedingly generous throughout the war' although separation 
allowances in the UK remained consistently lower than those paid by 
Canada, Australia and the United States to the families of their 
servicemen. 88 In Germany, although the minimum level of Family Aid 
increased by over 100% during the course of the war, many of the 
agencies responsible for these payments took every step possible to 
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minimise the actual amount they paid to service families. 59 One such 
strategy was to include all earned income against Family Aid payments, 
despite the fact that such a strategy was in direct contradiction to the 
state's policy that those receiving Aid should not be discouraged from 
taking up employment in war industries. As a result, many urban families 
in particular, faced with spiralling cost-of-living increases, were unable to 
make ends meet. 90 Besse[ claims that the deterioration in German civilian 
diet'clearly affected' mortality levels during the second half of the First 
World War, citing the rise in deaths amongst women from both 
tuberculosis and pneumonia together with the figure of 102,130 women 
who died in the influenza epidemic of 1918.91 
By the end of October 1920, the British government had ended payment 
of all Separation Allowances. The term, however, continued in common 
usage up to 1939 causing widespread confusion. In the introduction to a 
House of Commons debate in December of that year a note on the 
nomenclature reads 'the terms "separation allowance", though widely 
used in connexion [sic] with serving soldiers, does not seem to have any 
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precise meaning'. In the army, they were replaced by Marriage 
Allowance, payable to the wives and children of regular soldiers, a move 
that the Navy soon followed. 93 However, the confusion which had 
resulted from the lack of preparation for the administration of service 
allowances during the war, was not totally forgotten, at least not by the 
philanthropic organisations which had been caught up in its effects. Sir 
George Wickham Legg, Secretary of SSAFA, writing to the Ministry of 
Pensions in 1924, recollected 'the chaotic state of affairs in regard to the 
issue of Separation Allowances at the outbreak of war in August 1914.194 
Sir George Chrystal, Wickham Legg's correspondent, agreed with this 
recollection, regarding it as 'essential that advances should be 
forthcoming without delay in the event of men being called up'. 95 
Wickham Legg's suggestion was that, in the event of a future war, Local 
War Pensions Committees should administer allowances, but this was 
strongly opposed by the Treasury. 96 Their view was that there was little 
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danger of a similar situation recurring. As Marriage Allowance was now 
granted as a norm to regular servicemen, the administrative machinery 
for this was already in place and there was no certainty that Dependants' 
Allowances, payable to other dependants such as parents, would 
necessarily be granted in a future war. The War Office, in particular, 
regarded it purely a matter of ensuring that 'its machinery was in perfect 
working order'to, guarantee that payment of allowances would be made 
proMptly. 97 
On the question of Depend ants' Allowances, the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Dependants' Allowances in Future Emergencies stated, in 
July 1925, thatas long as only the regular forces are concerned, there 
will be no need for an allowance98 However, this Report dealt only with 
dependants of 'other ranks'. In April 1926, the committee re-assembled 
to consider provision for dependants of officers together with the rates 
and conditions applicable to such allowances should the need arise. 99 No 
decisions were made at this meeting and, in fact, the question of 
Dependants' Allowances was never fully resolved and continued to be 
the subject of numerous inter-departmental discussions throughout the 
1920s. The Ministry of Pensions also voiced concern about the granting 
of such allowances. Under the proposed scheme, allowances might be 
given to dependants who were not eligible for pensions and the Ministry 
felt that this might create a prima facie case for the granting of pensions 
to these dependants. 100 In these discussions political awareness of the 
high profile of service families in time of war is clearly acknowledged. The 
Army Council in particular argued that, in the case of a future 'great' war, 
dependants' allowances and pensions were bound to be an important 
issue with all provision being 'subject to public criticism'. 101 In addition 
they suggested that it would not be enough to satisfy the 'peacetime 
demands of reason' but that any scheme must also 'make allowance for 
individuals on whose behalf war-time public opinion was likely to be 
sentimental 9.102 
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All parties involved in these discussions felt that the huge expansion in 
personnel which would take place in the event of a future war, 
necessitated that any scheme should have the unanimous rather than 
majority agreement. 103 In particular, the huge expansion in army 
personnel that would take place in the event of a future war gave the 
opinions of the War Office added weight. In the light of this, no decisions 
could be taken which ran counter to War Office opinion. This dominance 
was reinforced when it was agreed that the Treasury and War Office, 
without consultation with the other services, should undertake preliminary 
discussions to outline an agreement. However the matter was not 
regarded as one of great urgency. Leslie Hore-Belisha, at the time 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury, suggested that such discussions 
should be postponed as the Treasury would be 'fully occupied with the 
Budget and Finance B illo. 104 In the light of the contemporary economic 
situation this was a more than reasonable suggestion. With 
unemployment standing at 3 million and an estimated budget deficit for 
the year 1931-32 of E120 million, the government's attention was focused 
on more immediate national economic problems than preparation for a 
possible future conflict. ' 05 
Following the budget of 1933, representatives of the Treasury, the War 
Office and the Ministry of Pensions met again in an attempt to resolve the 
problem of how allowances should be administered in future conflicts, but 
their differences still proved irreconcilable. 106 So great was the 
disagreement that the War Office went so far as to produce two different 
drafts of a booklet covering the regulations governing dependants' 
allowances - one based on their own view and the other on that of the 
Treasury. Despite a professed opinion of the War Office that the 
departments concerned ought to be able to settle the matter'without 
inflicting it on the Cabinet', no final decision had been made by June 
107 1938. With the likelihood of conflict increasing, charitable institutions 
again voiced their concern regarding arrangements for the administration 
of allowances. SSAFA went so far as to enquire of the Prime Minister 
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whether, on the outbreak of war, the government actually proposed to 
grant dependants' allowances. This enquiry elicited the frosty reply that 
'consideration had, of course, been given to this and similar matters' 
although it was 'impossible to give any indication of what the details of 
policy were likely to be. 108 
The aim of both governmental discussions and concern from charitable 
organisations had been to settle the question of eligibility for, and 
administration of, service allowances so that the 'chaotic' situation, which 
had ensued in the First World War, was not repeated. Instead, 14 years 
later, the situation remained unresolved. Not only were there no clear 
guidelines formulated for the administration of dependants' allowances, 
there were not even clear indications as to whether these allowances 
would be granted at all and, if granted, to whom. 
The introduction of the Military Training Act of 1939 further complicated 
the already confused picture. Regular servicemen were considered to 
have joined the services knowing the conditions under which they would 
be expected to serve, including those relating to families and allowances. 
Although wives and children received Marriage Allowance as a matter of 
course, arrangements for other dependants were the sole responsibility 
of the serviceman himself. However, the government recognised that 
amongst the 200,000 or so conscripts about to be 'swept willy-nilly into 
the services' some would already be the sole support for dependant 
relatives other than wives and children and provision would have to be 
made to sustain these existing arrangements. ' 09 Accordingly, 
dependants allowances were granted to cover this situation, although the 
calculations for these allowances were by no means straightforward. 
Indeed, the Defence Department of the Government of India, when 
considering the development of their own system for the administration of 
Dependants' Allowances in February 1941, examined the rules and 
systems in force in the UK and concluded that they were 'too complicated 
for application to India'. 110 Rates were calculated on the amount the 
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serviceman had been contributing towards the upkeep of the dependant 
prior to conscription and were dependent on the men continuing to 
contribute an allotment from their pay of no less than 3s 6d per week. ", 
If this condition was met, allowances then fell within three bands. For 
those who had been contributing more than 3s 6d per week but no more 
than 9 shillings, an allowance was paid at the rate of 7 shillings per week 
making a total of 1 Os 6d. For those who had been contributing more than 
9 shillings but no more than 15 shillings, the allowance was 12 shillings 
making a total of 15s 6d. For those contributing more than 15 shillings 
per week, an allowance was given of 17 shillings making a total of P-1 Os 
6d. 112 The proviso was also added that, in cases where dependant's lived 
with others, such as other family members or lodgers, who might 
contribute to the total income of the household, no allowance would be 
paid if this income, after allowances for rent and other fixed costs, 
exceeded 15 shillings per head. ' 13 Conversely, where a dependant lived 
alone, or in a household without other income, a special rate of El Os 6d 
was granted if it could be proved that the serviceman had been 
contributing at least this level of support before conscription. 114 
With the introduction of conscription, the question of Marriage 
Allowances also had to be re-assessed. In the regular forces, this 
allowance was not paid to the families of army and air force servicemen 
under the age of 26 or families of sailors under the age of 25, although 
the Chancellor had already agreed to a reduction of these ages to 23 
across the services. 115 Whilst regular servicemen were expected to take 
this factor into consideration when contemplating marriage, this could not 
be applied to men now being conscripted. Indeed, the whole issue of the 
qualifying age for marriage allowances in the service had been a matter 
of some public debate. The News of the World, in August 1937, carried 
an article by an ex-Coldstream Guard asking 'Why prevent a healthy and 
fit man from marrying until the age of 26'. The same article then went on 
to claim 'surely a man in the army has as much right to marry as a 
civilian'. ' 16 In fact, the Treasury estimated that I in every 40 men in the 
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general population in the age group 20-21 was married. ' 17 The 
withholding of Family Allowance from the wives of conscripted men under 
the age of 23 was recognised as being likely to have a detrimental affect 
on morale. A paper for Cabinet consideration in May 1939 stated that 
The Secretary of State for War is faced with the problem of raising 
some 75,000 recruits for the Regular Army in the near future and, 
though the number of married men in these low age groups is not 
great, it cannot be denied that the existence of a few married men 
ineligible for family allowance might have an adverse effect on 
recruiting quite out of proportion to their number. 118 
It should be noted that, although the decision had been taken by the 
government a month earlier to introduce conscription, in this paper the 
Treasury still referred to 'recruits' and a necessity to persuade men to 
enlist although in the discussions of arrangements for men called up 
under the Military Training Act a month earlier they had referred to men 
being 'swept willy-nilly' into the services. At the same time, allowances 
could not be granted to the wives of conscripts under the age of 23, if 
they were denied to those of regular servicemen below this age. As a 
result, in May 1939, the qualifying age for Family Allowance across the 
services was reduced to the age of 20.119 
These adjustments to allowances were accordingly codified into a white 
paper 'Allowances for Families and Dependants of Men Serving in HM 
Forces during the Present War', presented to Parliament on 28 
November 1939 by Leslie Hore-Belisha, then Secretary of State for 
War. 120 For Family Allowance, known in the Navy as Marriage Allowance, 
the qualifying age limit was suspended for the duration of the war. In all 
cases allowances remained dependant on the serviceman allotting a 
portion of his pay to his family according to rank and rate of pay. For 
example, for a serviceman being paid less than 17s 6d per week but not 
less than 14 shillings, the minimum allotment to family was set at 7 
shillings per week. This rose in stages to the rank of Warrant Officer 
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Class I and 11 where minimum allotment was set at 28 shillings per 
week. 121 
Dependants Allowances were granted to wives, legitimate, legitimated 
and statutorily adopted children or legitimate step-children for whom 
Family Allowance was not issued, together with fathers, mothers (if the 
father was either not alive or incapable of self-support due to infirmity or 
age), grandparents, step-parents, grandchildren, brothers and sisters 
(including half-brothers and sisters) plus foster parents, if they had 
supported the serviceman whilst a minor for no less than five years. 122 As 
can be seen from this list, once the decision had been taken to grant 
Dependants' Allowances, eligibility for these allowances was extended 
dramatically from that granted during World War 1. Whilst not made 
explicit in the regulations governing allowances, the intent was clear that 
this provision would also cater for illegitimate children although some 
administering authorities did not make such payments willingly. For 
example, a letter from the Unemployment Assistance Board (UAB) 
District Officer in Dundee to the Secretary of the UAB at the Ministry of 
Pensions in London in May 1940 indicated that payments to illegitimate 
children were being refused and applicants advised to apply to the War 
Service Grants (WSG) Advisory Committee. 123 This Committee, an 
advisory committee of the Minister of Pensions, known until December 
1939 as the Military Service (Special Allowances) Advisory Committee, 
had been established to administer special allowances which could be 
claimed in cases of financial hardship which were not covered by either 
Family or Depend ants' Allowances. The Committee also dealt with other 
financial problems, which had arisen following the introduction of 
conscription for the families of those who were not regular servicemen. 
Many families had existing financial commitments based on their 
previous civilian wages, which they could not meet on service pay. 
Applications could be made to the Committee for additional payments of 
up to E2 per week to meet commitments such as hire purchase 
agreements, insurance payments or education expenses undertaken 
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before call-up. 124 In contrast to cases where pension payments had come 
into effect, in these instances the Military Service (Special Allowances) 
Advisory Committee accepted that 
The separation of the man from his home is only temporary and 
the wife cannot be expected to reduce the standard of living to 
conform to the standard which might be expected in a permanent 
situation. 125 
Administrators also had problems with another category of service 
dependants, namely those women who came to be known as 'unmarried' 
wives. In a number of cases, men joining the forces claimed Family 
Allowance for a woman who later proved not to be their legal wife. Often 
these cases only came to light when the legal wife later made a claim for 
Family Allowance from the same man. Usually in these cases a man, 
separated from his legal wife, had established a home with another 
woman. Here the services found themselves in a difficult situation. On 
the one hand they did not wish to be seen as denying allowances to legal 
wives. On the other hand the War Office stated quite clearly that 
allowances were paid for'the maintenance of the soldier's home and, in 
time of war in particular, made to enable the home to be kept up, to 
which the soldier would return when released from service. 9126 In the 
cases in question, clearly, the home to which the soldier would be 
returning was not that occupied by his legal wife. Despite many 
attempted solutions, the heated feelings surrounding these particular 
allowances meant that by 1942 the situation had still not been resolved 
and, indeed, resurfaced in post-war discussions on service 
allowances. 127 As a War Office spokesman suggested 'This is a very 
tangled question in which the advocates of morality may possibly take 
one view and those of humanity another'. 128 1n the event, the War Office 
eventually took the humane view that allowances should be made, 
utilising both Family and Dependant's Allowance, to both women stating 
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'in both cases we should relieve the hardship due to the man's being 
called Up. 029 
Similarly complex cases also arose in April 1940 when the Ministry of 
Pensions had to deal with a number of cases of hardship resulting from 
men being called up who were not wage earners at that time but who 
would have been within ameasurable period P. 130 By and large these 
were sons who were undertaking an apprenticeship at the time of their 
call up and who would have contributed to the upkeep of their parents 
after their training. In a number of these cases WSG was allowed, limited 
to examples where serious financial hardship had resulted from debts 
incurred to meet training costs or where 'sacrifices' had been made and 
parents were now 'deprived of any reasonable prospect of comfort' . 
131 As 
the Yorkshire Post suggested in June 1941, 'No scheme, however, 
elastic can hope to cover the multitudinous individual cases by a rigid 
laying down of regulations'. 132 For those involved in the drafting of these 
regulations, the task of attempting to cover all eventualities must have 
seemed analogous of that of Jason trying to sow the dragon's teeth. 
In all cases, however, the whole system for claiming allowances often led 
to confusion for families and delays in the granting of allowances. For 
Family Allowance, a claim had to be submitted by the serviceman and 
then processed by the Regimental Paymaster, in the case of the army, 
and by the Director of Navy Accounts or the Director of Accounts, Air 
Ministry in the cases of the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force 
respectively. 133 Once this claim had been processed, a book of weekly 
drafts was sent to a nominated Post Office and a confirmatory form 
issued to the wife concerned. On presentation of this form at the relevant 
Post Office, signed and witnessed, the wife was issued with the book of 
drafts from which she could draw her allowances weekly, in advance. In 
an attempt to ensure that allowances were issued as quickly as possible 
once a man had been called up, claim forms were issued at the time of 
medical examination to be handed in, ready completed, when the man 
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joined his regiment. In December 1939, this system was altered so that 
the completed form could be handed in at medical examination to further 
speed up the process. In cases where a man enlisted voluntarily, forms 
were originally given out at the time of enlistment, but this procedure was 
also changed so that forms could be given out at recruiting centres. 134 
For Dependants' Allowances, claims had to be provided both by the man 
himself, who had to consent to deductions from his pay, and from the 
dependant involved, giving details of their financial circumstances. 135 As 
all such claims were subject to investigation to confirm levels of 
dependency, these allowances took rather more time to process. As a 
result of this, delays occurred and many people applied to the UAB for 
temporary help under the government scheme for the prevention and 
relief of distress arising out of the war, which had originally been 
envisaged as providing temporary assistance to those whose homes had 
suffered bomb damage. 136 Relief was often granted until such time as 
allowances were cleared when the money would be recouped from the 
backdated allowances. Although these payments were supposedly 
strictly termed an 'interim payment' attempts to reclaim such temporary 
aid were largely unsuccessful as many recipients persisted in regarding 
them as an advance on their allowances rather than a separate 
payment. 137 However, it remains almost impossible to distinguish 
whether this was due to deliberate attempts to defraud the system, a 
failure to understand a far from accessible system or even the non- 
delivery of mail due to frequent relocations and evacuations. One 
example of a case in point is that of the mother of a naval rating who 
claimed Dependants' Allowance on the grounds that her husband only 
earned 70 shillings per week. 138 On investigation, it was discovered that 
her husband's earnings were actually U per week, an amount well 
above the level of eligibility for such an allowance. Although an 
overpayment of approximately E20 had occurred before the true facts of 
the situation were discovered, it was impossible to reclaim the 
overpayment as the only person who could give evidence against the 
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woman was her husband, and this was inadmissible in law. It should, 
however, also be noted that, given the social norms of the period, it was 
also quite possible that the woman was ignorant of the true level of her 
husband's income until the investigation took place. 
In some cases, however, wives and dependants did make great efforts to 
pay back these advances, often at considerable hardship to themselves. 
In October 1939 Family Allowance drafts for a discharged RAF 
aircraftman were not immediately withdrawn. As a result the wife of the 
aircraftman continued to draw an allowance of El 16s 6d up to March 
1940, an overpayment of E36 6s Od. When applied to for repayment, the 
wife agreed to make payments at El per week until the full amount had 
been repaid. 139 
The Unemployment Assistance Board (UAB) also played a vital role in 
the normal administration of Dependants' Allowances by carrying out the 
investigations into family circumstances necessary before such an 
allowance could be granted. 140 Completed forms for Dependants' 
Allowance, as was the case originally for Family Allowances, were 
forwarded to the Regimental Paymaster. However, in December 1939 
these arrangements were changed, as they had been for Family 
Allowances, so that forms completed at the time of medical examination 
could be send direct to the local office of the UAB in an attempt to speed 
up investigations. 141 There can be no doubt that often these 
investigations caused resentment. Although families or dependants may 
well have supported the enlistment of their breadwinners, many felt that 
they now had a clear right to allowances as recompense. Any enquiry 
into their financial circumstances could appear as a suggestion that they 
were deliberately trying to defraud the services and the details required 
by the investigators meant that other members of the household also had 
to answer searching questions as to their financial status. 
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Although by April 1941 the regulations governing the award of 
Dependants' Allowances had been revised so that the UAB was no 
longer required to ascertain the actual amount of income of all members 
of the household, the investigation remained searching. 142 The form itself 
was divided into six parts. Details of the dependant themselves, their wife 
or husband and all their children under 16 years of age, both resident in 
the house and evacuated, plus any children to whom the dependant 
stood in the relationship of parent had to be entered in Section A. Two 
further sections required details of the gross income, and its source, for 
each member of the household plus details of their relationship to the 
dependant. Household members who had no or'insubstantial' resources 
were also required to state how long they had been resident in the 
household and how they had been maintained before the serviceman 
was called for service. The dependant themselves also had to provide 
details of any income from capital such as Post Office savings or 
Government Stock and to state if they actually paid the rent and whether 
or not this included furnishings, light and heat. Where the dependant was 
a boarder, the actual amount paid in board and lodgings was required. 143 
Even in cases where these details were fully completed, difficulties often 
arose when the investigators tried to verify the information. 
In June 1939, the District Officer of the UAB in Leeds reported local 
difficulties in assessing incomes in households where some members 
were employed intermittently in local collieries. 144 The problem arose 
because the local colliery company, Airedale Collieries Co. Ltd., 
proposed to make a charge of 6d for each enquiry. The local UAB had 
refused to pay this fee taking the view that'employers should be ready to 
do without payment something which is in the public interest. 145 Although 
the Colliery Company eventually 'expressed their willingness to co- 
operate', their attitude had resulted in yet another delay in the payment of 
allowances to needy families. 146 In other cases resolution of the problems 
proved to be impossible. In the case of dependants of crofters from the 
Scottish Isles claiming either Depend ants' Allowances or WSG 
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allowances, no accurate way was ever established to verify the previous 
earnings of the crofts. 147 
Regardless of the allowances being applied for, all claims depended on 
the correct and speedy completion of application forms often without 
advice or support. Although a RAF form of the time suggests that 
representatives from the British Legion or SSAFA would be 'pleased to 
assist applicants in completing the form', no advice is given on how or 
where to contact such representatives . 
148 For men in the throes of 
leaving home, the extra time needed to contact these agencies may not 
have been available and there can be no doubt that many forms were 
completed incorrectly causing delays and inaccuracies in the payment of 
allowances. In November 1939, The South Wales Daily Herald reported 
a number of cases where such incorrect forms had caused delays. 149 As 
a result of these cases the War Office sent officials to the area to 
investigate the situation and a system was devised whereby the British 
Legion was supplied with allowance forms and assisted applicants with 
their completion. Although, in this instance the War Office reacted swiftly 
and visibly, it had been necessary for the situation to be highlighted by an 
outside agency before an action was taken . 
150 By the end of 1939, these 
problems were more widely acknowledged with the UAB advising both 
the War Service Grants Committee and the War Office that many 
dependants 'may well feel dismay at the idea of completing it [the 
application form] unaided '. 151 To improve the situation, the Board 
suggested that a leaflet should be enclosed with each form informing 
applicants that their officers could help with its completion and listing the 
names and addresses of appropriate offices. No thought appears to have 
been given to the fact that many of the applicants may have had poor 
literacy or numeracy skills which, in addition to making it impossible for 
them to complete the form, would also have precluded them from reading 
the leaflet. 
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The single case of an Able Seaman serving on HMS Kenet at 
Portsmouth highlights not only the hardship which could result from 
inaccurate completion of forms, but also the hardships many families 
encountered with the change from civilian to service pay. 152 Whilst the 
serviceman in this case had been in civilian employment, he had been 
earning E4 1s 9d per week. As a naval reservist he now contributed E2 
15s Od to his family's upkeep made up of 25 shillings allotment from pay 
plus 30 shillings Marriage Allowance based on a claim for six children. A 
letter from his wife to the UAB set out the outgoings for the family 
totalling them as 38s 9d per week, leaving 16s 6d for food. Based on the 
figures given in her letter, the wife's calculations were actually incorrect 
as the amount left after outgoings was only 16s 3d. An investigating 
officer who visited the family reported that there were, in fact, seven 
children in the family and the wife was heavily pregnant so that additional 
expenses relating to her confinement would accrue in the near future. 
This case illustrates clearly the need families experienced for help in the 
completion of claim forms to ensure that they were receiving the full 
amount due to them. If the form had been completed correctly the family 
could have claimed in the region of an extra 1s 6d per week bringing the 
total left after outgoings to 18 shillings. Although the wife in this case is 
making a claim for extra support, nowhere does she give any estimate of 
the true cost of keeping her family. However, the amount she was 
receiving to keep a family of eight in 1939 was only I ls 6d above the 
level calculated by Rowntree in 1936 as necessary to maintain a family of 
five above the poverty line despite the fact that the cost of living index 
had risen by 11 points in the intervening period. 153 
Nor were there any obvious means for claiming allowances if men left 
without handing in their claim forms. Except in the case of War Service 
Grants, no provision was made for a situation in which the men 
concerned were not readily contactable. However, it was suggested that, 
in cases where normal procedure could not be followed, that it had 
'always been the intention that ... claims may be made by the wife or 
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dependant as if the member of the Forces were himself applying'. 154 In all 
these cases the onus was on the claimant to prove that dependency had 
previously existed and, in addition, permission would need to be granted 
by the man concerned for stoppage of allotment from his pay. No 
provision was made for a situation in which contact with the men involved 
might be difficult or impossible. As we shall see in Chapter 3, these 
issues had serious financial implications for the families of those later 
taken prisoner of war. 
The decision then to introduce conscription in 1939 and the subsequent 
mass mobilisation of manpower led to major administrative problems in 
the administration of service allowances. The Treasury view that, as 
Marriage Allowance was now the norm, there would be few problems 
with administration, although correct for regular servicemen, took no 
account of the possible effects of conscription. However, few of the 
problems associated with the granting and administration of service 
allowances faced in the Second World War had not already surfaced in 
the First. 'Unmarried' wives, dependant parents and other problems 
associated with the conscription of large numbers of a normally civilian 
population had all been encountered between 1914 and 1918. In 
particular, delays in payment of allowances due to the sheer weight of 
numbers involved had been common. In many of these cases, families 
had turned to charitable organisations for support and financial 
assistance. Lord Derby, speaking at the 37th Annual meeting of SSAFA, 
recorded that he had 
No hesitation in saying that although there was undoubtedly at the 
commencement of the War [WWI] a considerable amount of 
distress to families of soldiers suddenly summoned to the Colours, 
that distress would have been ten times greater if it had not been 
for the work of this Association. 155 
Despite this experience and the continuing concern expressed by 
charitable organisations during the 1920s that adequate arrangements 
had not been made for the administration of allowances in the event of a 
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future war, the government and the Services maintained a complacent 
attitude. In the light of this complacency towards service families and the 
subsequent problems experienced during the Second World War, 
Bamfield's statement that'no organisation of any kind anywhere can 
have fulfilled the needs, physical and emotional, of its members as has 
the army' seems extraordinary. 156 
The state's declared intention to make claiming for and administration of 
allowances as quick as possible, ignored the potential for delay at every 
stage of the process which was readily apparent to outside agencies. 
Although, as a newspaper article of the time suggested, 'no scheme, 
however elastic, can hope to cover the multitudinous individual cases by 
a rigid laying down of regulations', the failure of the government to benefit 
from the experience of the First World War contributed greatly to what 
quickly became an administrative nightmare. ' 57 As in 1914, the sheer 
scale of the problem was overwhelming. Between the outbreak of war 
and November 1939 alone, 300,000 Family Allowances were granted. 158 
The difficulties encountered and delays in granting allowances are clearly 
demonstrated by the fact that, by the end of 1941, applications for War 
Service Grant, to provide for families whose allowances were delayed 
were running at over 15,000 per week. 159 Far from the situation being 
dealt with solely by the War Office ensuring that its machinery was in 
perfect order, as had been suggested in 1924, only a few months into the 
conflict the services were already having to rely heavily on philanthropic 
organisations to keep the machinery working at all. General Sir Ronald 
Adam, Adjutant General to the Forces, speaking to the SSAFA 
Conference of County Secretaries in 1944, acknowledged this debt 
saying 
We do realise in the War Office the tremendous burden we have 
thrown on your shoulders -a bigger burden than we ever 
expected ZOOU would be asked to bear. It ought to have been 
foreseen. 
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In later chapters we shall see how this administrative burden in relation to 
allowances was added to with work concerned more specifically with the 
financial plight of POW families. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Family and Dependants' Allowances, 1939 to 1945. 
Towards the end of 1940, the problems associated with delays in the 
payment of allowances reached such proportions that the War Office 
requested a Major-General Buckley who had formerly had 'considerable 
experience of examining the organisation of commercial firms'to tour 
regimental Pay Offices and report on their operating systems. ' At the 
time, responsibility for the delays was being laid at the door of the UAB, 
although they, themselves, felt that their turnaround time for the 
investigations of claims for allowances was not unreasonable .2 Most 
cases were dealt with within six days of receipt although some delays, 
beyond the control of the Board, did arise, often caused by inability to 
locate and interview the claimants. 3 In the week of 1 November 1940, 
investigations were carried out into 21,287 claims of which 5,272 were 
'fruitless visits'. 4 Largely these unsuccessful visits were occasioned by 
claimants having subsequently taken up employment which meant that 
they were not at home when the investigating officer called or by 
claimants having changed address without notifying the Board. 5 As a 
result of Major-General Buckley's report, the Interdepartmental 
Committee on Army Allowances and War Service Grants (WSG), 
consisting of representatives from the UAB, War Office and Ministry of 
Pensions, was established to ascertain 
whether appreciable delays occur in settling claims for 
Depend ants' Allowances and War Service Grants and, if such 
delays do occur, to suggest remedies which may appear 
appropriate 6 
The final report of this Committee, known as the Malpass Report, was 
delivered in March 1941 and made a number of suggestions to ensure 
claims were dealt with all possible speed. Firstly the Committee 
established that postal delays were one of the main factors delaying the 
processing of claiMS. 7 The average delay in transmission of any item of 
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mail was found to be four days and, as investigation reports were 
normally forwarded three times, delays of up to twelve days could easily 
result. To expedite this situation, the Committee suggested that the Post 
Office should send claims direct to UAB Area Offices rather than sending 
the first to the District Offices, as was the current practice. 8 Within the 
Area Offices themselves, most delays were attributable to the difficulties 
outlined above of establishing contact with the dependants. In one in 
every three cases the dependant was absent at the time of the visit. 9 
However, it was noted that in some cases unavoidable delays were 
brought about by the sheer complexity of the cases. The cases of claims 
involving crofters, already mentioned in Chapter 1, where there were 
grave difficulties in assessing former earnings prove a case in point here. 
Overall, however, delays were found to be less than one week, which 
was not viewed as excessive. A reminder was nevertheless issued to all 
officers to the effect that cases under investigation were not to be viewed 
as 'merely paperwork' as they concerned 'living persons whose well- 
being and happiness often depended on an early decision being given'. '() 
An undated, and unsigned, note on the draft report of the Committee 
suggested that Sir Frederick Boscheven, Joint Permanent Under- 
secretary of State at the War Office, would 'no doubt' not only make the 
amendments recommended but, at the same time, 'pray again for the 
salvation of the Service from outside so-called business experts'. " 
Besides these investigations into the mechanisms for the payment of 
Dependants' Allowances, throughout the course of the Second World 
War the question of whether or not service pay and allowances were 
adequate and their regular reviews continued to pose problems. Initially, 
all three services had expressed an intention to review all allowances 
every six months as set out in Defence Procedure Circular No. 33, but by 
May 1940 only the Admiralty and Air Ministry had carried out such 
reviews. 12 For the Army, faced with much larger numbers of claimants, 
such reviews had become impossible. 13 As a result, allowances had 
failed to keep pace with cost of living increases and, from as early as 
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March 1940, campaigns had begun claiming that existing levels of Family 
Allowances were inadequate. 14 Thomas claims that, during the First 
World War, women themselves played a large part in demands for 
15 
adequate allowances. Similarly, in World War Two, wives of 
servicemen were often instrumental in beginning campaigns for 
increased allowances. The Ilford Recorder, for example, ran a series of 
articles beginning on 7 th March headlined 'Ilford Wives lead fight of 
Bigger Allowances'. 16 Five local service wives, led by Miss Sylvia 
Pankhurst, formed a deputation to lobby MPs and protest that existing 
allowances were inadequate, stating thatWomen in Ilford are being 
forced below the poverty line because their husbands had joined the 
Services' . 
17 The women demanded a six-point charter for service 
dependants including speedy delivery of application forms for grants, 
cases to be dealt with more 'expeditiously' and an increase in war 
pensions. 18 
In World War One, however, large labour organisations with some 
influence at government level, such as the War Emergency Workers 
National Committee, had also become involved in such campaigns. 19 
Between 1939 and 1945 no such labour involvement was apparent. 
Campaigns, begun locally by wives themselves relied on capturing the 
attention of local MPs and newspapers to publicise their campaigns and 
move them into a wider arena. As both the government and the services 
were sensitive to problems of desertion and lack of effectiveness of 
troops when the well being of their families was in doubt, if local 
campaigns managed to capture the interest of national newspapers they 
did acquire some degree of influence. However, despite the fact that 
national figures, such as Sylvia Pankhurst, and prominent MPs, such as 
Eleanor Rathbone, maintained an interest in service families throughout 
the period of the war, no popular national champion appeared to keep 
the topic permanently in the public mind. Virtually every campaign for 
increases in pay and allowances had to start from scratch at a local level 
and gradually build its support until it gained national attention. But, whilst 
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dependants could make at least make their discontent known, 
servicemen found it more difficult to articulate their discontent with pay 
and allowances. 
Generally, those serving in the armed forces could not campaign for 
increases to pay. Fred Bellinger, Labour MP for Bassetlaw, raised this 
point in a House of Commons debate on service pay and allowances in 
1942, claiming that'service lips are sealed by King's Regulations' . 
20 In 
fact, parliament was the only institution which could speak on behalf of 
servicemen in this matter, and traditionally, all claims for increases to pay 
had to be debated and agreed on the floor of the House. With the 
outbreak of war, the perceived motivation for joining the services became 
patriotism and a wish to serve one's country and in the light of this to 
cavil at existing rates of pay might be regarded as disloyal. This point is 
made explicitly on the cover of a report into Army pay and allowances in 
1944, which carries the following excerpt from an address to servicemen 
quoted in Thomas Hardy's novel The Trumpet Major. 
If the love of true Liberty and honest Fame has not ceased to 
animate the Hearts of Englishmen, Pay, though necessary, will be 
the least part of your Reward. You will find you best Recompense 
in having done your Duty to your King and Country, ... ' in having 
protected your Wives and Children from Death, or worse than 
Death, which will follow the success of such Inveterate Foes 21 
However, for those conscripted into the armed forces, the decrease in 
family income as a result of the change from civilian wages to service 
allowances was often dramatic and led to severe hardship as the number 
of families claiming additional War Service Grants to supplement their 
allowances has shown. 22 Conscripted servicemen were, therefore, 
caught in a dilemma. Although their level of service pay took no account 
of financial commitments undertaken before their conscription, at the 
same time they were unable to take any action to bring about an increase 
in pay to allow them to meet these commitments. All action to increase 
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allowances came from independent campaigns in response to financial 
difficulties faced by families and as such was always retrospective. 
Families had to be in need and facing hardship before they attracted the 
attention of MPs of philanthropic campaigners. No structure existed to 
ensure that families had sufficient allowances from the outset to ensure 
an adequate standard of living. 
In November 1940 both Family and Dependants' Allowances were 
increased at least partly in respon§e to local and national campaigns 
although, for Dependants Allowances in particular, the increases resulted 
partly'in the light of the principles underlying the Determination of Needs 
A 23 ct'. These increases resulted in an overall increase in expenditure on 
Family Allowances alone of F-7million per annurn but were not at a 
24 consistent level across the services. In the Army and Navy increases 
were dependant on level of pay, whilst in the Air Force increases were 
dependant on rank. In order to show the scale of increases afforded 
through the course of the War, Table 1 gives an overview of the changes 
in Family Allowance awarded to the lowest paid Army ranks. Although an 
increase of U million at first sight appears to suggest a substantial 
increase to allowances, the increase was, however, spread over an 
increase in total strength of armed forces between September 1939 and 
September 1940 of 1,345,000. Given these increased numbers claiming 
allowances and the rise in the cost of living in the same period, the 
increases were not even sufficient to allow families to maintain their 
existing standard of living. 
Consequently, campaigning for increased pay and allowances continued 
throughout 1941. In October, the Minister for Pensions, speaking in a 
secret session in the House of Commons declared his awareness that 
there had been 'a demand for a general all-round increase in pay and 
allowances'. 25 
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Date Wife Wife +I 
child 
Wife +2 
children 
Wife +3 
children 
Wife +4 
children 
Pre-war 24s 29s 32s 34s 35s 
Nov. 1939 24s 29s 33s 36s 39s 
Nov. 1940 25s 32s 6d 38s 42s 46s 
Feb. 1942 25s 33s 6d 40s 45s 50S 
May 1944 Not given 
Probably 
unchanged 
35s 47s 6d 60s 72s 6d 
Proposed 
Post-war 
31s 42s 53s 7 1/2 d 64s I %d 75s 9d 
Table 1: Changes in Service Family Allowances (Minimum Other Ranks) over the 
period 1939 - 1945. Rates quoted are per week. Allowances before February 1942 
include the relevant minimum allotment from husband's pay. Allowances after that date 
include the standard reduced allotment of 3s 6d per week. 
All figures taken from PRO/Tl621692/45396/1. 
This, however, was deemed to be so costly that it was 'almost impossible 
26 to contemplate at the present time'. And, for the first time explicit 
comparisons began to be made between the rates of pay of civilian and 
munitions workers and service pay, as well as comparisons with the pay 
27 
of the armed forces from Dominion countries. Major Milner, 
Conservative MP for Leeds, South East, speaking in the same debate 
made it clear that he felt that 
The munition worker or civilian worker will still be far better paid 
and his family better fed and clothed than the soldier's wife and 
family can hope to be and still there will be men from Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand fighting alongside our men but drawing 
twice and in some cases three times as much. 28 
The campaign for increased pay and allowances also continued in the 
pages of both national and local newspapers. For example, in December 
1941 both The Star and the Yorkshire Eveninq Post carried articles 
campaigning for higher allowances for service wives. The article in The 
Star, headlined 'Army Wives Must Have A Fairer Deal', was written by 
Irene Ward, Conservative MP for Wallsend, demonstrating the continued 
interest of local MPs in the plight of service wives. 29 
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Although an attempt was made in 1941 to focus increases on those most 
in need, the system by which hardship was determined remained 
extremely complex, even in the eyes of the service departments 
themselves. By October of that year, the War Office was forced to 
recognise that this complexity meant that, although efforts were being 
made to ensure that claims were dealt with as promptly as possible, 
ssome time may elapse before claims can be disposed of. 30 As a result, 
the Treasury, perhaps following the War Office lead in employing the 
services of a previously independent expert, commissioned a report from 
a former employee of Standard Cables into the procedures for claiming 
and administering Dependants' Allowances and WSG . 
31 This report 
suggested that, because of the way the procedure for investigating 
claims had been established with the UAB making preliminary 
investigations into household income but the Treasury and Service 
Departments maintaining responsibility for the final accuracy of the 
32 figures, a wasteful 'double check'was operating. If the UAB was made 
responsible for final accuracy, although service pay offices would make 
the award, issue allowance books and ensure allotments from pay were 
authorised, this 'double check' would be eliminated. The service 
departments, however, after perusing the report came to the decision 
that following this course would make no appreciable savings. 33 
By the end of 1941, establishment concerns over the effects worry about 
home and family might have on both the morale and effectiveness of 
servicemen led to the War Office contacting all army commanders asking 
them to make regular monthly reports on factors concerning their 
troopS. 34 Reports on the effect of conditions affecting families and 
allowances were specifically requested. From these reports an overall 
Morale Report was compiled quarterly throughout the remainder of the 
war and up to January 1948.35 In April 1942, the first meeting of the War 
Office Morale Committee took place, to consider the findings of these 
36 reports. In a report predating the establishment of the Committee, the 
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Adjutant-General had suggested that'the loss of Malaya, Hong Kong and 
the withdrawal in Burma, were all due to the low morale of the troops'. 37 
Adding that he felt the war would be won or lost on morale, an issue the 
British Army was 'too apt' to ignore as 'Morale is a psychological problem 
like sex, and therefore the Britisher is almost ashamed to talk about its38 
From the outset, the role played by home and wives in the maintaining of 
morale was acknowledged. Item 14 in the report of May to July 1942 
details the 'influence of women', listing a number of ways in which wives 
could adversely affect morale . 
39 These included persuading their 
husbands to be AWOL or overstay their leave and dissuading husbands 
from volunteering for dangerous duties in addition to themselves taking 
'French leave' from their factory work to go on holiday with their 
husbands. The perennial question of the 'fickleness' of women also 
surfaces in this first report. Women were regarded as 'almost invariably' 
preferring the company of the RAF, USA or Dominion troops and even 
civilian workers to that of soldiers as the British soldier'had less money 
40 tospendonthem'. In fact for the whole six years it operated, The War 
Office Morale Committee had little good to say about the wives of 
soldiers. The Victorian view of army wives as a 'serious evil' clearly 
41 persisted well into the twentieth century. Wives were blamed for 
persuading husbands not to volunteer for overseas or dangerous duties; 
for persuading husbands to desert or go absent without leave; for 
'sapping' morale because of their fickle behaviour; for burdening 
husbands with their financial worries and for worrying their husbands 
about their inability to cope with the strain of separation. 42 Whilst there 
can be no doubt that a number of these accusations were well founded, 
the Army gave no thought to ways in which they could alleviate this drain 
on morale by providing the families concerned with extra support. Instead 
wives were issued with suggestions on how not to worry their menfolk. 
For example, women were advised to limit their news in letters to the 
positive aspects of home life such as flowers they had grown and books 
they had read rather than telling their husbands about how frightened 
76 
they had been by bombing or if they had been ill. 43 A suggestion, in May 
1942, that women should tell their husbands about films they had seen 
was enlarged on three months later to suggest that they include who they 
had seen the film with. 44 Presumably this suggestion was made to 
reassure their husbands that they had been with girlfriends or family 
members and not for wives to confirm that they had been going out with 
other men. 
With the entry of the USA into the war in Europe, comparisons between 
British service pay and that of not only Dominion but also American 
troops continued to inform discussions on levels of pay and allowances. 
The Treasury, however, took the view that to use other countries as a 
'yardstick' by which to measure British service pay, would lead to a 
'breakdown in the financial front which would be as dangerous to our war 
effort as any military defeat could be'. 45 Generally, rates of pay within the 
different countries were felt to 'reflect the circumstances of that country, 
the standard of living, the difficulty of obtaining recruits'. 46 Table 2 shows 
comparative rates of pay and allowances between British, Dominion and 
US troops in 1942. 
In fact, although absolute rates of pay were often higher for Dominion 
and American troops, for their families the administrative procedures by 
which allowances were granted often negated these benefits. Under the 
American system married 'other ranks', except for the three highest 
ranks, were not recognised for Family Allowance. 47 To qualify for 
allowances US troops were required to contribute a minimum of $22 per 
month, approximately E5 1 Os Od, to their dependants, who then received 
48 $28 from the government. In Britain, allotments varied with rank in the 
Army and Navy and with level of pay in the RAF but were generally in the 
region of 7 shillings per week. 49 Canadian troops however, had to allot 
50% of their total pay, equivalent to approximately 3 shillings per day, to 
qualify for allowance . 
50 Not only was the level of allotment required from 
British troops higher than that of Americans, the problem of 'disposable 
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income' too continued to be problematic for the whole of World War II 
and the Prime Minister expressed 'deep concern' about the troubles 
which could arise from th iS. 51 By early 1942, a single American soldier 
had a disposable income in the region of 10 shillings per day, even if he 
made allotment to dependants, compared to that of a British private of 3 
shillings per day. 52 Rates of disposable income for married soldiers were 
6s 6d and 2s 6d respectively. 53 These comparative rates were deemed 
to place American troops in a much stronger position 'for the purposes of 
attracting the opposite sex' and examples rapidly come to light of 'bitter 
remarks about Americans and women' in Northern Ireland. 54 
Similarly, letters from troops in the Middle East expressed concern that 
Canadian and American troops were 'occupying' Britain whilst they were 
being sent to Libya and Egypt. 55 The Government, whilst recognising that 
it would be 
out of the question to fix the scales of pay of the Armed 
Forces by reference to those of other countries where the cost of 
living and scales of pay in general are considerably higher 56 
nevertheless recognised the necessity for taking some action in this 
matter, particularly in view of the fact that the number of American troops 
in Britain was likely to increase dramatically within a short space of 
time. 57 To this end they decided to appeal to British women, as part of 
their war effort, to 'not encourage troops of any nationality to indulge in 
ostentatious expenditure in public places' . 
58 There appears to be some 
confusion as to where this suggestion originated and whether or not it 
was ever put into practice. Although War Office files attribute it to the 
Ministry of Information and are not clear as to whether or not it was 
implemented, Reynolds, in Rich Relations, attributes it to the War Office 
and claims that it was never taken seriou Sly. 59 
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However, even if the suggestion was carried out, Army perception at 
least seems to have been that the appeal fell on deaf ears. In the months 
immediately afterwards, reports of the Army Morale Committee continued 
to suggest that women 'almost invariably' preferred the company of 
American or Dominion troops who had a greater level of disposable 
income than British soldiers . 
60 Although Canadian rates of pay also were 
higher than those of British troops, the situation here was ameliorated as 
the Canadian government agreed to hold back a portion of the pay of 
their servicemen in credits . 
61 The US War Department, however, were 
reluctant to do this, suggesting two other measures to ease the situation. 
62 Firstly, they suggested that US troops should be paid twice a month to 
reduce the amount of cash available to them to spend in any one night 
on the town. Secondly they agreed to attempt to encourage troops to 
invest part of their pay in war bonds, insurance or army savings 
schemes. Although Sir Kingsley Wood, Chancellor of the Exchequer saw 
these suggestions as being 'very helpful' in principle, their actual 
effectiveness is open to doubt. 63 By September 1942, GIs were routinely 
spending two-thirds of their disposable pay with official saving schemes 
being largely ignored. 64 
Unfavourable comparisons were also made, both by the public and in the 
press, between service pay and that earned by civilian, and particularly 
65 munitions, workers. Hancock and Gowing, in the official History of the 
Second World War volume dealing with the British War Economy, claim 
that this public criticism led directly to a debate in the House of Commons 
in late 1941 which in turn put revisions to pay and allowances in motion. 66 
In January 1942, the Secretary of State for War, speaking in the House of 
Commons referred to a suggestion that some explanation needed to be 
given for the 'disparity between the earnings of munitions workers and 
67 the emoluments of the forces'. A draft White Paper on Emoluments of 
the Armed Forces in July 1942 reported that it was a 'common thing' to 
68 hear service pay compared unfavourably with that of industrial workers. 
Although there 'had been no evidence of serious discontent in the 
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Services with the existing scale of allowances', pressure for increases 
had come from 'outside the Services' largely directed towards removing 
the 'alleged discrepancies' between service pay and that of munitions' 
workers . 
69 The paper went on to state that the comparison was not valid 
as industrial workers received all their pay in cash whilst servicemen 
received allowances for clothing, food and accommodation in addition to 
their pay. 70 1n addition, a soldier was only liable to tax on pay and not on 
benefits in kind or allowances whereas married civilian workers were 
liable for tax on any income above E3 per week . 
71 This meant that a 
married sergeant in the Army might have a total cash income for himself 
and his wife of F-4 3s 6d exempt from tax and in addition to allowances 
covering his own keep and clothing. 72 In a letter to the Secretary of 
State for War, the Treasury suggested that, in reply to unfavourable 
comparisons between civilian pay and service emoluments, stress should 
be given to the 'preferential position enjoyed by the Forces in relation to 
income tax'. 73 However, the War Cabinet agreed that a final revision of 
the White Paper should be made to avoid making direct comparisons 
between the real incomes of civilians and servicemen. The final version 
contained the statement that 
The object of this paper is to set out some of the factors which 
should be borne in mind in any attempt to measure the real value 
of the remuneration of all kinds received by members of the 
Services. Any direct or immediate comparison of pay between the 
soldier and the civilian is impossible since their systems of 
remuneration are essentially different. 74 
Although the general purpose of this White Paper on Service Pay and 
Allowances was primarily to dispel unfavourable comparisons between 
service pay and civilian wages, described by the Treasury as 'a 
particularly annoying line of claptrap', more concrete adjustments to 
allowances and pay were also included. 75 Qualifying allotments from 
soldiers to enable their families to receive Family Allowance were 
reduced from 7 shillings per week to 3s 6d at a cost of El 7.5 million per 
annum. 76 This proposal, put forward originally by the Labour Party 
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Parliamentary Services Committee, received 'a good deal of support' in 
debate and compared favourably with the rates required of US and 
Dominion troops of the equivalent of 3s 6d and 3s 8d per day 
respectively. 77 However, the matter did result in some discussion. The 
reduction would effectively mean that the lowest paid ranks would now 
not pay any allotment whilst the higher ranks would still maintain a 
minimum payment. Although this was regarded as an 'untidy 
arrangement', it was deemed preferable to removing all responsibility for 
families from the men themselves. 78 In addition, minor adjustments were 
made to child and dependants' allowances amounting to F-5m per 
annum. 79 The total cost of all changes to allowances and pensions, and 
including the instigation of a system of post-war credits for other ranks, 
was estimated to be in the region of E55m per annurn - an expenditure 
likely to rise to E60m per annum with continued expansion of the Armed 
Forces but which the Chancellor felt, would 'no doubt' be 'cheerfully and 
patiently borne. '80 From the outbreak of war in 1939 and including the 
implementation of the changes proposed in the 1942 White Paper, the 
cost of improvements to the conditions of service for members of the 
Armed Forces, excluding any improvements to pension rates, totalled 
P-93.25m. 151 
However, in the same period the strength of the armed forces had risen 
by over 320% whilst the purchasing power of the pound had decreased 
by almost one third. 82 Perhaps not surprisingly then, the White Paper 
received a very poor reception in both Parliament and the press. 'The 
Forces Programme' on the BBC on the evening of 15 September 
described its reception as 'as bad as ever scorched a White Paper 
black'. 83 Similarly, the Army Morale Reports for this period, although 
initially suggesting that there had been little pressure for increased pay 
and allowances before the White Paper now reported a 'unanimous' 
reaction that the increases were 'not satisfactory. '84 Generally, soldiers 
were reported as stating that they felt they had been given the minimum 
increase possible and families continued to suffer. 85 In Leeds, a survey 
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carried out after these increases had been implemented showed that one 
of the main causes of poverty was 'being a soldier's wife'. 86 One fifth of 
all soldiers'wives were claimed to be living in poverty, largely those with 
children who were too young for their mothers to go out to work, with an 
average shortfall of income against expenditure of 15s 6d per week. 87 
In the light of this discontent, in October 1942 the question of exactly how 
service pay and allowances were negotiated was again raised by Fred 
Bellinger, who led a deputation from the Serving Members Committee to 
meet with the Lord President and Lord Privy Seal and discuss the 
matter . 
88 As already outlined, the only existing channel for these 
negotiations was through the House of Commons, and MPs felt that'the 
constant repetition of Parliamentary Questions and debates on the 
subject of service pay and allowances was most undesirable from almost 
every point of view'. 89 Instead, a Committee of the House was suggested 
as a means of bringing the mechanism for negotiating service pay closer 
to that which existed in industry. A number of objections were raised to 
this proposal, largely by the services themselves, who felt that the 
introduction of a Standing Committee would widen the gulf between the 
services and the government and encourage a flow of grievances. 90 In 
addition, the Committee would come to be seen as being the decision- 
making body rather than just a channel for communication. In November 
the Government decided not to adopt the proposal for the Standing 
Committee. 91 Instead, a Cabinet Committee of Under-secretaries from 
the Treasury, Ministry of Pensions and all three Service Departments 
was set up to examine questions relating to service pay and allowances 
as they arose. 92 
Sir Stafford Cripps, the Lord Privy Seal, felt that the 'improvements' 
provided by the 1942 White Paper had given 'substantial justice' to all 
ranks of the services. 93 However, throughout the remainder of 1942 and 
the whole of 1943, financial worries continued to play a large part in the 
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reports of the Army Morale Committee. 94 The 1942 revisions, aimed 
largely at narrowing the gap between service and civilian pay had been 
intended to be final but civilian wages continued to rise once again 
widening the gap. By July 1943, commanders were reporting that men's 
letters no longer contained many complaints about pay and allowances, 
but this was felt to be 'because they were tired of complaining about 
them' rather than because the grievances had been met. 9,5 However, in 
October, commanders themselves were suggesting that the whole 
question of Family Allowances needed reviewing and were particularly 
concerned with reports of families who were just making ends meet but 
96 could not save anything for emergencies. Discontent also continued to 
be expressed with levels of service pay compared to that in industry. 
Ministry of Labour figures showed that average industrial earnings in July 
1943 were E6 1s 3d per week. 97 Service wages consisted of allowances 
for all meals, clothing, accommodation and amenities in addition to 
Family or Dependants' Allowances where applicable, exemption from tax 
as outlined above and health and unemployment insurance plus a cash 
wage of El 1s Od per week. 98 
As a result the Treasury concluded that the 'real' value of service pay 
was often above that of civilian wages. 99 However, they also concluded 
that, even taking into account payment of WSG, existing rates of Family 
Allowance, especially for the families of lower paid servicemen, 'did not 
enable the wife with children to live at the same standard as that enjoyed 
by the families of munitions workers'. 100 Because of this, increases to 
Family Allowances would now'merit consideration. ' 01 At the time 1.8 to 
2m Family Allowances were being paid across the three services and the 
cost of increasing minimum income for all wives to El 12s Od per week, 
without increasing required allotment, was likely to be in the region of 
: E5m. 102 Despite the fact that the Lord President of the Council, together 
with the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor and MPs who had expressed 
interest in the matter now began discussions into these possible 
increases, the feeling persisted that the government had only acted 
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under pressure from outside sources. Irene Ward, a persistent critic of 
government policy in this and other fields, suggested that the feeling in 
the country was that'the government never comes forward with 
proposals but waits for agitation'. 103 
Two schools of thought existed in relation to levels of service pay. ' 04 The 
first continued a train of thought outlined earlier that, in times of war, 
defence of one's country and duty took precedence over absolute levels 
of pay. Together with financial considerations raised by the necessities of 
a war economy, this resulted in an attitude whereby, if an existing pay 
system met the necessities of daily life, it would be 'an extravagant use of 
public funds to make available to servicemen and their families more than 
the bare necessities'. 105 The second school of thought, however, 
suggested that the labourer was always worthy of his hire. Service 
families should, in the light of this, be granted pay and allowances which 
would 'bring them above the mere subsistence level'. 106 
As the level of both public debate and that within the House of Commons 
became increasingly heated, it became clear to the government that they 
could not rely on the first school of thought. The Army had claimed that 
soldiers were upset by allegations that their families were 'starving or at 
any rate ill-provided for' and this view had been reinforced by the opinion 
of SSAFA who were dealing with the day to day problems of families 
whose allowances were delayed or inadequate. ' 07 The War Office, 
therefore, argued that a speedy end to the discussions was necessary to 
put servicemen's minds at rest suggesting that they could imagine 
I nothing more damaging to the spirit of the troops who are about to be 
engaged than acrimonious debate in the House of Commons'. 108 In the 
event W. D. Kendal, Independent MP for Grantham introduced an 
amendment to the government's proposed motion to investigate levels of 
service allowances stating that, 
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This House is of the opinion that the pay and allowances of 
members of His Majesty's Army are inadequate to enable them or 
their families to maintain a decent standard of living and that, 
therefore, it is urgent that immediate increases be made in such 
payments and allowances. 109 
This amendment, which would have forced the government to 
acknowledge that existing levels of service pay were inadequate, was 
narrowly defeated, after a lengthy debate. 110 
At all costs the government deemed it necessary to 'avoid a hasty and ill- 
considered decision... on the lines of the equally hasty and ill-considered 
conclusion reached in September 1942'. 111 To prevent this a paper, 
known as the Holland Report, was prepared by the Adjutant General's 
office on existing rates of pay and allowances. ' 12 The report firstly 
analysed the finances of 'other ranks' Army families and came to the 
conclusion that, without other income, families 'cannot maintain a decent 
standard on the allowances, qualifying allotments and voluntary 
allotments available to the private soldier'. ' 13 For officers, the Report 
assumed that their families would 'follow the way of life of a middle class 
family enjoying an income of some E600 per year. ' 14 Difficulties in 
maintaining this life style were largely experienced only by junior officers. 
However, the case of officers' families proved to be'very much more 
complicated' as, during war, Family Allowance for officers did not vary 
with rank so any flat rate increase would apply to both those in need and 
higher ranking officers' families, who were already adequately provided 
for. ' 15 The Report concluded that'the basic rates of Family Allowance are 
below the normal rates of bare subsistence'. ' 16 The increases suggested 
would amount to a cost of in the region of: E20 million per annum. A cost 
which the Prime Minister regarded as 'not unreasonable'. 117 
In the resultant White Paper, the main suggestions dealt with increases 
to Family and Children's Allowances for the families of 'other ranks', and 
introducing a common basis for allotments across the services. 118 
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Minimum payments for WSG were also increased, as were allowances 
for officer's families. 119 Although, as already discussed, such an increase 
benefited all officers, increases were greatest for junior officers with 
families. Overall the cost of the changes, which were to be implemented 
from May 1944, was estimated to be in the region of F-50 million in the 
first year. 120 
The First Lord of the Admiralty, introducing the revised rates of 
allowances on behalf of all three services in a broadcast on 20 December 
1944, spoke of the changes having come about as the result of a 
'comprehensive' review of all service rates of pay and allowances in 
relation to workers in industry. 121 For'the first time in history' there was 
now a 'reasonable equity' between pay in the armed forces and that in 
industry and broad 'equality between the services'. 122 The review was 
sited in a wider government initiative to make the service a more 
attractive career so as not to have to 'rely on an large unemployment list 
as a recruiting ground for the forces of the crown. 123 
There was, however, no suggestion that increased levels of Children's 
Allowances would continue beyond the period of the war itself. Just as 
discontent existed among some servicemen at their levels of pay 
compared to that of civilian workers, so some civilian workers expressed 
discontent with the services' system of Children's Allowances. 124 These 
were regarded as rewarding those who had large families as the levels of 
allowance increased with the number of children. In fact, the government, 
whilst considering these particular changes as being appropriate in a time 
of conscription when older men with existing families were taken into the 
forces, did not consider that such changes would be 'suitable as a 
permanent part of the pay code'. 125 In addition, under the Family 
Allowance Act, for the first time Family Allowances within the services 
became liable for income tax when the serviceman's pay reached taxable 
level. 126 Within the army, the new rates of pay and allowances were 
6 accepted as not unreasonable'. 127 
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Overall the review was seen as establishing the fundamental points of 
..... a broad equality of treatment between the three 
services and a substantial correspondence at a suitable point 
between Service pay and industrial wages. 128 
No further changes to allowances or pay were envisaged in the near 
future except in the event of a 'marked alteration in the economic 
situation of the country general ly,. 129 
As we have seen in this chapter, the problems outlined in Chapter 1 in 
attempting to draft regulations covering all eventualities continued for the 
whole period of the war. From 1940 onwards, however, the problems 
associated with pay and allowances became increasingly focused around 
the question of the comparison between service and civilian pay. Issues 
surrounding family welfare in terms of levels of income continued to 
inform comments in the Army Morale Reports throughout the period of 
the War although no information is given in relation to the morale of those 
taken prisoner of war. The information contained in the reports was 
gathered by divisional and district commanders and no comparable 
system was established for camp leaders in prisoner of war camps to 
collect information . 
130 Despite the fact that in 1940 large numbers of men 
from the British Expeditionary Force were taken captive, the plight of their 
families did not feature in any of the discussions of that year surrounding 
pay and allowances. The fall of Singapore in 1942 and the subsequent ill- 
defined status of those missing in the Far East posed even more 
problems for families but again these problems were not specifically 
addressed in discussions on service allowances in either 1942 or 1944. 
By late 1944 reports of the Army Morale Committee showed that 
concerns of servicemen in general regarding their families these were 
becoming subsumed by other concerns. 131 Concerns more directly 
related to a return to civilian life such as re-establishing family life and 
housing and employment feature more prominently in later reports. 
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Similarly, comments in the 1944 White Paper suggest that the services 
too were beginning to focus their concerns on recruitment and pay for the 
post-war services. 132 
In contrast to the situation in Britain, in France the financial concerns of 
prisoner of war families achieved a much higher profile. Immediately after 
the outbreak of war, the Third Republic acted to provide for the families of 
all servicemen, career officers, non-commissioned officers and other 
officers with a minimum of two years' service were entitled to a monthly 
salary, of which up to three quarters could be paid directly to their wives 
or parents. 133 Soldiers whose families had depended on them for 
financial support were entitled to claim allowances made up of a daily 
sum for their wife or dependant parent plus an additional sum for each 
child. 134 As with Dependants' Allowances in Britain, these allowances 
were subject to investigation but in France this was to determine need 
rather than prior levels of support. 135 With the fall of France in June 
1940, the great majority of these allowances became payable to the 
families of prisoners of war. As a result, whereas campaigns in Britain 
were waged for higher allowances for all servicemen, those in France 
were directed explicitly towards better allowances for prisoner of war 
dependants. 136 
Despite this, in July 1941 Family and Health Secretary, Jacques 
Chevalier wrote that 'a prisoner's family with children is condemned to 
9137 the most severe deprivation ... Assertions were made, firstly 
by 
Chevalier and later by Maurice Pinot, in charge of the Commissariat 
General aux Prisonniers de Guerre Rapatries, that this deprivation led 
directly to POW wives turning to prostitution as a means of eking out their 
meagre allowances. 138 Pinot asserted that, in Paris by December 1941, 
75% of all prostitutes were POW wiveS. 139 Fishman asserts that the 
accuracy of these figures is impossible to determine and that they were 
used largely as a scare tactic to gain increases in allowances for POW 
families. 140 Although the tactic was eventually successful, the proposed 
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changes took over a year to implement and allowances were only finally 
increased under pressure from Pierre Laval, Head of the Vichy 
government from April 1942 . 
141 Laval, like many in the British 
government, recognised important political benefits to be gained by 
demonstrating concern from service families in general. 142 In France, 
however, as a result of the particularly large number of women who were 
wives of prisoners of war, this group gained a political importance not 
afforded to them in Britain. Despite this higher political profile and the 
resultant increases in allowances, Sarah Fishman reports that, of the 
prisoner of war wives she contacted for her study, none reported living on 
allowances alone. 80% reported also being in some form of employment 
either in or outside the home. 143 
In Britain, the suggestion of wives turning to prostitution to supplement 
their allowances never appeared as an issue in political debates nor in 
local campaigns to increase allowances. Even in cases where complaints 
were made against wives, these were usually based on allegations of co- 
habitation or neglect of children. However, there can be little doubt that, 
for many, allowances proved barely adequate to provide for a family. Mrs 
Parkes, whose husband was taken prisoner in January 1941 recorded 
9 you'd got to be very, very careful because what little bit you'd got you'd 
got (sic) to pay yer rent and, er, of course there wasn't a lot of food you 
could get. P144 Although between 1939 and early 1946, allowances for a 
wife with two children rose by over 65%, in the same period the 
purchasing power of the pound fell by almost exactly the same 
amount. 145 In real terms then, service families as a whole were very 
much worse off than the families of those employed in, for example, 
engineering and shipbuilding, whose wages had risen by almost 
180%. 146 
Despite the fact that many of the problems faced by service dependants 
in Britain during the Second World War had already been apparent 
between 1914 - 1918 few remedies had been developed in the 
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intervening years. Perhaps the fact that, although many families had 
faced hardship during the First World War, few had actually starved, 
meant that the need to devise solutions to the problems of administering 
large numbers of allowances and ensuring that they were at an adequate 
level was not regarded as vital. In Germany, where large numbers of 
service families and war widows had faced destitution and starvation both 
during and immediately after the First World War such solutions had 
been devised. Indeed, even in 1940 when labour shortages in Germany 
were critical, it proved impossible to recruit soldiers' wives into work as 
the allowances they received were so generou S. 147 Koonz suggests that 
labour market experts at the time went so far as to suggest decreasing 
the benefits paid to soldiers' wives in an effort to encourage them to take 
up paid employment. 148 
In Britain, however, the administration of allowances staggered on, with 
the amounts granted being neither totally adequate nor at a level low 
enough to cause national outrage. And, for those like Mrs Parkes, whose 
husbands were taken captive, the general problems of inadequate 
allowances, inefficiently administered were exacerbated by the 
interpretation of regulations governing the admission and administration 
of Family and Dependants' Allowances with regard to the families of 
those taken prisoner of war. 
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Chapter 3 
Dead. Missina or Prisoner of War? 
The first two chapters of this study have followed the overall 
development of service allowances from the inter-war period to 1945. 
Integral to this summary has been a critique of governmental action 
associated with these developments and a consideration of problems 
arising from them. A number of these issues, for example the age of 
admissibility for Family Allowances, arose from the introduction of mass 
conscription in 1939. For the first time since 1916 the service hierarchies, 
and the War Office in particular, were brought into direct contact with 
large sectors of the general public whose motivation, concerns and prior 
knowledge of service life were rather different than those of the career 
servicemen they normally dealt with. As we have already seen, a number 
of the issues involved in the development of service allowances, such as 
the treatment of young married servicemen, arose from an apparent lack 
of foresight on the part of the Services regarding the implications of the 
introduction of mass conscription for the families involved. Similarly the 
implications of allowance regulations for the families of those taken 
prisoner of war do not appear to have been fully thought through - 
particularly for the families of those taken prisoner on the Far East. In 
this chapter we shall consider the implications of the methods of 
administration of service allowances with particular reference to this 
group of dependants. 
It is clear that the intention of the State was that Family and Dependants' 
Allowances should continue for any period during which the soldier was a 
prisoner of war. ' This is confirmed by a War Office minute following the 
outbreak of war in September 1939, which stated that pay, Family 
Allowance and Depend ants' Al Iowa nces should continue during any 
period of captivity for both officers and other ranks. 2 However, different 
scales of allowances were applicable depending on whether the 
serviceman was deemed to be missing, prisoner of war or killed. For 
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many families the point at which a missing breadwinner changed from 
being categorised as 'missing' to 'presumed dead' or'prisoner of war', 
apart from the huge emotional upheaval involved, was often critical in 
terms of family budgeting. As has already been shown Family Allowance 
rates were often substantially higher than pensions as wives of missing 
servicemen were 
under a greater obligation to try to maintain the normal standard of 
the home than was the wife who knew she had become a widow 
and would, therefore, have to conform to a new and lower 
standard. 3 
So critical was this difference for some families that RFL Watkins, a 
member of the Territorials, wrote that men often used to leave their 
identity tags off when they went into battle. If they were killed they would 
then be reported 'missing' and their families would continue to receive 
4 
allowances for a time before being reduced to a widow's pension . 
In a letter to the Treasury, Humphreys-Davies, Under-secretary at the 
War Office, set out the agreed position regarding allowances for men 
5 
reported missing. For the families and dependants of both officers and 
men, pay and allowances continued to be issued at normal rates for the 
first four weeks unless the man was reported dead during this time. For 
the next thirteen weeks, the appropriate allowances plus two sevenths 
6 
pay (for officers) or compulsory allotment (for men) was issued . 
Dependants of officers who were not entitled to pensions did not receive 
any allowances. In the case of families of officers reported killed, married 
allowance plus two sevenths of pay was issued for thirteen weeks 
7 although no allowances were issued to dependants. For the families of 
other ranks reported killed, widows and dependants eligible for pensions 
continued to receive a temporary allowance pending the award of 
pension for a total period of thirteen weeks. 8 In the first four weeks this 
temporary allowance amounted to Family or Dependants' Allowance plus 
actual allotment from pay. After this time it decreased to allowance plus 
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allotment at the qualifying level. For those dependants outside the 
pensionable categories, allotment at qualifying rate was issued for four 
weeks only. 9 
Although the regulations were by no means straightforward they 
appeared, at least in theory, to cover all possible eventualities. However, 
once war was actually declared, two major problems arose particularly 
concerning the determination of allowances payable to the families and 
dependants of servicemen taken captive. Firstly, many of those 
servicemen later notified as being prisoners of war were first notified as 
missing until their status was clarified. For these servicemen's families 
the length of time before the serviceman's fate was ascertained became 
a critical factor in determining their entitlement to allowances. This can 
be demonstrated most easily with reference to the Navy where the exact 
fate of men lost on the high seas was particularly difficult to determine. 
Before 1942, the normal procedure had been to assume that seamen 
lost in battle on the high seas were extremely unlikely to have survived if 
no information as to their whereabouts had been received within the four- 
week period. 10 Unless survivors had been picked up by another ship, 
which would have forwarded information, they were most likely to have 
drowned. In July 1942 HIVIS Exeter, Jupite , Electra, Encounter and 
Strongho Ld had all been lost in battles in the Java Seas. " However, 
given the geography of the area, it seemed likely that most of the crew 
members, particularly of the Exeter and Jupite who had survived the 
initial battle, would have been able to reach the Java coast. Although this 
change in perception of the fate of sailors did prompt calls for a change 
in procedure, some within the Navy felt that there was 'no reason' for 
change. 12 Others considered that an extended missing period should be 
implemented as the Japanese had not adhered to the 'normal civilised 
procedure'of allowing the Red Cross to ascertain details of prisoners in 
13 their hands and so notification might not be immediately forthcoming . 
By the end of July 1942 this second attitude had prevailed and an 
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extended missing period was granted to personnel missing from these 
ships plus sailors from HMS Thanet and Perth also lost in the area. 14 By 
November 1943 this decision had been vindicated. At the 4th meeting of 
the Interdepartmental POW Co-ordinating Committee (Finance), the 
Admiralty reported that an 'unexpectedly large' number of naval 
personnel reported missing in the Java Sea were now confirmed as 
being captives of the Japanese. 15 In the case of officers, 50% of the 
total number originally reported missing had survived. 16 
Once the procedural decision was taken, however, the administration of 
such allowances did not automatically run smoothly. As was often the 
case, decisions taken at one level did not always filter through 
immediately to those applying them. The wife of Chief Petty Officer 
Butland, missing from the Electra, still had her allowances reduced to 
pension rates after the statutory seventeen weeks and only had the 
smissing' rate reinstated after attention was drawn to her case by the 
London Eveninq News. 17 As we have already seen in a number of cases 
related to service allowances, the intervention of the press was again 
required to expedite the situation speedily. 
Indeed, from the beginning of the war, difficulties had arisen around the 
issue of precise dates when families were notified that servicemen were 
posted 'missing'. Although specific periods were set out when allowances 
should change from full pay plus allowances to allowance plus allotments 
and then to pension rates, Service Departments and families did not 
necessarily receive this information at the same time. 18 To use the Navy 
again as an example, in the case of Naval officers there was often a 
discrepancy between the date on which the officer was known by the 
Admiralty to be missing and the date on which his family received such 
notification. 19 For operational reasons, it was often considered politic by 
the Navy not to allow the loss, or otherwise, of particular vessels to 
become common knowledge. For example, in early 1941 a German radio 
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broadcast claimed the loss of HMS Illustrious in the Mediterranean. 20 A 
later broadcast by Sir Walter Monkton KC, Director General of the 
Ministry of Information, reported that, at the time, it had been tempting to 
set the record straight by releasing the information that the vessel had 
not in fact sunk . 
21 However, as the Ministry of Information felt that this 
was exactly the information which German agencies were trying to 
obtain, silence was maintained until the Illustrious had been sufficiently 
repaired in Malta to leave under her own stea M. 22 No mention is made of 
whether or not any consideration was given to the feelings of the families 
of the seamen on this vessel who must have believed that their loved 
ones had been lost. This policy somewhat backfired in 1941 when the 
medium Helen Duncan released the news of the sinking of HMS Barham 
during a seance in Portsmouth before the Admiralty had released the 
news to the families concerned. 23 Mrs Duncan was regarded as such a 
threat to security that she was tried in 1944, originally on a charge of 
conspiracy, and eventually convicted under the 1735 Witchcraft Act. 24 
Obviously, a widow could not be expected to make any financial 
arrangements until she was officially notified of her husband's death. As 
a consequence the Treasury agreed that pay and allowances should be 
continued up to the date at which their families were notified that they 
had been killed rather than being stopped from the date at which the 
authorities received such information. 25 Similarly, the period during 
which payment of temporary allowances commenced was also 
calculated from the date of notification of death to the widow herself 
rather than notification to the appropriate government department. 
Problems also arose, again apparently largely unforseen, from the lack 
of official notification of the death of a serviceman if the wife 
subsequently wished to remarry. Especially if the widow in question 
wished to remarry another serviceman as a possibility existed in the eyes 
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of the Treasury that one woman might in this way be claimed as a 
legitimate dependant by two men. 26 The War Office generally only gave 
allowances for second marriages if a period of seven years had elapsed 
from the time when the former spouse was known to have been alive. 27 
However, the Co-ordinating (Inter-departmental) Committee on 
Dependants Allowances, meeting in April 1942, considered whether or 
not it was realistic in time of war for service departments to only grant 
allowances for second marriages if the woman had formally been notified 
that her first husband was dead . 
28 At the time there was no agreement 
on this issue as differing views existed within the Committee as to how 
far the service departments should become involved in the moral issues 
these re-marriages raised. Some members felt that there was no need to 
'look beyond the marriage certificate' that is, if a marriage certificate 
existed then the serviceman had a right to claim allowances, but no 
agreement could be reached . 
29 Although an Assistant Secretary in the 
Administration and Clerical Section of the War Office, acting as 
Chairman of the Committee, felt that the matter should be referred to a 
'higher authority' there is no information as to whether this higher - 
authority was envisaged as being governmental or spiritual . 
30 The matter 
then disappeared from the files, but it becomes clear that no solution 
was agreed upon as it re-surfaced in October 1945. At this time both the 
War Office and the Admiralty were in agreement that it was 'not 
unreasonable' for a woman whose allowances had been reduced to 
pension rates to assume that the authorities regarded her husband as 
dead even although no formal notification of death may have been 
received . 
31 The Air Ministry still, however, had reservations and the 
matter again disappears. 32 
In fact, the whole question of women re-marrying on the assumption that 
their husbands were dead when they were actually prisoners of war, 
continued to present a problem throughout the war and in the years 
immediately after. One example will serve to illustrate this point. In March 
1942 Bombadier Ford of the Maritime Regiment was reported killed in 
the Far East and his wife officially notified of his death in jUly. 33 In 
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September of the same year Mrs Ford re-married a Private Appleton and 
Family Allowance was issued to her in respect of this marriage from 27 
September. 34 However, in June 1943 Mrs Appleton, as she now was, 
received a postcard from Bombadier Ford informing her that he was in 
fact a prisoner of war in Japanese hands. The War Office decreed that in 
these 'distressing circumstances' it was up to Mrs Ford to 'make up her 
own mind as to her future' and she decided that she would carry on living 
with Private Appleton even if this had to be on an 'irregular basis'. As she 
had married in good faith following official notification of her husband's 
death, the War Office requested permission from the Treasury to 
continue her payments of Family Allowance in respect of her new 
marriage. Although the Treasury agreed to this they asked the War 
Office to note that this decision should be seen as being 'without 
prejudice to any general decision on policy that we may wish to take if an 
appreciable number of similar cases come to notice. ' 
In the Treasury files this case is referred to as an 'Enoch Arden' case 
after the Tennyson poem of the same title. 35 In this poem two childhood 
friends, Philip Ray and Enoch Arden compete for the hand of Annie Lee 
with whom they have grown up. Annie marries Enoch but he later goes to 
sea to earn sufficient money to support his family. Following reports of 
Enoch's death at sea, Annie then marries Philip. However, Enoch is not 
dead. He returns to their village but, on seeing Annie and his children 
happy with Philip, he determines not to spoil their happiness and leaves 
without speaking to them. The fact that this type of case had been given 
a name suggests that Mrs Appleton was not an isolated example, and 
the Treasury was reluctant to commit itself to a policy without specific 
information as to the likely overall financial implications. An attitude 
which was again apparent when the question of extended allowances for 
servicemen whose status was not confirmed came under consideration. 
In some ways their caution was justified. Recovery of 'overpayment' of 
allowances claimed for a bigamous 'wife' could not be made under the 
normal articles of payment. Instead they could only be recouped by a 
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penal deduction from wages under Section 25 of the Army Act or by 
36 
sentence of a court-martial. War Office records for the period 1941 and 
1947, show no such cases where overpayment was successfully 
recovered. 37 
Vivienne Chatfield, herself the widow of a Far East POW, states there 
were many unpleasant shocks of this nature for returning prisoners as 
'many [wives] had remarried when their husbands were missing, and 
others were living with other men' . 
38 However, it should not be assumed 
that failing marriages or bigamous relationships were solely the 
prerogative of those taken captive and their families. Many of the general 
histories concerning the return of servicemen to Britain after the end of 
the war contain similar testimony. 39 A survey conducted in Birmingham 
during the last two years of the war estimated that one third of all 
illegitimate births were to married women and, of these, half were to 
servicemen's wives . 
40 Divorce figures for adultery in the years 1939 - 45 
show a four fold increase with 58% of cases being brought by 
husbands. 41 
Problems also arose in relation to notification dates and the veracity of 
confirmation of status of servicemen from the 'unexpected developments 
in France and Belgium' as, following the evacuation from Dunkirk, large 
numbers of British servicemen became trapped behind enemy lines 
without any reliable information as to their fate. 42 1n many cases the only 
information available was from other servicemen who had escaped into 
unoccupied France and reported that several of their comrades were 
alive but hidden with French families. 43 In these cases the rules were 
adapted so as not to jeopardise the situation of the man himself or of the 
family hiding him and no further enquiries were made. Instead 
allowances continued at full rates for two and a half months from the 
date when the man was reported as having last been seen alive, after 
which time each individual case was reviewed . 
44 By August 1941, forty- 
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nine men had been reported missing but alive behind enemy lines in 
France or BelgiUM. 45 Of these men, fourteen eventually found their way 
back to British territory and reported their escape. 46 Fifteen of the 
remainder were captured by the Germans and in March 1943 were 
prisoners of war, eight were interned in Vichy France and later became 
prisoners of war in Italian hands. 47 In another six cases, relatives 
submitted further letters written by the men involved to support claims for 
continuing allowances rather than reduction to pension rates. 48 In the 
remaining six cases, no news was received following the original report 
of their still being alive . 
49 Thirty other cases also came to light, mainly of 
escaped prisoners of war, but also of some servicemen missing in 
Greece in similar circumstances and a number of men were known to 
have escaped from prisoner of war camps and remained at large for at 
least one year and, in one case, for three years . 
50 Again, in the great 
majority of these cases no further action was taken to try to verify the 
situation in case the man's position in hiding was jeopardised. 
By March 1941 it had become clear, to the War Office at least, that the 
period of seventeen weeks during which allowances and allotments were 
continued was insufficient time to ascertain whether a serviceman was 
dead or a prisoner of war, even in Europe. 51 Indeed reports that men 
were prisoners of war in German hands were still being received for 
some men ten months after they had been reported missing during the 
evacuations from Belgium and France. 52 The War Office now suggested 
that this period for continuing allowances should be extended to twenty- 
six weeks. 53 This was still less than the time allowed in the First World 
War when, although allowances only continued for two months for ' 
married officers and single officers with pensionable dependants, they 
were continued for thirty weeks for other ranks. However, in March 1940 
the likelihood of large numbers of men being taken prisoner of war was 
not seen as being likely. Humphreys-Davies, Assistant Secretary at the 
Treasury regarded it as 'unnecessary and undesirable to legislate for the 
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future on the assumption that the British Army habitually throws away its 
arms' and is, by implication, taken prisoner. 54 Instead, it was suggested 
that provision should be made for'special cases, where men previously 
reported missing were subsequently found to be alive and at large in 
Belgium and France . 
55 Despite the matter being referred to an Inter- 
Departmental Conference on 20th March 1941, the Treasury held to this 
position. 56 
The fall of Hong Kong, a mere nine months later on 25th December 
1941, again opened the matter for discussion. Within the War Office, the 
feeling was that, although most of the garrison here would eventually 
prove to have been taken prisoner of war, the length of time anticipated 
for the Japanese to formally notify the authorities of this fact would mean 
that, under existing rules, many families would be reduced to the 
equivalent of pensions unnecessarily. 57 In the light of this, the Army 
Council anticipated 'a strong and growing body of public criticism' and 
proposed that the seventeen week period for the continuation of 
allowances be extended by a further thirteen weeks . 
58 The position was 
to be reviewed if the Army Council received definite information 
regarding the fate of 80% of the garrison within the first eight weeks of 
this extended period. Although some concern was expressed that the 
public should understand the 'differentiation in treatment' between 
personnel missing at Hong Kong and those captured in Libya, in 
February 1942 the Treasury agreed to sanction the situation in the Far 
East as 'a special case . 
59 The rationale for this was that where men 
were lost in 'small batches', as was the case in Libya, information as to 
their status was almost always available 'within a comparatively short 
time' . 
60 As a result, extension of allowances was only required in cases 
where large numbers of men had been lost at the same time and 
notification was likely to be delayed . 
61 Based on this decision the War 
Office then requested that further'special cases' should be considered if 
other areas of the Far East fell under Japanese control. 62 For example, 
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in the case of Malaya the War Office argued that, as three months after 
the fall of Hong Kong 'not a single name [had] been transmitted by the 
Japanese Government, there were no grounds for hoping that the 
position would be any different in the case of Malaya. 63 In fact this 
example was seen as being even more delicate in that many families 
from Malaya had been evacuated to Australia where they would be in 
contact with families evacuated from Hong Kong and any difference in 
treatment would be immediately apparent. 64 
As Hong Kong had fallen on 25 December 1941 families and 
dependants would have automatically received allowances in full, 
including any voluntary allotments in issue, up to 30 April 1942. Following 
agreement by the Treasury, these allowances were now extended to 30 
July 1942, that is for a further thirteen weeks. 65 Singapore had fallen on 
15 February 1942, and allowing five days for official notification, 
temporary allowances would anyway continue up to 20 June. 66 In Java, 
which was reported as having surrendered on 10 March 1942, under the 
normal regulations allowances would continue up to 15 July. 67 In these 
later cases, the normal time for the issue of temporary allowances had 
not yet expired so the Treasury saw no reason to extend them. A hand- 
written, and unsigned, note in the margins of a letter on the subject 
accuses the War Office of making such proposals on 'sentimental 
68 
grounds'. Not an attitude many service families would have attributed to 
them. 
Instead of formulating an overall policy, the Treasury argued that 
agreement with the Japanese to allow for telegraphic notification of 
prisoners of war had changed the situation from the time of the fall of 
Hong Kong. Unlike the Foreign Office, who saw the Japanese as 
extremely inefficient in giving these notifications, the Treasury, without 
giving specific examples, claimed to have 'found them quite the reverse 
in many other things'. 69 Consequently, they regarded it as 'not 
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impossible' that their prisoner of war information service would prove to 
be efficient, at the same time noting that the War Office offered the 
d usual threats of Ministerial action' if the War Office's proposals were not 
agreed to. 70 The possibility was also raised that most families from these 
locations, rather than being in Australia as had been assumed would, in 
fact, be returned to Britain . 
71 They would then compare their own 
situation favourably with that of families of men reported missing in Libya 
rather than unfavourably with those reported missing in Hong Kong. 
Nevertheless, some extension was reluctantly agreed to and the 
Treasury suggested that allowances in all Far Eastern cases should be 
extended to the date approved for Hong Kong. 
The War Office argued that to implement such a decision to agree a 
common date would effectively give families concerned with the fall of 
Singapore seven weeks less on temporary allowances than those from 
72 Hong Kong. A further complication was also raised in that, whereas 
there was little doubt about who was actually in Hong Kong at the time of 
its fall, there was greater confusion in the case of Singapore. Large 
numbers of reinforcements reached there late in the campaign, moving 
under rules of secrecy. 73 As a result many relatives did not have definite 
knowledge that their menfolk had actually been in Singapore. In 
response, the Treasury attempted to clarify their position by stating that it 
had been their intention that 'in all Far Eastern cases where the normal 
period, or the extended period in the case of Hong Kong, expired before 
the 31 July, full allowances should nevertheless be continued to that 
date. 974 Even then, temporary allowances would not necessarily cease at 
that date as the particular circumstances would be taken into 
consideration nearer the time. 
By the third week in June 1942, when normal temporary allowances were 
due to cease for the families of those missing from Singapore, The War 
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Office had received only one official list of 343 prisoners of war taken at 
75 Hong Kong. Although the Japanese government had promised that a 
list of names of 280,000 would be sent by way of ships carrying 
evacuated diplomatic staff from Japan, this list would not be available 
76 
until after the first exchange in Lourengo Marques. In viewof this, the 
War Office saw no prospect of being able to inform the majority of the 
next-of-kin within 'any reasonable interval' after the 31 Jul Y. 77 As a 
result, the Army Council requested that normal allowances should be 
continued for a further thirteen weeks adding the question of how 
cessation of these allowances would be construed by relatives. 78 
Transfer to pension rates after this period of time would, they thought, be 
viewed by some, if not the majority, of families as 'unofficial' notification 
of death. 79 Inevitably, the lack of information available to the relatives of 
those missing in the Far East through official channels meant that any 
changes of this nature would be immediately seized on. The Treasury, 
as usual more concerned with financial savings than family well-being, 
viewed further extensions as 'entirely wrong' and claimed that if they had 
known how long the situation would go on for they would only have 
approved an extension for a maximum period of three months. 80 
Eventually, however, the question of administrative costs helped to sway 
the Treasury from this opinion. Even if 80% of those missing were 
eventually found to be alive, some 20,000 remaining cases would still 
need to be transferred to pensions or allowances equal to pension. 81 As 
it would be a 'difficult matter'to change all these dependants of men not 
reported captive from temporary allowances to pensions in a short space 
of time, the Treasury agreed that there should not be any reduction in 
temporary allowances before the end of October 1942, a total of 43 
82 weeks from the fall of Hong Kong. Extensions beyond this period would 
still be considered, if necessary, to ease the administrative work 
involved. In respect of the effect on public morale and possible 
repercussions in terms of popular support for the war effort, the War 
Office had on this occasion a better than normal grasp of public opinion, 
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and certainly a better understanding than the Treasury. In a letter to the 
Treasury, they claimed the matter as one 'which could not be dealt with 
solely in the light of reason and logiC. 983 They also thought it necessary to 
take into account'the force of public sentiment as it has been and will be 
expressed, in this connection, in Parliament and elsewhere' . 
84 In 
contrast, a hand-written margin note to this letter, added by the Treasury, 
asks 'Do the general public believe this? '85 
The economic argument put forward by the War Office hinged on the 
assumption that at least 80% of those originally notified as missing would 
eventually be found to be prisoners of war. For these men no extra costs 
would have actually been accrued as, the families and dependants of 
prisoners of war were entitled to full allowances anyway. Based on this 
assumption the War Office estimated that the extra cost of extending the 
payment of temporary allowances until 31 October 1942 would 'certainly 
be less than E20,000'. 86 Again administrative factors came into play. The 
prospect of having to issue 45,000 new allowance books for the 31 July 
1942, when it was not known for certain who was to be issued with 
allowances and who with pensions, certainly added weight to the 
argument for continuing temporary allowances until definite information 
was available about the majority of those missing. 
By 7 December 1942, only 2,200 army personnel had been reported by 
the Japanese as having been taken prisoner - accounting for slightly less 
than 6% of all those originally posted missing. 87 There seemed little 
prospect of others being notified before the middle of January 1943 
when the next deadline for expiry of temporary allowances came into 
effect. As a result the Treasury again sanctioned an extension this time 
of twenty-six rather than the anticipated thirteen weeks . 
88 However, the 
Far East was still regarded as a special case and the Treasury declined 
to authorise the War Office, Air Ministry or Admiralty to extend payment 
of temporary allowances in other cases beyond the normal seventeen 
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week period. 89 They argued that to discriminate between cases in 
Europe would lead to complaints from those whose allowances were not 
extended and that it would be difficult to convince them 'that they are 
being fairly dealt with. '90 Initially, both the Air Ministry and Admiralty saw 
this as fair. However, neither of these services wished to resist the War 
Office, because of the much greater number of soldiers concerned. As a 
result, in November 1942, the Treasury agreed to extend the normal 
period of payment of temporary allowances from seventeen to twenty six 
weeks in all cases from the date of notification of casualty for other 
ranks. 91 Payment of temporary allowances to dependants of officers 
remained at thirteen weeks. 92 
There can be no doubt that the lack of a coherent policy on length of 
payment of temporary allowances and the length of time taken to make 
decisions on these matters did have an effect on the finances of the 
families concerned. Corporal D. Hanks, of the 2nd Battalion Highland 
Light Infantry, was notified as missing in June 1942.93 In a form letter of 
30th June 1942 his wife was notified that her current allowance of 35s 6d 
per week would continue until 25th October 1942. If no news of her 
husband had been received by that time the War Office would then make 
a decision regarding further allowances. A letter of 28th November 1942 
from the War Office to the Treasury seems to suggest that Mrs Hanks 
may have complained to the Treasury about not knowing what her future 
arrangements were to be. In fact, she had not been told what would 
happen once the temporary allowance expired as the War Office was 
trying to obtain sanction from the Treasury to continue this allowance. 
Their letter noted that 'I hope that what has happened in this case will 
help to convince the Treasury of our difficulties in dealing with this type of 
case if we do not get quick decisions from you. ' By 25 October the 
Treasury still had not reached a decision and Mrs Hanks' temporary 
allowance ceased. She was then paid an allowance at pension rates of 
19s per week until the Treasury reached their decision. As this decision 
ill 
reinstated her temporary allowance, a book of drafts then had to be re- 
issued for family allowance at the original rate. The Treasury's indecision 
had resulted in the extra administrative work involved in issuing two 
allowance books in addition to a reduction in Mrs Hanks' income of 16s 
6d per week whilst their decision was pending. There is no suggestion 
that she was then reimbursed for the period during which her allowance 
was unnecessarily reduced. 
The whole issue of reducing the allowances paid to the families of men 
who were posted 'missing' was viewed by the War Office as likely to 
cause 'serious financial embarrassment', especially to wives and children 
of officers. 94 If the allotment portion of the allowances ceased after four 
weeks and lower temporary allowances were issued, the reduction of 
income could be up to: E30 per month for the families of higher paid 
officers. This could lead to particular problems for Naval families ratings 
who had traditionally been able to make allotments not only into bank 
accounts which their families could draw upon, but also directly to 
outside agencies such as insurance companies. 95 If such payment of 
insurance premiums was interrupted, because of a reduction in funds 
available, then the whole policy would be forfeit. At a meeting of the 
Imperial Prisoners of War Committee in early June 1942, Admiralty 
representatives suggested that the families of Naval Officers missing in 
the Far East should receive temporary allowances assessed on married 
allowance plus any allotment which the officer was 'already making to the 
family at time of casualty. 996 As Naval officers were perceived as normally 
allotting 'considerably more' than the two sevenths of pay allowed for by 
temporary allowances, a reduction to this level would represent a serious 
cut in family budget. 97 Again the Navy saw this as especially hard where 
men would probably ultimately be found to be prisoners of war and the 
reductions unnecessary. The War Office objected strongly to this 
proposal as the Army pay system did not allow officers to make 
allotments through official channels. 98 As a result there was no official 
means within the Army of verifying existing levels of contribution and in 
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this objection the Air Ministry supported them, as a similar situation 
operated within the RAF. Again, due to weight of numbers, the Treasury 
whilst feeling a 'very considerable sympathy' for the Admiralty view 
nonetheless supported the War Office standpoint. 99 
Throughout late 1942 and early 1943 the period for the payment of 
temporary allowances to dependants of men missing in the Far Eastern 
theatre of war continued to be extended. In June 1943 the War Office set 
out the existing position for all areas concerned. 100 In Malaya extensions 
were proposed which would bring the period of payment of temporary 
allowances up to sixty-nine weeks or to 30 September 1943, whichever 
was sooner. In this area the Japanese were reporting names of prisoners 
of warroughly by areas of internment in alphabetical order' so that an 
almost complete list had been received, albeit in stages. 101 However 
these lists did not cover those prisoners, possibly up to 50% of the total, 
who had been moved to Siam and Indo-China from where almost no 
names at all had been forthcoming. 102 It was hoped that, as the 
Japanese lists for Malaya were almost complete, they might then turn 
their attention to Siam and Indo-China next and there was 'some reason' 
to hope that the bulk of names would be received by the end of the 
year. ' 03 Because of this expectation a new proposal was made that 
temporary payments to dependants of all those missing in Malaya and 
Singapore up to ninety five weeks in total, but not beyond 31 st January 
1944.104 
In the Dutch East Indies, uncertainty about the overall situation had led 
to those servicemen known to have been in this area not being posted 
missing until 1 February 1943 (i. e. approx. twelve months after fall of 
Singapore). 105 Accordingly, temporary allowances were due to expire 
after the normal twenty-six weeks at the end of August. Of those missing, 
one third of Army personnel had been reported as prisoners of war with a 
slightly higher figure for the RAF. The general feeling within the War 
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Office was that allowances to the dependants of these men should be 
extended to the same date as those for dependants of missing from 
Malaya or for forty-three weeks, whichever was the shorter. 106 Originally 
service personnel reported missing in Burma had also been included in 
the Malayan category and all those reported missing in either Burma or 
India before 31 October 1942 were still included in this category. 107 For 
the families of those missing in these areas in later campaigns, between 
1 November 1942 and 31 May 1943, estimated by the Army to be 
probably less than 1,000 men, temporary allowances were extended to 
fifty two weeks in all, without any over-riding date for cessation of 
payment. 108 As these were the most recent casualties, and as they were 
furthest from Tokyo, it was assumed that prisoners here would be 
amongst the last to be officially reported. 109 
These suggestions were all agreed by the Treasury in June 1943 and the 
ad hoc situation for the extension of Temporary Allowances continued 
throughout 1944 and up to the beginning of 1945 by which time the War 
Office were dealing with nearly 3,000 cases of missing personnel. 110 In 
the case of allowances for dependants of Navy personnel in particular, 
pressure was still being exerted on the Treasury by the Services to 
continue allowances 'so long as names of prisoners were coming 
through"" 
Although, as had been assumed by the services, many of those notified 
missing did indeed later turn out to be prisoners of war, naturally a 
number of servicemen were officially declared dead during the extended 
period of allowances. In these cases the Treasury had envisaged that a 
period of six weeks would be needed to make arrangements for a 
change over from allowances to pension in order to ascertain eligibility 
for pension and the rate of payable. Initially it was suggested that 
allowances should be continued during the changeover period rather 
than an immediate reduction to pension rates. However, the War Office 
had already put in hand preliminary enquiries in the cases of all men 
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declared missing so that the results of these enquiries would be 
immediately available to the Ministry of Pensions should the men 
subsequently be notified dead. As a result of these enquiries the War 
Office envisaged that cases needing investigation from scratch would be 
few and could be dealt with within the six-week period. ' 12 The Treasury, 
rather unusually given their normal lack of sympathy for widows, in this 
case saw it as important to give dependants three months' notice of 
cessation of allowances, especially where these had been extended for 
long periods of time, to allow for new financial arrangements or cutbacks 
to be implemented. 113 In the light of this, for all allowances due to end 
on the current proposed date of 30 June 1945, reviews needed to be 
completed by February and would have to be based on data available at 
the end of January to allow time for circulation of information. 114 On the 
other hand, if reviews of naval allowances were postponed until April, as 
the Admiralty was suggesting, allowances for these cases would have to 
be extended beyond the end of June. Therefore, it would have been 
manifestly impossible for the Secretary of State for War to announce in 
February that Army and Air Force allowances were going to be 
terminated if the Admiralty were not going to review the position until 
April. ' 15 
In the event, the Secretary of State for War, Sir John Grigg, made a 
statement regarding allotments and allowances for dependants of both 
officers and men, for all three services, missing in the Far East to the 
House of Commons in March 1945.1 16 After outlining the normal position, 
Sir John continued by explaining that, because of the 'extreme delays' by 
the Japanese government in reporting the names of those held prisoner 
of war, extensions to the missing allowance had been approved for an 
extended period. In the case of men reported missing following the fall of 
Hong Kong, normal allowances had ended in May 1943 and lower rates 
paid as the length of elapsed time was such that men still missing from 
this theatre of war had to be assumed dead. For men missing in other 
areas in the Far East the position had been reviewed in the light of all 
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available information. Most of those reported as missing in the fighting in 
Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies and in Burma before November 
1942 had now been reported as prisoners of war either by official 
notification or through communications received from the men 
themselves. Because of this level of notification the government was now 
forced to accept that a 'considerable number' of those still missing 
following these campaigns would not still be alive. ' 17 In the light of this 
conclusion it had been decided that temporary allowances for those still 
missing from these campaigns would cease on 31 July 1945 for other 
ranks and on 1 August 1945 for officers. For the families and dependants 
of all these men continuing allowances at the lower pension rate would 
be paid. Despite his earlier assertion that many of those missing could 
not still be alive, Sir John nevertheless stated that this did not mean that 
the death of the missing man had automatically been presumed or that 
efforts to trace him would cease. Out of a total of 2,054 men missing in 
campaigns after November 1942, only 19 had been officially notified as 
being captives of the Japanese by July 1945 and, at the end of October 
1944, the War Office suggested a further twenty-six week extension of 
temporary allowances to 31 January 1946.1 18 
Although many of those reported as missing in the Far East did later 
prove to have been taken captive, nearly 30,000 men were killed in this 
particular theatre of war. Consequently, a number of families must have 
been granted continued missing allowances when they should have been 
paid lower pension rates and the Treasury and Service Departments 
faced the problems of whether to try to reclaim such allowances and if so 
how. In fact, even where families were officially notified of the death of a 
serviceman, the authorities often perceived potential dangers of 
overpayment. Mrs Fuller, the widow of Airman Sgt. LE Fuller was 
officially notified of her husband's death in early 1943.119 By October 
1944 five applications had been made to Mrs Fuller for the return of her 
RAF order book which was valid up to February 1945 and, in the eyes of 
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the issuing paymaster allowed for the possibility of 'serious fraudulent 
encashment of orders. 'The Postmaster at the Bramford Road Office in 
Ipswich where the orders were due for encashment stated clearly that 
the book was 'not to hand' and so it was assumed that Mrs Fuller had 
retained the book and might possibly be continuing to draw her 
allowance. However, a later note in November 1944 records that the 
book had in fact been handed to the postmaster at Bramford Road in 
May 1943 and the book was finally forwarded to the Air Ministry in 
Worcester in November 1944. Far from having fraudulent intentions, Mrs 
Fuller's lack of reply was, as the Ministry of Pensions suggested, 'a stony 
silence as a protest against what she may regard as our incompetence. ' 
For a recent widow struggling to cope with the death of her husband and 
the reduction in her income, the continual badgering for the return of an 
order book which she had promptly returned in the correct way must 
have seemed final proof that the government and services held the 
families of their servicemen in very low regard indeed. However, where 
overpayments did occur, there is no evidence to show that the Services 
or the Treasury made any attempt to reclaim them. Perhaps it proved too 
difficult to establish an exact date when the man had died and so 
calculate the extent of overpayment. Perhaps the experience of trying to 
reclaim overpayment of allowances for bigamous 'wives' had alerted the 
authorities to the difficulties implicit in such action. Given the case of Mrs 
Fuller, it seems more likely that the action had a practical basis rather 
than that the Treasury balked at trying to reclaim overpayments from 
grieving widows. 
Decisions affecting the families of British servicemen also had wider 
ramifications in that they could also affect the families of Dominion and 
Empire servicemen. The India Office, for example, saw any British 
decision regarding the dependants of those missing in Burma in 
particular as important as it would also apply to the families of those 
missing from British Service establishments in India . 
120 They considered 
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that the way the families of those missing following a mass surrender 
were dealt with would be 'of great psychological importance from the 
recruiting point of view', thus echoing the Secretary of State's statement 
of 1939 . 
121 However, the War Office had discovered that there was no 
regular allotment system in operation for the families of men of the Indian 
Brigade missing following the fall of Hong Kong and Singapore and, in 
the light of this, agreed to pay families the amount reckoned to have 
been generally remitted to them by the men - 50% of pay - much higher 
than the amount normally allotted by British troops. 122 In the case of 
families of men missing at Hong Kong these allotments would have 
ceased on 1 May 1943. By this time only 184 out of a total of 3,000 men 
of the Brigade known to have been in Hong Kong and Singapore had 
been reported by the Japanese government as prisoner of war and it 
appeared that the Japanese were deliberately withholding the names of 
Indian servicemen. 123 In the light of this, allowances for the families of 
Brigade servicemen missing from Hong Kong and Singapore were 
extended up to 31 December 1943. However, by the beginning of 
December, despite all efforts made by the Government of India to obtain 
names, the total number of servicemen confirmed as captive from Hong 
Kong was only 364, with no names at all reported for Singapore. 124 A 
further extension to allowances of six months was proposed with 
subsequent automatic extensions of six months for as long as the total 
reported remained at less than 50% of the total missing. By June 1944, 
only 463 of the 1,700 missing at Hong Kong and 1,804 of the 3,600 
missing in Malaya were confirmed as being prisoners of war. 125 Although 
the latter figure was hoped to show some change in the attitude of the 
Japanese government in the notification of status of Indian troops, 50% 
were still unaccounted for. At this time the maximum of 50% being 
allotted to families from pay was increased to 60% following a similar 
increase already implemented within the Indian Army. 126 
Again the actions of the British government proved to be reactive rather 
than pro-active in the matter of service family welfare. Unlike the British 
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government, the Government of India had adopted a special category 
'missing believed prisoner of war to deal with allowances for families of 
men missing from the Indian Army. 127 In this way allotments could be 
continued at the equivalent of payments being made under British Family 
Allowance system unless proof of death was furnished. There is no 
suggestion that the Treasury, nor any of the Service Departments, ever 
proposed a similar category for British troops, despite a stated conviction 
that at least 80% of those missing would eventually prove to have been 
taken prisoner. Had this been done it would have removed the necessity 
for continual reviews of payments under the 'missing' provision and 
greatly reduced the administrative costs involved. Instead the Treasury 
seem to have preferred to deploy resources in this way rather than run 
the risk of overpayment of allowances to families. Indeed, the first 
extension to allowances for the families of those still missing was only 
agreed 'in view of the strong political interest displayed at the present 
time regarding the position of Prisoners of War in the Far East'. 128 As 
had been the cases with increases to allowances, the government once 
again failed to take the initiative to provide for service families and had to 
be forced into action. 
With the cessation of hostilities in the Far East in August 1945 and the 
release of prisoners, the conditions for extension of allowances ended. In 
November 1945, families of the 568 airmen still missing were given three 
months' notice that normal married allowance would cease and 
temporary allowances at pension rates would come into effect as it was 
6practically certain' that news of any men missing but still alive would be 
received within a few weeks . 
129 The Air Force felt that if news had not 
been received by that time there would, unfortunately, 'be little room for 
doubt' that the men were in fact dead . 
130 The War Office issued similar 
notices although at this time 4,800 men of all ranks were still missing 
from the Army. 131 Within the Air Force continuing efforts were made to 
trace the men still missing through search teams set up in Rangoon, 
Meiktila, Mandalay, Bangkok and Saigon to attempt to locate the 
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wreckage of aircraft. 132 By May 1947,62 wrecked aircraft had been 
133 located and the remains of 22 airmen recovered . By October 
1947 the 
search teams were beginning to be dismantled and, by January 1948, 
the operation was finally ended. 134 By then, of the 568 airmen still 
135 
missing at the end of hostilities, 499 had been traced . 
At the beginning of this chapter we saw that it was indeed the intention of 
government that allowances should continue to be paid to families for 
time during which their menfolk were captive. Problems, however, began 
to arise whenever men were unaccounted for over an extended period of 
time as there was a lack of a coherent policy for periods when the actual 
status of a particular serviceman was unclear. Before December 1941, 
when dealing almost exclusively with those taken captive in Europe, the 
decision to adopt a 'wait and see' policy by extending allowances over 
short periods whilst awaiting official notification was not unreasonable. 
Both Germany and Italy were party to the 1929 Geneva Convention and, 
whilst communications were disrupted, notification through official 
channels was generally forthcoming. With the entry of Japan into the war 
and the huge losses sustained after the fall of Hong Kong and 
Singapore, however, the situation was radically altered. 
Japan had not adopted the Geneva Convention and hence was not 
bound by its conditions regarding treatment of prisoners of war although, 
upon entry into the war, the Japanese Foreign Minister, Togo Shigenori, 
had agreed that the conditions of the Convention would be applied 
mutatis mutandis. 136 However, the Japanese Field Service Code of 1941 
clearly sets out the prevailing Japanese attitude towards prisoners of war 
when it states that its own servicemen 'shall not undergo the shame of 
being taken alive. 137 Given this underlying attitude it was inevitable that 
tensions would occur between cultural inclination and the treatment of 
prisoners of war prescribed not only by the Convention but also by the 
normal concerns of reciprocity of treatment. Although in December 1941 
the Japanese created a POW Information Bureau, its duty in relation to 
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the dissemination of information regarding enemy prisoners was never 
adequately fulfilled. This is not to suggest that the Bureau deliberately 
set out to withhold information regarding Allied prisoners of war but 
rather that it did not see the importance to British families of such 
information. Its function of providing information regarding Japanese 
servicemen taken captive was similarly unfulfilled. A report on Bureau 
activities written in 1955 states that, when enquiries were received from 
next of kin the Bureau 'replied appropriately in the light of Japanese 
traditional concepts'. 138 This suggests that notification to next of kin was 
not only not automatic, but also that there was some reluctance to admit 
the shame of capture on the part of both government agencies and 
families alike. 139 Small wonder then that little priority was given to 
notification of POW status to other governments. It is, perhaps, more 
surprising that any notifications were received at all. However, for next of 
kin in Britain, and British government agencies, this resulted in extended 
periods of time, often from the moment of possible capture until liberation 
at the end of hostilities, when no definite news was received as to 
whether servicemen were dead, missing or actually prisoners of war. As 
a result, families remained in a state of limbo neither automatically 
eligible for full allowances nor for pensions. 
This inevitably raises the question of why the government chose 
throughout the period from 1941 to 1945 to continue to extend 'missing' 
allowances on a short-term basis rather than to agree a workable 
solution for the duration of hostilities. As we have already seen, the 
Indian government adopted a special category of 'believed prisoner of 
war'to circumvent the problem. Unfortunately the situation in India is a 
rare case where an actual comparison can be made. By and large the 
historiography of prisoners of war again concentrates on the living 
conditions and pay of the prisoners themselves with little mention of their 
families. Even where fleeting mention of families is made there are no 
references to how allowances were administered to dependants whilst 
their menfolk were prisoner. As an example, Jonathan Vance in Obiects 
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of Concern mentions that Canadian prisoners enjoyed the 'benefit' of 
'support for relatives'. 140 No mention is made of how this support was 
administered nor of whether or not the actual status of the serviceman 
141 had to be confirmed as POW for this support to be forthcoming . 
Although Fishman does consider in detail the administration of 
allowances to the families of French prisoners of war in Europe, this 
situation was rather different from that of prisoners of war in the Far East. 
With the collapse of the French army, huge numbers of soldiers were 
captured, but most families received notification by August 1940, or at 
the latest January 1941.142 Whilst this wait of six months must have 
seemed interminable to the families concerned, in administrative terms 
the time scale, coupled with the fact that Germany was party to the 
Geneva Convention and thus bound to supply notifications, meant that it 
was feasible to wait and see if notification arrived before making any 
decisions regarding changes from allowances to pensions. 
It is tempting to argue that the British decision, or rather non-decision, 
was economically driven. In earlier chapters we saw that, traditionally, 
pensions were paid at a lower rate than allowances, based on the 
rationale that allowances were paid for the upkeep of the soldier's home 
for him to return to but that a widow might be expected to move to more 
modest accommodation. It might be argued, therefore, that keeping 
families on 'missing' allowances would prove the quickest and most 
convenient way, administratively, of transferring dependants from 
allowances to pensions. If families were transferred to a special 'missing 
believed prisoner of war' category this would then necessitate more 
paperwork to alter them to pension status if notification that the man in 
question was dead were to be received. Figures for 1942, however, 
discount this argument as increases in both pensions and allowances of 
that year meant that, for other ranks, pension payments became higher 
than allowances. Table 1 gives the comparative figures proposed in a 
draft statement for increases in allowances and pensions dated February 
1942 143 
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It seems, therefore, that there was no formal overall policy determined to 
deal with the situation where servicemen were classified as 'missing' for 
extended periods of time. The Foreign office claimed to have found the 
Japanese 'not unreasonable' in other areas, although they did not 
specify precisely which areas, and perhaps continued to hope that the 
requisite information would eventually be supplied regarding captured 
British servicemen for the administration of allowances to be adjusted 
accordingly. There is no evidence in the available sources to suggest 
that at any time the government discussed the possibility of finding a 
lasting solution to this problem based on the existing situation. Whatever 
the reason, the government, rather than taking the initiative, chose once 
again to act in a reactive rather than a pro-active manner. 
CURRENT RATES CATEGORY PROPOSED RATES 
PENSIONS FAMILY PENSIONS FAMILY 
ALLOWANCE ALLOWANCE 
(Inc. minimum (Inc. minimum 
allotment) alltoment) 
22s 6d 25s Wife/widow 25s 25s 
(Over 40 or with 
children) 
31s 32s 6d Wife/widow +1 34s 6d 33s 6d 
child 
37s 3d 38s Wife/widow +2 41s 6d 40s 
children 
42s 3d 42s Wife/widow +3 47s 45s 
children 
15s 6d Childless widow 18s 6d 
I 1 under40 
Tablel: Proposed increases in allowances and pensions 1942. Figures taken from 
Proofs for Army Orders. Proof 3.31 August 38. PRO/AST1 1/122. 
1 Minute Sheet Reg. No. 0103/2647 Ottley, Director of Finance, Treasury. 26 September 
39 and agreed 05 October 39. PROIWO32/9909. 2 Minute Sheet Reg. No. 0103/2647 Ottley, Director of Finance, Treasury. 26 September 
39 and agreed 05 October 39. PROIWO32/9909. 3 Brigadier Holland, War Office speaking 07 April 43 at a meeting considering the raising 
of pay supplementation from 2/7th salary to 3/7th. PROIT162/792/E40219/2. 4 Letter R. F. L. Watkins, London SW16 to Iris Strange. 13 November 82. Box 43, Iris 
Strange Collection. University of Stafford, Special Collections. 
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' Letter from Humphreys-Davis, Principal, War Office to Crombie, Assistant Secretary, 
Treasury. 08 March 41. PRO/T1 62/792/E40219/1. See also ADMI /11909 and, for 
families who opted to remain at stations abroad, PRO/T1 62/92/E40219/1. 
6 Letter from Humphreys-Davis, Principal, War Office to Crombie, Assistant Secretary, 
Treasury. 08 March 41. PROfTl62/792/E40219/1. 
7 Letter from Humphreys-Davis, Principal, War Office to Crombie, Assistant Secretary, 
Treasury. 08 March 41. PRO/T1 62f792/E40219/1. See also ADMI/I 1909 and, for 
families who opted to remain at stations abroad, PRO/T162/92/E40219/1. 8 Letter from Humphreys-Davis, principal, War Office to Crombie, Assistant Secretary, 
Treasury. 08 March 41. PRO/T162/792/E40219/1. 
9 From 31 December 41 the Treasury agreed that, following concessions granted to Civil 
Defence workers, that allotments issued to families and dependants of deceased service 
personnel should continue at the actual rate in issue for the whole 13 weeks rather than 
being reduced to compulsory rate. PROfTl 62/792/E40219/1. 
10 Minute Sheet. 06 July 42. PRO/ADM1/1 1909. 
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Chapter 4 
Financial problems for prisoner of war families 
Even where there was no problem in ascertaining the true status of 
'missing' servicemen, problems still arose in connection with allowances, 
often in relation to the physical arrangements for their payment. In many 
instances these problems arose because the mechanisms for claiming 
allowances or altering the administration of existing allowances 
depended on the ability of servicemen being able to contact the 
administering agencies. As detailed in Chapter 1, generally claims by 
'other ranks' for both family and dependants' allowances had to be made 
by the servicemen themselves and processed through the Regimental 
Paymasters. Additionally, in the case of Dependants' Allowances, 
authority had to be provided by the serviceman for a stated allotment to 
be deducted from pay to trigger the payment of the allowance. This being 
so, any situation which resulted in difficulties in either ascertaining or 
confirming the wishes of the men involved necessarily led to problems of 
administration and possible non-payment of allowances. 
For men who were captured in Western Europe, the problems were not 
perceived as being insurmountable, although it was still appreciated that 
arrangements for the maintenance of families 'were apt to breakdown 
when they [the men] became prisoner of war or missing'. ' Belligerent 
powers in this theatre of war had agreed to keep to the articles of the 
Geneva Convention, whereby POWs were accorded facilities to transfer 
amounts of money'to bank or private individuals in their country of 
2 origin'. The Japanese, however, had not been signatories to the Geneva 
Convention and were not bound by its rules. 3 In the light of these 
differences the administration of allowances for families and dependants 
of prisoners of war in Europe and the Far East needs to be considered 
separately. 
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In many respects arrangements for the payment of allowances to the 
families and dependants of British prisoners of war in Europe may be 
regarded as relatively straightforward. In addition to the fact that the all 
parties involved were signatories of the Geneva Convention, 
communications with prisoners of war in Europe were a good deal more 
straightforward than those with men captured in the Far EaSt. 4 The 
Phillimore Report suggests that, where men were stationary in one camp, 
letters to and from Germany only took three weeks in tranSit. 5 As a result 
it was possible to ascertain the wishes of the men concerned in respect 
of any changes to allowances or allotments and to utilise normal written 
methods of gaining consent for any changeS6. Problems did, however, 
arise when prisoners were transferred from one camp to another as 
letters went astray or were not forwarded. In particular in 1943 when a 
total of almost 70,000 men were transferred from camps in Italy to 
Germany there were often delays in communication until new addresses 
were advised and, at one stage, all mail was frozen until new addresses 
had been received. 7 
Notes issued for the guidance of Camp Leaders in German prisoner of 
war camps set out the overall procedure for payment of allowances and 
reinforce the idea that major problems of communication with these men 
were not anticipated. 8 However, notes for the Royal Navy stated that, if 
new rates of pay came into force and it was necessary to increase the 
level of allotment from pay to continue to qualify for allowances, then the 
additional amount would automatically be deducted. New instructions 
regarding allotments, alterations or stoppages of allotments could then 
be notified by the men either 'writing direct to the Secretary of the 
Admiralty' or through a letter to a relative who would then send the letter 
on to the Admiralty. 9 Similarly for the Army and RAF, allowances 
continued to be issued as at time of capture with applications for changes 
to voluntary allotments being made in writing to the Regimental 
Paymaster or Senior Account Officer, War Casualties Non-Effective 
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Accounts Depot respectively. Allowances for other ranks across the 
services were paid by means of drafts from allowance books, held by the 
wife or dependant, at local post offices so most wives continued to draw 
their allowances in the same way that they had before their husbands 
were captured. Officers allowances, however, were paid direct into the 
officer's own bank account in the United Kingdom. Instructions for RAF 
officers note that 'it is incumbent upon the officer to make suitable 
arrangements with his bank for providing his family and other dependants 
with funds' by sending a letter to Air Ministry Accounts for forwarding to 
the Manager of the branch in question. 10 Although it had been envisaged 
that such arrangements would be made before the officer was posted 
abroad, the assumption was made that no major problems would be 
encountered with prisoners of war communicating in writing with their 
families, their bankers or the service department concerned. 
Only in the case of the RAF had it been considered that possible cases 
of hardship might occur where arrangements had not already been made 
or where these arrangements had broken down. In these cases, the Air 
Council alone of the services, had the power to order that the whole or 
part of the officer's pay and allowances be paid to the wife or other 
dependant who could show that the officer concerned had previously 
contributed to their upkeep or that he would have contributed had he 
been aware of the circumstances. " In exercising this power every effort 
was made to 'interpret the officer's wishes from such evidence as is 
available' rather than to make provision based on the needs of the 
farnily. 12 The one major exception to this rule was the case of the families 
of Merchant Navy officers. Before June 1941 allowances for the wives 
and children of officers or ratings serving under naval discipline in 
Admiralty vessels who were taken captive were paid at the rates laid 
down by the War Office Pensions and Detention Allowances Mercantile 
Marine Scheme. " After this date a scheme came into operation whereby 
in excess of 75% of prisoners of war net wages, after deductions for 
camp pocket money (lagergeld), income tax and Merchant Navy Officers 
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Pension Fund, were paid direct to dependants. This scheme provided 
directly for the needs of the families concerned and is in marked contrast 
to arrangements for other service families where the emphasis was 
placed on holding as much money as possible in the prisoner of wars 
personal account in Britain 'against the time when he came home. 04 
In the light of these arrangements, it was not envisaged that serious 
problems would occur for the dependants of those held prisoner of war in 
Europe due to lack of provision for them to draw on officers' banking 
accounts. However, this problem was exactly the one which arose for 
dependants of those captured in the Far East. Within the first few weeks 
of their entry into the war in 1941, Japanese forces had taken more than 
120,000 British prisoners of war. 15 As the Japanese were not signatories 
to the Geneva Convention the ability of prisoners to transfer money was 
not guaranteed. In addition, although the treatment of enemy prisoners 
by other belligerents was often underpinned by considerations of 
possible reprisals against their own servicemen, this situation did not 
exist in the Japanese case. Not only did the Allies hold very few 
Japanese prisoners, where prisoners were held, the Japanese 
government was largely indifferent to their fate. Any effort or expenditure 
on prisoners of war such as notification of captivity or mail services was 
considered unnecessary and, although in 1943 a mail route was opened 
through Soviet Russia, in general letters were slow to arrive at their 
destinations, if they arrived at all. 16 Normal routes of communication 
could not, therefore, be relied on as a means for dealing with financial 
matters. 
In fact, the Army Council already had powers, under Article 1 OC Royal 
Warrant 1940, to use the pay of missing officers or those taken prisoner 
of war for the benefit of their wives and dependants 17 . However, as they 
stood at the time the regulations were open to two possible 
interpretations. Under one interpretation, the Army Council could apply 
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all unissued pay and allowances, from the date the officer was posted 
missing or captured, for the benefit of family and dependants irrespective 
of when these monies became due. Alternatively, the Council could 
apply pay and allowances due only from the date the officer was posted 
missing or captured. Although originally it was proposed that the second 
alternative should be adopted, in fact in April 1942 the wider 
interpretation was accepted. 18 For either interpretation, it was agreed 
that, where the Paymaster in Manchester was satisfied that the officer 
was maintaining his wife to the amount claimed, an amount not 
exceeding the total of Family Lodging Allowance plus two sevenths pay 
would be issued. 19 This amount could be increased where there was a 
larger balance standing to the officer's credit and the Army Council was 
satisfied that the officer had regularly contributed a larger amount. In 
seven cases payment was made to families resident in the UK in 
advance of the due date where hardship was claimed due to non-receiPt 
of remittances from Hong Kong . 
20 However, where pay and allowances 
were paid, on the officer's order, direct into a private banking account 
'there would be nothing on which the Army Council could operate their 
special powers'. 21 
In cases where the wife did not have access to her husband's bank 
account either through a letter of authorisation to withdraw funds or an 
arrangement to transfer money directly arranged by the officer before he 
was posted abroad there was no way for her to obtain these funds. This 
was also the case where the account was held abroad and had become 
inaccessible due to circumstances of war. To circumvent these problems 
it was suggested that, in the case of prisoners of war, the Army Council 
could exercise its powers to access pay and allowances before issue to 
the bank. In this way wives would get the allowances due to them before 
funds were transferred to the inaccessible account although any balance 
would 'continue to flow' in accordance with the officer's orders to his 
bank. 22 For dependants other ranks, the problems of issue of allowances 
were not so great as Paymasters already had sufficient information 
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regarding allotments to allow them to continue to make appropriate 
payments to families although the War Office envisaged that there would 
6almost certainly be some unusual cases where some hitch will occur. s23 
The Navy considered that such a contingency as being taken prisoner 
ought to have been foreseen by the men concerned and claimed that 
their officers had been 'repeatedly urged to make provision for their 
families. o24 In cases where families had been left stranded, departmental 
approval was originally granted for payments to be made to the family 
and charged against the officer's account. 25 However, the Navy solicitor 
advised that such payments were outside the Admiralty's powers and, in 
the light of this, it was deemed necessary for all cases to be judged 
individually and payments made only where circumstances forced the 
26 issue rather than developing an overall policy for such cases. The 
Commander in Chief in Ceylon who had already authorised such general 
payments was seen as having exceeded his authority as there was a 
1 27 considerable risk' of double payment occurring. Theequally 
considerable risk' of families not receiving any payment and facing 
financial hardship or destitution does not seem to have weighed in these 
considerations. In a similar move to that taken by the War Office, the 
Admiralty belatedly began to investigate the possibility of obtaining 
powers too issue allowances in these cases, powers that the Air Ministry 
already possessed for their officers held by enemy forces. 28 
With the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942, the situation became 
even more complicated. In this instance the Paymaster, carrying some of 
the records, escaped to Australia and it was assumed that he would 
begin to function from there, paying allowances to the families 
concerned . 
29 To avoid confusion, payments were made from this source 
to families who had escaped to, or were already in Australia, but payment 
to families outside Australia were from 14 February 1942, made from 
Manchester in the same way as those to families from Hong Kong. 30 For 
once, concern regarding the possibility of overpayments took second 
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place to concern for families. Although it was appreciated that problems 
would arise if officers had themselves escaped to Australia and 
continued to draw pay there, it was felt to be in the best interests of the 
families to take this risk. The Paymaster was asked to report any 
payments made after the February date to officers whose families were 
not in Australia and, in this way, although there was some danger of 
families receiving double payment at least it was ensured that no family 
would be completely without funds . 
31 However, problems continued to 
surface in this location up to January 1944 with regard to British Royal 
Army officers who had been in the pay of the Indian Army when they 
were taken prisoner. 32 In these cases, although payment of salary should 
have been taken over by the Manchester pay office, families would 
normally have continued to receive their allowances from local 
33 branches. Generally the War Office felt that, as the most up to date 
information on pay increases and changes to allowances was held in the 
UK, it would be better to make the payments from Manchester to a local 
account which the wife could draw on. 34 In all cases, except that of 
Merchant Seamen outlined above, the prime considerations of the 
Services and Treasury were to follow what they knew or perceived to be 
the wishes of the officer in question and to reduce the risk of 
overpayment. The actual level of need of the families concerned played 
no part in discussions on these issues. Instead, the War Office in 
particular, was at some pains not to undermine the integrity of its officers 
by acknowledging the fact that many had left for service overseas without 
making adequate financial arrangements for their families. 
In addition to the problems of payment of allowances associated with 
communication issues or lack of access to accounts, a number of other 
circumstances also gave rise to difficulties. Most commonly, these 
occurred where household income rose above the maximum limit for 
allowances to be applicable or, where the household income was already 
too high but the serviceman had made a voluntary contribution. But more 
immediate problems were caused for families where War Service Grants 
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had been issued to meet pre-enlistment commitments or where a soldier 
continued to receive a 'balance of civil pay' (BCP) payment to make his 
army pay up to the level of civil pay he had received before enlistment. In 
both cases these allowances decreased as service pay increased as the 
man was expected to make up for the decrease in grant by increasing 
the amount he allotted to his family. However, whereas the BCP or War 
Service Grant had been paid direct to the family, increases in service pay 
went direct to the serviceman. 35 Effectively this meant that, when a 
serviceman's pay was increased, family income was immediately 
reduced until the serviceman could make arrangements to increase 
allotment, a situation obviously difficult for prisoners of war to expedite. In 
the case of War Service Grant, the situation was eased by the wife or 
dependant themselves writing direct to the Paymaster who then referred 
the case to the War Office so that a diversion of additional allotment 
could be made to cover the reduction in income. 36 By April 1945 the 
number of cases of this class were 'considerable. ' Cases involving 
changes to BCP were more difficult to estimate as Regimental 
Paymasters did not necessarily know when this was in issue although by 
November 1944,3,478 BCP accounts were being maintained. 37 Ofthese 
cases, Family or Dependants allowances were issued on 2,006 with 
1,360 cases being affected by a reduction due to payment of War 
Service Increment (WSI) or Japanese Campaign Pay (JCP) paid from 1 
November 1944 38 
. 
The second major set of circumstances that gave rise to problems, were 
associated with the payment of Dependants' Allowances, where no direct 
instructions were available from the serviceman concerned, involving 
voluntary allotment to one member of a household who subsequently 
died. A War Office memo of 24 April 1945 stated that, where a soldier 
had been making a contribution in favour of one parent who then died, 
the Regimental Paymaster had the power to transfer this payment to the 
other parent as, 'in all such cases it can be taken as conclusive that the 
soldier would have desired to continue such an allotment. '39 Despite this, 
136 
cases did occur where hardship was caused through misinterpretation or 
ignorance of the regulations. One such case was that of S/Sgt O'Toole of 
the Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers, a prisoner of war in 
Japanese handS. 40 S/Sgt O'Toole's wife, was admitted to East Sussex 
Mental Hospital in October 1942 as'a certified person of unsound mind' 
as a direct result of the experiences she had suffered during her 
evacuation from Hong Kong and during her subsequent return, via 
Australia, to England. 41 In February 1944 the County of Southampton 
Public Assistance Council enquired of the Regimental Paymaster in 
Leeds whether a Dependants' Allowance should be issued for Mrs 
O'Toole and if this could be paid direct to the County Council as a 
contribution towards the cost of her maintenance. Consideration was also 
given to whether or not a provisional issue of voluntary allotment could 
be made to Mrs O'Toole's parents, Mr and Mrs Fitton, whose only 
income was an Old Age and Supplementary Pension. Mr and Mrs Fitton 
were suffering hardship in trying to provide some extra comforts for their 
daughter. On Mrs O'Toole's admission to hospital it had been decided 
that conditions had not been met for continued payment of Family 
Allowance and this was suspended immediately. In December 1943 
S/Sgt. O'Toole's pay account held a balance of E299 6s 71/2d. 
A letter from the War Office to the Regimental Paymaster in Leeds dated 
8 March 1944 confirmed payment of Family Allowance to the Public 
Assistance Committee in Southampton for Mrs O'Toole's maintenance. 
In addition, a deduction of 1 Os 6d per week was to be made to Mr and 
Mrs Fitton 'in order that the parents may be able to procure some 
personal comforts for Mrs O'Toole. ' Although this seemed a clear 
arrangement, confusion later arose as to whether the allowance had 
been granted for both Mr and Mrs Fitton or for Mrs Fitton only, as stated 
in a memo of 17 February 1944. In September 1943, this distinction 
became critical as Mrs Fitton died and as the result of a 
misunderstanding about to the actual nature of the allowance, payments 
were suspended. In April 1944, Mr Fitton wrote to the War Office 
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enquiring about the allowance. At the age of 73, his only income was Old 
Age and Supplementary Pension of El 7s Od per week. He tried to visit 
his daughter once every two weeks but the fare was 4 shillings and, as 
he had insufficient income to buy her comforts, he was obliged to take 
her some of his own rations. He requested the War Office 'for God (sic) 
sake do what you can too (sic) help me and oblige. 'The War Office 
replied to the Regimental Paymaster that the difficulty with this case was 
I not understood'. The diversion of 1 Os 6d per week from S/Sgt O'Toole's 
pay was quite clearly set out as being for Mrs O'Toole's parents (my 
italics) and authority to pay the allowance to Mr Fitton was confirmed in 
July 1944. No further correspondence has come to light to show whether 
or not Mr Fitton was reimbursed for the period during which the 
allowances was suspended. If one assumes that the allowance ceased 
after Mrs Fitton's death in September 1943, and did not resume until July 
the next year this would mean that a deficit in payment of in the order of 
F-22 had resulted - an enormous sum for a pensioner on an income of 
under F-2 per week - purely as a result of administrative misinterpretation. 
There appears to be no accurate way of estimating how many cases of 
hardship of this nature occurred. Although the O'Toole/Fitton case is the 
only one of its kind recorded in War Office or Treasury files this does not 
necessarily mean that it is unique. It is possible that the correspondence 
regarding this case came to the notice of War Office officials because of 
its unusual combination of circumstances. If Mrs O'Toole had been well 
enough to remain in the care of her parents, Family Allowance would 
have continued to be paid to her and would have been at her family's 
disposal. If S/Sgt O'Toole had been serving in Europe, it would have 
been possible for Mr Fitton to write to his son-in-law and request extra 
funds which could have been provided from the E299 held in his pay 
account. The real problem, however, arose from the failure of the 
Paymaster concerned to read correctly the conditions of the diversion 
from pay. If Mr Fitton's plight had not been so extreme he may well not 
have written to the War Office direct and other families or relatives may 
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well have suffered in silence without taking such direct action. Although 
this misreading may have been confined to one Paymaster, it seems 
unlikely that Mr Fitton was the only relative to suffer. Between 1942 and 
1944 a total of 318 diversion orders were made -a figure small enough 
to suggest that many of them may have contained specific, individual 
instructions requiring careful perusal by Paymasters if they were to be 
administered correCtly. 42 However, even if cases of this type were small 
in number, their existence suggests a lack of attention by those 
responsible for the payment of allowances to the details of their 
administration and an underlying attitude which afforded no importance 
to the needs of the service families relying on them. 
In November 1944 a report was prepared by the Army Council 
summarising powers to order diversionary payments of this nature which 
clearly laid out the history, rationale and current position. 43 The Council's 
powers to order diversion from pay and allowances of an officer who was 
prisoner of war or missing in favour of a dependant was delegated, within 
certain limitations, to the Paymaster's Office in Manchester and local 
paymasters abroad. The rationale for this was that officers' arrangements 
for maintenance of families 'were apt to breakdown when they became 
POW or missing' and could cease altogether if no arrangements had 
previously been made with banks for funds to be drawn. 44 Problems were 
also recognised if payments were normally credited to banks abroad now 
in enemy territory. In addition, the report recognised that changing 
circumstances such as needs of education, cost of living rises or 
sickness sometimes resulted in the original provision becoming 
insufficient to meet needs. 45 Although diversions had originally operated 
only in cases where previous maintenance was provable, other cases 
had come to light where it was obvious that the officer would have 
wished to contribute if he had known of the circumstances and so powers 
were extended to cover these situations . 
46 In addition to permanent 
diversion orders, interim orders could also be granted covering a period 
Of two to six months to provide for immediate needs whilst enquiries into 
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the officer's wishes were completed or where family circumstances were 
subject to continuing change and needed continual review. 47 Where a 
permanent order was made, this was only normally reviewed if the 
recipient applied for an increase or if there were new developments such 
as the return of a family from abroad . 
48 All of these cases were ones 
which presented some form of difficulty and, as a result they were 
forwarded to the War Office together with all the relevant information 
available. The applicant was also required to complete a pro-forma giving 
full details of their claim and certifying that these details were correct. 
Each case was then examined with reference to the officer's personal 
papers and confidential enquiries were made of his banker. 49 In some 
cases personal interviews with the applicant were requested but these 
were rare. Once a decision to order diversionary payments had been 
made, this fact was recorded in minutes in the officer's personal 
papers. 50 Straightforward cases, were dealt with by the Paymaster 
without reference to the War Office although, as the O'Toole/Fitton case 
shows, even apparently straightforward cases sometimes proved beyond 
their administrative abilities. 
The underpinning principle of any diversionary order was to attempt to 
carry out an officer's known or presumed wishes. To this end provision 
formerly made by the officer was used as a guideline to intentions but 
changes in family circumstances, of which he could not be aware, were 
also taken into consideration together with any improvements in his own 
financial situation. 51 In cases where the wife was provably wholly 
maintained but not able to give the exact amount of maintenance, a 
maximum diversion of Family Lodging Allowance plus two sevenths of 
pay applied although this maximum diversion was regarded as 
exceptional and only authorised in exceptional circumstances. Orders for 
diversion were not made if it was thought that this would be against the 
officer's wishes or'for the purpose of enforcing maintenance against an 
unwilling officer'. 52 Policy generally was, as has been seen earlier, to 
ensure that a reasonable balance remained in the officer's account 
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against his return. Overall the department attempted to maintain a 
balance between being placed in the position of trustee controlling a 
discretionary trust on behalf of the officers' families whilst at the same 
time working closely with bankers, trustees, relations and employers to 
'ensure that officers' monies were properly applied. v 53 No diversionary 
orders were granted on purely speculative grounds - that is, no orders 
were made purely on the basis that it would be the reasonable thing to do 
- if there was no evidence to support a claim. At all times, the War Office 
acted for the benefit of the serviceman concerned regardless of the 
possible hardship this might entail for families. However, only a small 
number of applicants were refused diversion orders. Forty cases were 
refused because of a misunderstanding on the part of the wife who had 
not understood that the officer's original arrangements would be reverted 
to once the status of the officer was ascertained and normal pay and 
allowances resumed., 54 By and large, cases of deliberate 
misrepresentation of the facts to try to obtain diversionary orders were 
rare. In most of the other cases refused, it was clear that the officer in 
question had no intention of maintaining the applicant whether they had a 
moral claim to support or not and the War Office respected the officers' 
decisions. 
For other ranks, the Council's powers to order allotments from pay of a 
soldier who was missing or a prisoner of war were again delegated, if 
straightforward, to the Regimental Paymasters. Generally these powers 
had been operative since November 1943 as a result of the hardships 
some families had experienced when men who were missing or captive 
could not give instructions regarding allotments or changing family 
circumstances. 55 These changes most commonly included: the death of 
the family breadwinner, usually the soldier's father; unemployment of the 
breadwinner; illness of the applicant; ending of some other form of 
income; increasing age or numbers of family all resulting in increased 
expenditure. In a number of other cases, parents or other relatives had 
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become eligible for Dependants' Allowances whilst the men were missing 
or held captive but the allowance had not be issued as there had been no 
means of obtaining the necessary authority to make the required 
allotment from pay. Between December 1943 and July 1944,230 orders 
of this nature were made, usually for an indefinite period as the soldier 
was missing or held captive in the Far EaSt. 56 In addition, a small number 
of orders were made in respect of servicemen captive in Europe until 
instructions from the serviceman were received. 57 The amounts involved 
ranged from 5s 7d per day down to 3d with the smaller amounts 
generally being to supplement an allotment previously authorised by the 
soldier to qualify the recipient for Dependants' Allowance which they had 
become entitled to in the soldier's absence. 58 In the case of Dependants' 
Allowances the amount of the order was fixed at contributory allotment 
level and, in cases where the allowance was transferred to another 
dependant on the death of the recipient, the allotment continued at the 
level already operative. In cases where the order was required to meet a 
loss of income, logically, this was at the required level to meet the 
shortfall. 
Again, cases requiring further investigation came to the War Office 
through Regimental Paymasters together with details of pay, date of 
casualty, details of past and current allotments and next of kin. The 
Assistance Boards normally arranged investigation of these cases, with 
SSAFA becoming involved in interviews and making confidential 
reports. 59 In urgent cases an interim allotment could be made pending 
investigation and payments were generally made from the date of 
application although in certain cases, where the soldier's intentions could 
be precisely established, orders could be given for retrospective 
payment. 60 
For the families of both officers and other ranks, steps were taken to 
ensure that those who needed to know that such provision could be 
made did know, although it was seen as undesirable to publicise the 
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matter too highly for fear of 'inviting a mass of undesirable applications. 16l 
Although the War Office believed that few dependants remained unaware 
of the existence of these diversionary powers, thanks to the work of the 
various agencies such as Welfare Officers and SSAFA in addition to the 
Paymaster, they also commented that'it was remarkable how very few 
cases have come in relation to the number of our prisoners of war. j62 
Rather than considering the possibility that these low numbers resulted 
from a lack of efficient communications however, they regarded them as 
a comment on how well the Army administrative arrangements for paying 
families were working. 
By December 1944, the War Office, presumably with a view to large 
numbers of prisoners of war being released in the foreseeable future, 
was giving consideration to ways in which these diversionary orders 
63 could be stopped in cases where officers 'became effective again'. 
Again it appears that their priority was to ensure against the possibility of 
unnecessary extra provision for families who could once again access 
funds direct from the servicemen concerned. For officers it was 
envisaged that the order would become invalid as soon as he was once 
again 'operative'. 64 Payments would be stopped and the officer issued 
with a statement of all payments made plus a reminder that he should 
now make his own arrangements for maintenance of his family and 
dependants. Originally, other ranks were to be informed of the issue of 
allotments under diversion and given a limited period, 14 days, to apply 
for continuation of the allowance. This was later changed so the 
allotment would remain in place unless the soldier indicated his wishes 
otherwise. 65 
Just as there had been many exceptions to the regulations governing the 
issue of allowances following the introduction of conscription, so a myriad 
of special cases and financial problems arose for the families of those 
taken captive. In the case of families of officers evacuated from Hong 
Kong and Singapore to Australia many arrived destitute. 66 For example, 
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the wives of junior officers faced 'extreme difficulty' in trying to meet 
mess charges out of the proposed two sevenths of pay and it was agreed 
to waive these charges for the families of junior officers only. 67 For 
families in Britain, changing family needs during long periods when 
menfolk were still 'missing' for extended periods caused many problems. 
Mrs May Sawford of Swansea wrote to the War Office in June 1943 
enquiring about the possibility of an Education Grant for her two eldest 
68 sons aged 6 and 8 to go to the Bible College School. If her husband 
had been officially declared dead she would have been able to apply for 
this grant as a matter of course but, as he was still posted 'missing', she 
thought this was not permissible. In fact, an Education Grant could be 
allowed in this type of case. However, as a letter from the Pensions 
Office in Blackpool to the Ministry of Pensions in August of the same year 
suggests, the difficulty was that the War Office did not want the fact that 
they could grant these allowances to be 'too widely advertised. o69 
Problems with the payment of allowances to the families of those taken 
captive were not, however, the sole prerogative of the families of British 
prisoners of war. Similar problems existed for captives of other 
nationalities held by British and Dominion agencies. For example, in 
March 1943 Italian prisoners of war held by British forces expressed 
concern that they were unable to remit money to their families in 
Ethiopia, which was no longer occupied by British forces . 
70 The Foreign 
Office suggested that it might be possible to send money to these 
families if the consent of the Emperor was obtained on the basis that this 
would mean that the Ethiopian government would then have to provide 
71 less support themselves for these families. In the event, it transpired 
that the Italian prisoners of war in question were being held in India and 
that the majority of Italian civilians had been removed from Abyssinia. In 
November 1943, the War Office wrote to the Foreign Office stating that 
'We should certainly not allow Italian prisoners in India or anywhere else 
to send money to their families in Italy. P72 Instead a scheme was 
proposed whereby prisoners of war could transfer part of their credit 
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balances of pay at home to their families. However, the conditions 
imposed on such a scheme by the Italian government and the rate of 
inflation in Italy at the time were such as to make the amounts involved 
'too trivial to be worth the trouble'. 73 In fact, the amount which would have 
eventually been remitted to the family was in the region of 12 shillings per 
month. At the time British soldiers'wives were being paid a family 
allowance in excess of seven times this amount, although the smaller 
amount would no doubt still have been welcomed by families in Italy with 
no other income. Once again, the driving force behind the decision 
seems to have been the scale of the administrative burden caused by the 
implementation of such a system rather than the needs of the families 
concerned. 
Obviously, significant problems existed for some families of those taken 
captive in relation to the actual mechanisms for the transfer of monies. 
For the families of other ranks this problem was often circumvented as 
the wives and dependants involved were issued with books of drafts, 
which could be drawn at a designated post office. Additionally the 
amount that the serviceman normally allotted from his pay was known to 
the Paymasters involved and allotment at this level could be continued 
despite loss of contact with the serviceman himself. Although problems 
did arise when changing family circumstances might have warranted an 
increase in this allotment, by and large for the families and dependants of 
other ranks allowances continued as normal. For the families of officers, 
however, the situation was very different. In these cases Family 
Allowance was paid direct to the bank account of the officer himself who 
then transferred funds to family and dependants. Although Paymasters 
knew the amount of allowance, the actual amount transferred to wives 
and other dependants remained a matter of conscience for the officer 
himself. In cases where the officer had not made arrangements for their 
wives and dependants to draw funds direct from their banks all monies 
ceased when the officer was taken captive. 
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Problems of this nature were not entirely unforeseen. A draft letter of 
October 1939 from an Under-secretary of State at the Foreign Office had 
suggested that: 
In the absence of machinery for the transmission of money from 
POWs to their relatives in the country to which they belong, the 
provisions of Article 23, if carried out, would involve considerable 
hardship to the dependants of officers who were captured. 74 
The same letter continues with the assertion that, although discussions 
had taken place with the Red Cross regarding mechanisms for sending 
parcels, food and 'comforts' to POWs themselves 'no mention is made of 
how money will be got to their families. 1 75 
For the families of those officers captive in Europe it was possible that, 
with the co-operation of their captors, correspondence could be sent to 
banks in England to expedite this situation. However, for the families of 
those taken captive in the Far East, the situation did indeed become 
desperate. The attitude that it was a matter of personal responsibility for 
the officer himself to have made arrangements with his bank for his wife 
or other dependants to be able to draw funds from his account was 
common in all three services. As already detailed, only the RAF had in 
place a contingency scheme whereby pay and allowances could be 
transferred direct to families if proof of earlier financial provision could be 
produced. Although it may not seem unreasonable to expect an officer to 
take this responsibility, this assumption needs to be set against the 
prevailing Service and government attitude towards the whole question of 
prisoners of war. We have already seen the Treasury regarding it as 
I unnecessary and undesirable'to shape policy for this eventuality. Within 
the Services themselves there was precious little encouragement for men 
to consider the possibility of a time when, in the words of A. J. Barker, 
they might be 'no longer effective in the business of war' and a 'liability to 
friend and foe alike. s76 Given this general attitude, it seems unrealistic 
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then to have expected officers, additionally charged with the 
responsibility for the upkeep of their men's morale, to dwell on such a 
possibility. There was, therefore, an inherent tension in governmental 
thinking between the attitude they took towards preparing men for the 
possibility of being captured and the responsibility they expected the men 
to undertake towards providing for their families in the event of such an 
eventuality. The possibility that these conflicting attitudes might lead to 
financial hardship for the families of those concerned was not a 
consideration in the development of policy on these issues. 
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Chapter 5 
Official Sources of Information 
Although the first chapters of this study have concentrated on the 
financial concerns of service families in general and prisoner of war 
families in particular, to suggest that fiscal worries were the sole, or even 
prime, concern of these families would be misleading. For many families, 
not just in Britain, lack of information about missing husbands, fathers, 
sons and brothers was arguably an even more pressing concern than 
lack of finances. Fishman, in her study of the everyday life of French 
prisoner of war wives, reports 'lack of news' as one of the main causes of 
emotional difficulties experienced by these women. ' Mrs Buswell, whose 
husband, a gunner in RAF 99 Squadron, was shot down over Germany 
in late 1944, spoke for many when she claimed 'You were so helpless. 
You couldn't do anything and you couldn't find out anything. Nobody 
92 would tell you anything. It is, therefore, important in any study of 
prisoner of war dependants to examine how the state communicated 
news and information to these families. 
As already detailed in the introduction to this study, by the end of the war, 
a total of 192,335 British service personnel had been taken prisoner, of 
whom the great majority left behind wives or other dependants. Even 
though the government recognised that the treatment of prisoners of war 
was 'always likely to assume political importance', no clear strategies for 
collating and disseminating information were developed before 1939.3 
Despite the fact that the experience of World War I had suggested that 
there was a necessity for clearly designated areas of responsibility within 
government departments for prisoner of war matters, the potential 
problems were again severely underestimated. 4 During the First World 
War, the War Office had established a Prisoner of War Directorate and a 
Government Committee on the Treatment by the Enemy of British 
prisoners of war. 5 Information regarding prisoners was largely collected 
from escaped or repatriated British prisoners and then collated by the 
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Prisoner of War Department at the Foreign Office. 6 Given these 
arrangements it was almost inevitable that disagreements would arise 
between the various departments as to just who was ultimately 
responsible for POW matters. As we have seen in earlier chapters, a 
predisposition existed within the War Office to regard their claims in such 
matters as paramount because of the greater numbers of army personnel 
involved. In an attempt to settle these disagreements, an 
interdepartmental committee was established in February 1916 under the 
chairmanship of Lord Newington, Under-secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, to co-ordinate the work of all government departments concerned 
with prisoner of war matters. Initially consisting of representatives from 
the Foreign Office, War Office, Home Office, India Office, Colonial Office, 
Admiralty, Air Ministry, Board of Trade and Ministry of Shipping, by the 
latter stages of the war the committee had expanded to include 
7 
representatives of the Dominions. However, as this committee was not 
given any real authority over the departments involved, internal 
disagreements continued. 
Matters came to a head in October 1916 when the Foreign Office refused 
to be concerned further with prisoner of war matters and the War 
Committee of the Cabinet established an independent Prisoners of War 
Department to deal with this work. 8 As, once again, no clear authority 
was established, matters of disagreement over policy continued to be 
referred back to the War Committee. Confusion was heightened by the 
establishment of three further bodies dealing specifically with prisoner of 
war matters: the Prisoners of War Information Bureau, the Central 
Prisoners of War Committee of the Red Cross and the Government 
Committee on the Treatment by the Enemy of British Prisoners of War. 9 
Although the existence of separate committees may have been intended 
to facilitate access to information, in fact it led to much confusion in the 
minds of those families seeking information about missing servicemen. 
The confusion was further reinforced by the fact that all committees, no 
doubt with the best of motives, were prepared to answer general queries 
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regarding prisoner of war matters without referring the enquirer to the 
responsible government department. 10 
The so-called Belfield Report, 'Work in Connection with Prisoners of War 
from August 1914 to January 1919', outlines six major areas of public 
dissatisfaction with the manner in which matters relating to prisoners of 
war were treated by the government. " Amongst these lack of information 
together with a lack of awareness as to which authority was ultimately 
responsible for prisoners feature highly. Nevertheless, as we shall see in 
the course of this chapter, the same areas of dissatisfaction again 
became evident in public perception of the government treatment of 
prisoners of war and their families during the Second World War. Despite 
the fact that, during the inter-war years, most government departments 
had established permanent public relations or press departments, no co- 
ordinated policy for the dissemination of information to the general public 
had been devised . 
12 Similarly, no clear-cut policy had been developed 
between the various departments involved, for the dissemination of 
information to the families of those taken captive. 
In 1939, the government gave general responsibility for prisoner of war 
matters into the hands of the War Office 'because the majority of [ .... I 
prisoners in enemy hands come from the army. 03 In fact, during the 
period of the 'phoney war' so few servicemen fell into enemy hands that 
the subject was not one of immediate concern. Additionally, whilst the 
war remained exclusively European, the issue of prisoners was not 
regarded as one of pressing urgency. All parties involved were 
signatories of the Geneva Convention of 1929 and, as such, had agreed 
to abide by common regulations both for the treatment of prisoners 
themselves and for notification of their status to national governments. 
However, with the captivity of 44,000 men from the British Expeditionary 
Force in June 1940, prisoners of war became much more of an issue and 
the inadequacies of the existing arrangements were recognised by the 
War Office. 14 Consequently, a separate Directorate of Prisoners of War 
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(DPW) was established. Satow and S6e, in what is otherwise a largely 
uncritical review of the work of the Foreign Office's Prisoner of War 
Department during the Second World War, claim that there was 'no 
excuse' for not having seen before this time that such a department 
would be needed. 15 They then go on to suggest that the whole task of 
dealing with these matters would have been made a great deal easier if 
both the War Office and Foreign Office had realised at an earlier stage 
that concerns relating to prisoners of war would 'require continuous 
effort'. 16 
This initial action set a pattern for the handling of these concerns where 
government departments remained reactive to external circumstances 
rather than being proactive in developing policy. In fact, by late 1941, the 
POW Directorate had increased in size to include three official branches, 
although unofficially operating Six. 17 For the purposes of this study the 
most important branches were PW2 dealing with the interpretation of the 
Geneva Convention, PW3 concerned with the welfare of British prisoners 
in enemy hands and PW4 dealing with censorship and correspondence. 
Overseeing the Directorate as a whole were a Director, initially Major- 
General EC Gepp, CB, DSO, a Deputy-Director, Major-General V 
Bloomfield CB, DSO and two Assistant Adjutant Generals. 18 By March 
1945 the Directorate had grown to consist of thirty-six military officers, 
nine junior civil servants and seventy-eight clerks indicating the scale to 
which POW matters expanded. 19 However, not all POW issues came 
under the jurisdiction of the DPW. Both the Foreign Office and other 
branches of the War Office themselves retained an interest, together with 
the Navy and the RAF. It was recognised that none of the services could 
nor should be 'relieved of their immediate responsibility to the next-of-kin 
of their own personnel nor for the immediate problems of those 
personnel. s20 Consequently, from the outset, relatives were faced with a 
bewildering array of departments when trying to obtain information on 
missing servicemen. They were, however, assured by newspaper articles 
that 'without any application on their part' strenuous efforts were being 
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made to trace all missing personnel, and a leaflet was prepared by the 
War Office detailing the procedure for notifying relatives of servicemen 
missing or taken prisoner . 
21 To some extent the confusion was 
ameliorated in October 1940. At this time all work on lists of British 
prisoners of war was transferred to the DPW but, not surprisingly given 
the circumstances, news often came to relatives more quickly through 
unofficial channels than through official channelS. 22 For example, David 
Rolf quotes the example of Private Bowers, captured in Belgium in the 
summer of 1940, who managed to pass hand-written messages to Red 
Cross nurses. These messages were then forwarded to his mother long 
before she received official notification that he was missing let alone a 
prisoner of war. 23 
Information regarding prisoners received from enemy governments, with 
the exception of propaganda broadcasts, was regarded as 'official' and 
most commonly took the form of lists sent to the POW Information 
24 Bureau of the Foreign Office in the relevant country. These bureaux 
were established as a requirement of the Geneva Convention Article 77 
which stated that 
... a belligerent power is bound to set up an Information Bureau for the purpose of furnishing as soon as possible information as to 
the captures of prisoners of war, with particulars of identity, to 
enable the families to be quickly notified, and official addresses to 
which letters to the prisoners may be sent by their families. 25 
The bureaux were required to forward this information through two 
channels - the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva and 
the relevant protecting power. 26 For British Prisoners of War, the 
protecting power was initially the USA. After their entry into the war in 
December 1941, the Swiss government took over this role. 27 
Despite that fact that one of the main functions of these bureaux was 'to 
enable the families concerned to be quickly notified', many families were 
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dissatisfied with the service. 28 With increasing delays in 'official' 
information it became inevitable that many relatives, unable to obtain 
information in any other way, turned to 'unofficial' sources. The chart on 
page 159 gives an overview of both official and unofficial sources of 
information. These included lists prepared by British legations and 
neutral sources, lists based on escapees' stories, lists based on enemy 
propaganda broadcasts and lists broadcast by the Vatican - regarded by 
some as 'very amateurish' . 
29 All 'unofficial' lists received in London were 
analysed and then either recorded as 'acceptable' so raising their status 
to that of official lists, or'unconfirmed' which gave no guarantee of their 
accuracy. 30 However, in the light of long delays in 'official' notification 
unofficial broadcasts acquired a large following. It became common for 
those who heard the broadcasts to pass the information on to the families 
of those mentioned in case they, themselves, had not been listening . 
31 A 
miscellaneous file at the Imperial War Museum contains twenty-six letters 
and cards expressing thanks to those who had passed on information 
from a single broadcast in November 1944.32 Mrs Ginnard of London El 
received twenty-three letters from strangers who had heard her 
husband's name mentioned. Mr and Mrs Owen of Salford, whose only 
son had been taken prisoner at Anzio, 'didn't realise that anyone could 
be so good'when they received numerous letters following the broadcast 
of his name. 33 Mrs Heath of Colchester, however, first heard that her 
husband, who had been missing since May 1940, had been taken 
prisoner from a rather different 'unofficial' source. A fireman from the pit 
where he had worked heard his name mentioned in a nightly broadcast 
by Lord Haw Haw. 34 
As we have already seen in the case of Private Bowers, some families 
received direct communications from prisoners themselves before 
receiving official notification of their captive status. In these cases the 
War Office asked that relatives would keep them informed . 
35 in fact, 
although such communications were not regarded as sufficiently reliable 
to act as confirmation of status the BBC still forwarded transcripts of 
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these broadcasts to the relevant service department to be checked 
against their missing IiStS. 36 On 30 September 1944, Captain GW Smith 
was reported missing, believed to be captive in Germany. 37 
Correspondence received by his parents from the War Office suggested 
that it 'may be some time before an official notification to that effect is 
received' and asked that, if any unofficial confirmation was received that 
they would 'kindly notify this office. ' On 6 December, Captain Smith's 
parents received a further communication from the War Office telling 
them that a broadcast on the German European Service had contained a 
message, believed to be from their son, saying that he was in good 
health and would write as soon as possible. However, this broadcast 
could not be regarded as 'official' and their son was still to be officially 
regarded as 'missing'. By the time Captain Smith was 'officially' 
confirmed as a prisoner in Oflag 79, some five months later, his parents 
had already heard from him direct and from the 'padre' of his regiment. 
Public perception, not unnaturally, was that for families to hear direct 
from their relatives before receiving official notification indicated that 
there was 'something wrong with the machinery. M The Imperial POW 
Committee, however, determinedly chose to see this in a positive light, 
suggesting instead that it showed that arrangements in the enemy 
39 country for forwarding mail were working 'satisfactorily'. Onrare 
occasions official notification proved to have been premature. The 
mother of Private Thompson, of the Royal Army Medical Corps, was 
somewhat surprised to receive official notification that he had been taken 
prisoner in July 1940. At the time in question, he was on honeymoon in 
Leeds. At a similar time, Mrs JS Walker of Pudsey, in Leeds, was 
equally confused to receive official notification that her husband, a 
Lance-Corporal driver in the RASC, had also been taken prisoner when 
his regiment had not left England. 40 
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Additional confusion resulted from the fact that, although the DPW was 
meant to be dealing with the ICRC and the protecting power solely 
through the POW Department at the Foreign Office, the War Office had 
established their own contacts in both London and Geneva, enabling 
them to receive notification lists direct. Despite these actions on their 
part, however, they still viewed independent action by others 
unfavourably. The wives of the British Ambassadors in Lisbon and 
Turkey were both reprimanded for forming private organisations to 
provide parcels and comforts to British prisoners of war . 
41 This type of 
action was in direct contradiction of government policy formulated in the 
wake of similar action during the First World War. 42 At that time, the 
government had felt that such initiatives were detrimental to morale, as 
they were unable to provide comforts for all prisoners. Those not 
receiving comforts were regarded as being in danger of becoming 
demoralised by their perceived neglect. To some extent these fears were 
justified as was demonstrated by a similar situation in July 1942 when a 
number of prisoners received large amounts of mail from unknown well- 
wishers in response to advertisements and appeals although, in fact, 
43 such appeals had been made in newspapers in earlier years. As early 
as June 1940, the Yorkshire Eveninq News ran an article entitled 'Drop 
the Boys a Line' in which readers were assured that'a letter, even from a 
casual acquaintance, would do a world of good. j44 In addition to being 
'detrimental to the morale of less fortunate prisoners', such initiatives also 
had the effect of delaying 'legitimate' mail and the Imperial POW 
Committee officially condemned all letters written by strangers in 
response to such appeals. 45 
On capture, all prisoners were issued with a postcard on which to inform 
their next of kin of this fact and to provide a mailing address. Many of 
these cards were pre-printed with little space for personal comments as 
is clearly shown by the card received by Mrs MS Rookwood from her 
46 husband, Acting Bombadier John Rookwood, in Borneo. Acting 
Bombadier Rookwood had only signed the card without completing any 
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of the suggested phrases and, so its formulaic nature can be clearly 
seen: 
Dear ............. 
Have received letters/no letters. 
My health is .................. . Hope everything is well with you, and you are receiving your 
allotment. 47 Please remember me to ........... . 
Even within Europe, there were numerous failures of this system with 
specific examples quoted by the War Office at Stalags XVIIIA and XVIID 
in Germany and at Capua in Italy. 48 In the Far East, despite continual 
attempts by both the British government and charitable organisations to 
improve the situation, communication with those taken captive remained 
problematic throughout the war. Mr and Mrs J Bannister of Bicester, 
Oxfordshire, were so relieved when they finally heard from their son in 
Taiwan in July 1943 that they published the letter in the Bicester 
Advertiser. 49 
Even in the best of circumstances the route for mail from the Far East 
was convoluted. Letters and cards from Singapore, for example, were 
first sent, by sea, to Tokyo and then, by sea again, to Raslin in Korea. 
From Korea, mail travelled overland to Mukden, across Siberia to 
Moscow and then on to Istanbul, Trieste, Geneva and Lisbon before 
finally being forwarded by air to London . 
50 Further constraints also 
existed in that all letters sent to prisoners of war in the Far East had to be 
typewritten, or block printed, and, from October 1943, limited to a 
maximum of twenty-five words . 
51 These strictures were claimed to make 
censoring faster but, as Vivienne Chatfield noted, 'it was no easy matter 
to make an interesting note in only twenty-five word S. P52 After the 
surrender of Japan it became clear that, even where letters complied with 
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these conditions, precious few ever reached their intended destination or 
recipients. 
In general three main factors affected the length of time taken for official 
notification that a man had become prisoner to be confirmed although 
notification from all theatres of war was, at times, affected by particular 
circumstances. 53 Firstly, the number of prisoners captured at any one 
time could affect the period taken for notification to be received. Where 
comparatively small numbers of men were captured, as in the Libyan 
campaign, notification was normally received within four to five weeks, 
but in the siege of Tobruk in June 1942, where 33,000 men were 
reported missing, delays were much longer. 54 In fact, by the end of the 
seventeen-week period during which 'missing' allowances were paid to 
the families of these men, 25% still remained unaccounted for. 55 
Secondly, the medical condition of the man himself at time of capture 
could also affect the speed of notification. In general, arrangements for 
obtaining information about men held in hospitals were not good. 
Additionally, many of the seriously wounded were too ill either to provide 
identification or to be moved from Field Hospitals to camps where 
notification could be more speedily effected. In the event of prisoners 
dying in captivity, a reciprocal arrangement existed with the German 
government that photographs of the grave, taken by the Red Cross, 
should be sent to the home government. 56 Although photos of German 
graves were forwarded in this way, with the exception of a small number 
of RAF graves, no photos of British graves were received from Germany. 
In November 1942 the Japanese government proposed that the ashes of 
deceased British prisoners in the Far East should be returned on 
exchange boats. 57 Although the British government were keen to show 
that a prisoner of war was not 'regarded as a dishonoured man', they 
were equally wary of any attempt to play Dominion governments off 
against one another or any possible reciprocal demands . 
58 The matter 
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was, therefore, referred to the Imperial Prisoner of War Committee, Sub- 
Committee A, whose terms of reference included the co-ordination of 
policy with regard to POWs concerning more than one government within 
the Empire 'with a view to avoiding undesirable differences of 
treatment' . 
59 The Committee noted that it was agreed policy of all the 
Dominion governments that the bodies of their nationals should not be 
sent home for burial whilst hostilities continued. Requests by families for 
the return of bodies or ashes from France, the Middle East and other 
theatres of war had all been 'consistently refused. P60 In keeping with this 
policy a reply was sent to the Japanese government requesting that all 
prisoners of war dying in captivity should, with the exception of Sikhs and 
Hindus, be buried locally with appropriate rites. Hindus and Sikhs were, 
where possible, to be cremated and their ashes scattered into a river or 
the sea. 61 
Finally, the locality of the actual capture itself often affected the speed of 
notification. Germany did not forward notification of prisoner of war status 
until prisoners actually reached a camp within the Greater Reich and in 
some cases this caused serious delay. 62 For example, the families of 
those servicemen taken prisoner during hostilities in Crete did not receive 
notification for almost six months. Mrs Parkes, who claims that her 
husband was taken prisoner in Germany in January 1941 and then 
transferred to Italy, received no notification of his official status for three 
months. Her comment that 'really the first joy was when we got a letter 
ourselves, yer (sic) know, from him' must have been echoed by many. 63 
Although Mrs Parkes' comments regarding delay in notification remain 
valid, it seems likely that she has reversed the locations here and that 
her husband was in fact taken captive in Italy and later transferred to 
Germany. As such, her testimony serves to highlight potential problems 
with oral history sources in that such inconsistencies cannot be checked 
without direct access to the interviewee. 
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For families whose menfolk were taken prisoner in the Far East, long 
delays in notification became almost inevitable given the locality of 
capture. Indeed, the Japanese themselves invoked this argument in 
attempting to explain the delay in notification of the men taken prisoner in 
the three Burma campaignS. 64 However, even before the introduction of 
particular problems related to prisoners in the Far East, the whole 
question of possible delays in notification had become a matter for 
concern and confusion for the families involved. The Foreign Office 
considered that what constituted an 'undue delay' could only be decided 
when all the circumstances of capture were taken into consideration as 
different circumstances would inevitably result in different time scales 
being regarded as acceptable. 65 In addition, to accept any form of 
funofficial' notification was seen as weakening the case for insisting on 
speedy 'official' notification. 66 Although this argument was, no doubt, 
true it can have been of little comfort to families anxiously awaiting news 
of any kind. The whole concept of different time scales for different 
circumstances of capture must also have caused confusion for relatives 
not conversant with all the military ramifications of different campaigns. In 
the case of Navy personnel, as we have already seen, there was often a 
'deliberate delay' between the date a seaman was known by the 
Admiralty to be missing and the date at which this information was 
forwarded to the next-of-kin. However, even when a delay had been 
declared unacceptable, it was still no easy task, even within Europe, for 
the Foreign Office to decide the appropriate channel for complaint. 67 In 
cases where delay resulted as a matter of policy, the Protecting Power 
was deemed the appropriate channel, whereas if delay was due to 
inefficient administrative procedures, complaint could most effectively be 
made to the POW Bureau concerned. In many cases representation to 
belligerent powers only proved effective when some degree of reciprocity 
could be enforced or a 'threat made in relation to traffic in the opposite 
direction'. 68 
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In this respect the work of the Imperial POW Committee in establishing a 
common policy aimed to be effective in ensuring that one Dominion 
government could not be played off against another . 
69 A similar policy 
was extended to the American government where separate but parallel 
approaches were favoured emphasising the solidarity of all governments 
in the matter . 
70 However, in the matter of Japanese civilians interned in 
the United States, Washington had not supplied lists to the Japanese 
government and so their claims for reciprocal treatment were open to 
question a factor that the British Foreign Office regarded as 'exceedingly 
tiresome. P71 
With the entry of Japan into the war, the problems of notification had 
become even more acute. In fact, by May 1942, less than 0.1% of the 
captives claimed by the Japanese government had been officially notified 
to the POW Information Bureau at the British Foreign Office . 
72 Sub- 
committee A of the Imperial Prisoner of War Committee noted that there 
were a number of 'unsatisfactory' features of the position with regard to 
prisoners in the Far EaSt. 73 These included the general lack of 
information regarding numbers and locations of captives in Japanese 
hands, the lack of information regarding deaths in captivity and the lack 
of information about subsequent transfers of prisoners of war. Vivienne 
Chatfield, whose husband was taken prisoner in 1942, believed that he 
was held for the whole period of his captivity in Java where he had been 
captured. In fact, on his liberation in September 1945, she learnt that he 
had been transferred four times, ending up in Singapore, by way of 
Batavia. 74 For the British government, the problem was often one of how 
to explain such delays to the families concerned without increasing 
worries about ill-treatment or public dissatisfaction with the way the 
government were handling the situation. 
However, with the lack of official notification, unofficial and sometimes 
politically dangerous sources came into play. In March 1944, the Swiss 
Consul in Bangkok received secretly the names of 6,000 British prisoners 
164 
being held in Siarn. 75 The onward transmission of this list proved 
problematic as to transmit in cipher might render the names inaccurate 
for identification purposes and it was feared that such a long 
transmission would attract Japanese attention. The Swiss themselves 
expressed a preference for sending the list, by courier, to Shanghai and 
then, by mail, to Siberia for onward transmission to Tehran. From here 
the list could be sent either to the British Embassy in Tehran or to Berne. 
The War Office considered that the best course would be to enlist 
Russian help but in the end the decision was left with the Swiss. The list 
was eventually taken to Tokyo personally by a member of staff from the 
Swiss Consulate who requested that the Soviet Ambassador should 
transmit it to the British Embassy in Moscow. The urgency of this 
information to the families, or government, seemed not to be appreciated 
by the Swiss diplomats as, by February 1945, the list had still not been 
transmitted. At this time it was viewed as probably being out of date and 
less politically sensitive and could be sent'by the hands of any diplomatic 
colleague who would consent to take ity. 76 As, in the meantime, Turkey, 
Brazil, Egypt, Romania and 'the rest' had declared war on Japan, it was 
envisaged that a 'flock of diplomats' would now be coming home any of 
whom could bring the list with them. 77 Although the matter remains 
unresolved in the archival sources, it is indicative of the convoluted 
attempts made to obtain official information from this difficult area. 
By September 1943, delays in notification from the Far East were such 
that the International Red Cross negotiated a radio message scheme 
through Radio Suisse. 78 Under this scheme, prisoners of war who had 
been out of contact with their next of kin for a specified period, usually 
three months, were allowed to exchange radio messages limited strictly 
to family news. The messages were grouped to save on transmission 
along the lines of 'Prisoners of War X, Y&Z all in good health and ask 
news of their relatives. '79 The success of this scheme was, however, 
tempered by the fact that what purported to be personal messages from 
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the Far East were inevitably mixed with propaganda and spoken in a 
clearly Japanese voice. 80 
Other radio links proved rather more successful. In January 1941, 
Australia Radio accepted an invitation from the Japanese controlled 
Radio Batavia to begin a system of exchanging broadcast messages. 81 
Although the system did not finally come into operation until August 
1944, once begun it continued to broadcast messages at the rate of 300 
82 
per week, despite the fact that the Japanese ended their co-operation. 
Originally intended only for the next of kin of Australian prisoners of war 
and civilian internees, the scheme was widely used by the next of kin of 
all British Commonwealth prisoners of war and internees who were 
resident in Australia. However, despite continual attempts on the part of 
the government and charitable organisations to ensure channels of 
communication, problems of communication for the families of those 
taken captive in the Far East continued throughout the war. Iris Strange 
spoke for many when she recorded many years laterFor me, as with so 
many others, there was no news once Singapore fell to the Japanese, 
except of terrible atrocities in the camps. 983 
Once information was received in London, the process of notifying the 
families concerned was still 'by no means a simple clerical task. 84 
Difficulties ensued for a variety of reasons such as the omission of 
nationality by the enemy POW Information Bureau, the abbreviation or 
'mutilation' of names and from insufficient details, such as regimental 
85 numbers, being included to aid positive identification. If all details were 
decipherable, notification was normally distributed to other government 
and service departments within twenty-four hours for onward distribution 
to next of kin. Problems associated with notifications from the Far East 
proved to be so acute that a campaign began for a specific department to 
be established to deal with information from this area. Anthony Eden, 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, received a deputation of MPs and 
relatives of British prisoners of war in the Far East, all of whom wanted a 
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'single channel of communication' between the government and the 
public to deal with enquiries concerning both prisoners of war and civilian 
internees in this location. 86 The deputation expressed concern that a 
number of enquiries had been passed from one department to another 
without relatives receiving any satisfactory answers and expressed the 
need for'somewhere where the public could go or write to and be sure of 
87 a reply'. That this concern was strongly felt is clear from a petition, 
presented in February 1944, from relatives of men missing in Singapore 
and Malaya 
We, the undersigned, must bring to your notice the fact that the 
fate of our men in Singapore and Malaya is, to date, unknown. 
Most of us, wives, mothers, sisters, have waited with almost 
inexhaustible patience to learn the fate of those dear to us. The 
time has arrived when we feel something definite must be done. 
We have made allowances for the disinclination of our enemies, 
the Japanese, to forward the names through the usual channels, 
but we feel that the British Government are strong enough in 1943 
to force the issue in this direction. 
We have all waited since the capitulation in 1942, and have no 
evidence of the safe landing of our men on the island of Singapore 
or the peninsula of Malaya, such were the conditions. 
This business may, in the eyes of the world, seem a military 
catastrophe, with the details of which we are not concerned, but 
the fate and treatment of these thousands of our men is very much 
our concern, and we insist that the attention of the Government is 
given immediately to this, and that a responsible Committee be 
formed to watch the interests of these prisoners and their next-of- 
kin; also that some arrangements are entered into whereby these 
names can be sent through with the shortest possible delay. 88 
In its last paragraph this petition hints at a public perception that the 
official attitude to the fall of Singapore and Hong Kong was seen solely 
as a military catastrophe. To the families concerned it appeared that 
there had been no consideration for the effect the events might have had 
on their emotions and day to day lives. 
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In response to these increasing concerns from the next of kin of those 
missing in the Far East, supported by an increasing number of MPs, the 
POW Far East Enquiry Centre was established as an extension of the 
War Office Enquiry Centre. 89 Not all government departments were in 
favour of this development. Neither the Air Ministry nor the Ministry of 
War Transport (who dealt with enquiries concerning merchant seamen) 
was keen to hand over enquiries to a central bureau. The Colonial Office 
felt that the Centre had been established 'as a political sop' to prevent 
further campaigning for a separate Ministry to deal with POW matters. 90 
However, all departments concerned ultimately co-operated to provide 
information from their own sources in order for the Centre to be able to 
respond to as many enquiries as possible and interviewing and clerical 
staff were drawn from experienced staff at the War Office Casualty 
(Prisoner of War) Branch. 91 In addition a special set of instructions was 
issued to staff outlining a variety of methods for dealing with enquiries. 
Personal or telephone enquiries were dealt with by the liaison officer from 
the service concerned, whilst written enquiries were transferred to the 
department concerned. 92 In these cases the enquirer was to be informed 
'by means of a non-stereotyped letter' of this action. 93 
To the general public, however, it must have appeared that some queries 
were dealt with preferentially by the centre whilst others, apparently at 
random, were forwarded to the various service departments. Colonel 
Phillimore, who in 1949 produced a report into all aspects of the 
administration of prisoner of war matters, wrote to the War Office at the 
time, arguing that any suggestion of enquirers being passed from one 
agency to another would be seen as a red rag to MpS. 94 Correspondence 
from the Air Ministry indicates that they also felt that this procedure would 
95 only lead to further confusion for relatives. Agreement was finally 
reached that all general enquiries regarding policy, plus all cases where 
the enquirer did not know the correct department to contact, would be 
dealt with by the Enquiry Centre. 96 Specific enquiries regarding individual 
prisoners would be directed to the various Service Departments. There 
168 
remains some doubt, however, as to whether the details of these 
procedures were communicated to the relatives concerned. 
There is evidence too that the tone of replies to enquiries from next-of-kin 
was initially less than sympathetic. An undated War Office circular 
suggests that replies to enquiries had sometimes been 'couched in rather 
curt official language'which might be either 'unintelligible to the recipient' 
97 or 'unnecessarily unsympathetic'. The circular continued 
... It must be remembered that many letters received in the Record Office are written by people with little understanding of 
official "jargon" and however trivial the matter appears officially, it 
is usually one of vital importance to them. 98 
and went on to suggest that replies should be, 
... couched in simple straightforward language so that the 
recipient may clearly understand that their queries have not been 
treated casually but have received proper consideration. 99 
Not only is this unusually humane circular undated but its author remains 
unaccredited and the conditions surrounding its production unknown. The 
number of enquiries received by the Centre confirmed the need. In June 
1944 alone the Centre dealt with 376 personal callers, 27 telephone 
enquiries and 922 enquiries by letter. 100 
The Enquiry Centre also published a handbook for relatives setting out 
the problems of obtaining information from the Far East and explaining 
how the situation there differed from that in Europe. 101 Although sources 
from the Red Cross and the War Office do not make the point explicit, 
this handbook together with that for the relatives of those held captive in 
Europe, was not provided free to the families concerned. In both cases, 
the Handbooks were issued at a cost of 2d. 102 
The authorities were keen for the public in general, and relatives in 
particular, to understand that they 'had no power until victory is won to 
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actually compel the Japanese authorities to do anything to which they are 
ill-disposed. P103 The whole question of reciprocity, regarded as so 
important in ensuring fair treatment of prisoners of war in Europe, 
possessed no leverage in the Far East. However, even given these 
limitations, the whole picture of how much information, held by the 
government, was released to the relatives of those taken captive in the 
Far East remains incomplete. 
Throughout 1942 information regarding the treatment of prisoners in the 
Far East, was heavily censored. 104 This was, in part at least, to prevent 
the general public, whom the authorities regarded as unable to 
appreciate the difficulties and possible repercussions of publicising the 
conditions in the camps, from concluding that the government was not 
doing everything possible to expedite the situation. The Phillimore 
Report of 1949 suggests that reports regarding the ill treatment of 
prisoners of war aroused 
... bitter resentment which can have serious repercussions on a 
government which cannot show that it has done all within its 
power to avert such action, mitigate its effect and generally 
improve the welfare of our own men in the hands of the enemy. 105 
As early as February 1942, the Imperial POW Committee was reporting 
in its 'Summary of Action' that reports were being received of atrocities in 
Japanese camps. ' 06 However, many of the reports at this time were 
conflicting so that no pattern of treatment across the area could be 
established. In April, reports from Macao on Stanley Camp in Hong Kong 
described the conditions as 'inhuman' whilst another report of the same 
1 107 time asserts that prisoners in there were 'receiving sufficient food . 
By 
1943, the War Office had positive evidence of appalling treatment and 
deaths of prisoners of war working on the Burma-Siam railway. 108 
However they expressed a fear that if this information, together with 
evidence of atrocities in other camps across the region, leaked out, it 
would be 'very difficult' to justify their earlier silence to the public. 109 In 
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fact the information did indeed 'leak out' when, in December 1942, the 
Sunday Graphi carried a report in their Stop Press section entitled 'War 
Prisoners Die of Starvation' based on the testimony of three British 
sailors who had escaped to Chungking from a Japanese transport. 110 
As a result the War Office received hundreds of enquiries from relatives 
concerned about the discrepancy between official reports and this 
eyewitness account. "' The Ministry of Information prepared a statement 
for broadcast stating that the Government 
knowing the great distress caused to the families of British POWs 
and internees in the Far East from lack of news, wished to take 
this opportunity of telling them what had been done and the 
reasons why up till then they had received so little 
information ......... 
112 
However, the broadcast was not made until August 1943. The 
government deemed it necessary to co-ordinate a simultaneous release 
with the Dominions and India, and wanted to allow for sufficient advance 
publicity so that the broadcast would attract the maximum number of 
listeners. ' 13 The numbers of enquiries received by the War Office and 
Far East Enquiry Bureau from worried relatives was not apparently 
considered sufficient evidence of interest in the ýubject to save next-of- 
kin from a further eight months of worry over these conflicting reports. 
When the broadcast was finally made, on 16 August 1943, the Foreign 
Office suggested that the success of the broadcast, in terms of listening 
figures, proved that propaganda, if handled correctly, was an effective 
weapon. 114 As we saw earlier in the cases of families receiving 
communications direct from captured relatives before receiving official 
notification, the Government once again determinedly attempted to put a 
positive gloss on the situation. The fact that, at this time, there were 
estimated to be between 50 - 55,000 British servicemen in Japanese 
hands would seem to suggest that there was little chance of such a 
broadcast failing to accrue high listening figures. ' 15 
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The War Office enforced similar news censorship on the 'Avant Project' 
in 1943, dealing with the proposed exchange of prisoners with the Axis 
powers. ' 16 To prevent 'false optimism' on the part of the next-of-kin, 
censorship was applied so completely that many relatives had no 
knowledge of the proposed exchanges until October 1943 when 
husbands, brothers and sons arrived on their doorsteps. ' 17 Small 
wonder, then, that many families became so suspicious of both the 
quality and level of information they received from official sources that 
they turned for support and information to local and charitable groups. 
By 1944, the Government had modified their whole stance on the 
withholding of information regarding conditions in the Far East. Whereas 
earlier the release of such information had been viewed as likely to cause 
friction with the Japanese authorities resulting in still worse treatment of 
prisoners, this was now seen as having potential to aid efforts to achieve 
better conditions. 118 The 34th meeting of the Imperial Prisoner of War 
Committee, Sub-committee A, in April 1944 noted that there had been a 
'violent' Japanese reaction to publicity regarding the conditions in the 
camps and saw this as indicating a 'sensitiveness' to world opinion. ' 19 
For example the suggestion was made by the Committee that Japanese 
military pride could be stung by suggesting that the government was 
unable to control the military who had direct charge of prisoners. The 
meeting also suggested that campaigns highlighting these issues would 
'bring home the facts' to the British public. 120 A strange volte face 
considering that, until 1942, it was considered necessary to keep these 
details from the public for fear of political repercussions. 
Once a serviceman had been officially notified as being prisoner of war, 
the question then arose of the disposal of his personal assets. For 
prisoners of war this was often a matter of some importance as their kit 
contained items such as extra clothing and blankets which could be 
forwarded to them, at least in Europe . 
121 As we have already seen earlier 
in this chapter, the question of providing clothing for inclusion in personal 
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parcels was a vexed one. For many families, the possibility of recovering 
at least some of their relatives existing kit would provide some financial 
relief as these items were both difficult and expensive to replace. An 
extract from the journal of an escaped prisoner states that his next of kin 
had not been notified of the whereabouts of his kit and so did not know 
how to claim it. The serviceman had to purchase new kit himself on his 
arrival home at a cost of 1: 70.122 
Until 1941, pay books, effects and the wills of soldiers reported missing 
were generally sent in the first instance to the Paymaster in Liverpool. 123 
However, by late 1941 'numerous complaints' had been received from 
the next of kin of both officers and other ranks taken prisoner that they 
had not been allowed access to the kits of their relatives. 124 The question 
raised was one of whether or not it was lawful for the War Office to 
authorise the handing over of a soldier or officer's property without his 
prior consent. Although it was recognised that in some cases soldiers 
might not wish all their effects to be forwarded to their relatives, the more 
practical question of shortage of clothing for those taken captive also 
came to bear on this issue. 125 Effects for both officers and other ranks 
included letters, documents, personal papers and articles of sentimental 
or intrinsic value. Kit was defined, for officers, as uniform clothing, camp 
kit and saddlery. 126 Other ranks were presumed to have no kit other than 
'effects' as all other belongings consisted of government property, which 
had been issued to them. In practice, however, it was agreed that 'every 
soldier accumulates a stock of articles such as woollen garments, which 
are neither effects nor army property' and these articles were, therefore, 
classed as 'kit'. 127 
In June 1942, the War Office suggested a compromise whereby 
personal effects would not be released but kit could be, provided an 
indemnity was obtained from those removing items of kit preventing any 
future claims against the War Office by the serviceman for this action. 128 
The final agreed procedure for officers' kit was laid out in 'Personal 
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Property (Kits. etc. ) of British Army Officers who are Prisoners of War'. 129 
Under this procedure the kit of an officer who was taken prisoner was to 
be sent to the UK for storage following a minimum retention period of one 
month in the theatre of war in which the officer was captured. The kit 
might then be claimed by a personal representative of the officer who 
could produce evidence that they had the authority to act on behalf of 
that officer. If no prior authority existed, the kit could be released to a 
representative provided an indemnity signed by the officer was produced 
to indemnify the department against any subsequent claims for the kit. 
Alternatively kit could be claimed where the War Office received direct 
instructions from the officer that the kit was to be disposed of in this way. 
Although the procedure appeared tedious it was nevertheless possible, 
given time, for the families of those taken prisoner in Europe to obtain 
such instructions. Personal effects of both men and officers still could not 
be claimed. 
To facilitate the claims procedure, Messrs. Cox and King in Liverpool 
who, under contract to the War Office, undertook the storage of both kit 
and effects, agreed to sort the items they received into 'kit' or'effects'. 130 
A contract stated that the War Office would pay Messrs. Cox and King 6d 
for opening a parcel for the purposes of identification and a further 5 
shillings for sorting, making an inventory and re-securing the parcel. 131 In 
fact kit and personal effects were already parcelled separately by Cox 
and King so there should have been no immediate problem with this 
arrangement. 132 However, with the opening of the Far East Enquiry 
Centre it became clear that there were a large number of 'retrospective' 
cases needing to be dealt with. 133 The Director of Freight Movement felt 
that the delay was due to the fact that Messrs Cox and King were not 
carrying out notifications properly but saw no merit in changing the 
system as, in fact, very few applications to claim kit had been received. 134 
A letter of January 1944 from the officer in charge of the Infantry Records 
Office, Exeter to the War Office states that, of two hundred and thirty 
letters sent to next of kin regarding the procedure for claiming kit, only 
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135 fifty three replies were received. Of these, twenty eight said that since 
the fall of Italy, they had no address for the serviceman to obtain 
authority for release of kit, ten demanded its release simply on the 
grounds that they were next of kin and fifteen others also expressed this 
demand saying that although they had written for authority no reply was 
likely to be forthcoming within four to six months. The letter goes on to 
state that 'in most cases the writers express feelings varying from 
distress to indignation to a combination of both that this baggage is not 
being forwarded to them. " 36 In fact the kit of the particular battalion in 
question, The South Wales Borderers, presented particular problems. As 
their normal peacetime station was in India, some of the baggage had 
been closed in November 1941.137 The Officer in Charge felt that 'it was 
more than probable that it would be advantageous to the contents to be 
taken out and exposed to the air or otherwise dealt with, though possibly 
in the case of clothing it may already be too late after two years in a hot 
climate' . 
138 Further problems arose with other battalions also based 
overseas before the outbreak of war as, in setting up homes in these 
areas, a number of men had accumulated many bulky possessions. 139 In 
August 1943, the Officer in Charge, Infantry and AEC Record Office in 
York, wrote to the Under-secretary of State at the War Office regarding 
the problem of the 'great quantity' of heavy kit weighing 'approximately 
two tons' which had already been received and the amount of this type of 
kit which it was anticipated would arrive in the near future . 
140 Even if 
enough manpower had been available to sort these items, many of the 
trunks were 'locked and roped' making them virtually impossible to 
open . 
141 The Officer in Charge requested permission to despatch these 
items direct to the next of kin but there is no record of any suggested 
solution from the War Office. 142 
Although the primary concerns of the War Office in this matter were to 
protect the interests of the men and their own actions against possible 
future repercussions, there is some evidence that they were not totally 
without concern for the families involved. Mrs Chippendale of 
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Westminster, who had enquired into the whereabouts of her son's 
effects, received a reply from the Director of Organisation himself, in 
December 1943, apologising for an initial reply she had received whose 
curt tone he considered was 'not one which was approved by the War 
Office'. 143 She was then assured that her particular enquiry was being 
taken up with the Record Office concerned. 144 However, cases still arose 
where communications between families and the War Office broke down. 
In May 1942 Mr Burn, the father of Captain Michael Burn (KRR) No. 2 
Commando who was prisoner in Germany following the St. Nazaire raid, 
rang Messrs. Cox and King requesting that his son's kit should be 
forwarded direct to him as next of kin. 145 Mr Burn wanted to send items of 
clothing from this kit to his son in Germany. When it was explained that 
this could not be done without authority from his son Mr Burn was 
'extremely rude' in his remarks and inferred that this action was 'causing 
the very gravest of hardship. 046 Mr Burn continued shouting 'in a loud 
voice' about red tape and finally closed the conversation by slamming 
down the phone. He then sent a letter to the War Office saying that it 
appeared 'disgraceful and unnecessary that additional unhappiness, 
worry and expense should be caused to relatives' because of some legal 
principle and expressing his disbelief that such a 'wooden principle' could 
not be broadened. 147 The immediate problem lay in the fact that relatives 
were only allowed to send one personal parcel to prisoners per quarter 
and Mr Burn believed that, if the kit were not released immediately, he 
would not be able to send additional clothing from the kit to his son in 
time for Christmas. The War Office, adhering to its affirmed policy of 
treating enquiries with 'proper consideration' replied that 'some 
concession to meet the special circumstances could doubtless be 
arranged. 048 In fact, given that, at this time, correspondence with those 
held captive in Germany was taking approximately six weeks to arrive, 
Mr Burn could probably have written to his son to arrange the necessary 
permission in sufficient time to allow the parcel to be forwarded before 
Christmas. The actual resolution of the problem and any compromise 
reached is not recorded. 
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Throughout this chapter clear parallels have been shown between the 
government attitude towards developing a coherent policy for the 
administration of service allowances and for administering the 
dissemination of information to families. In both cases, despite clear 
warnings from SSAFA, in the case of allowances, and the Belfield 
Report, in the cases of prisoners of war, no adequate preparations were 
made before the event and government responses remained reactive 
rather than proactive -a situation that continued even once the scale of 
the problem had been realised. In fact, on the question of dissemination 
of information, government strategy to the general public as a whole, not 
just to prisoner of war families, can be seen to be indecisive at best. 
Under government circular 2269 of 1942, it had been planned to 
centralise information available to the public in local enquiry centres 
providing the public with one central agency to which they could apply for 
advice on a wide range of topiCS. 149 The Sheffield Information Centre, 
located in the Town Hall, dealt with requests ranging from details of 
accommodation address for wives visiting their husbands stationed in the 
area, to an enquiry on how to make up rabbit skins. 150 However, despite 
the success of this scheme, as suggestion was made that information 
should be made available in more diverse locations, such as local Post 
Offices . 
151 In the matter of information for the next-of-kin of prisoners of 
war such inconsistencies led to a general lack of confidence in the 
information and advice available from government agencies. The Belfield 
Report had been explicit in its recommendation that, in the event of a 
future war, 'the most practical course of action would be to establish at 
once an interdepartmental committee'to deal with POW matters. 152 
However, this advice was ignored and, from the outset, the fact that 
responsibility for POW matters cut across departmental boundaries, 
caused confusion for the families concerned, if not for the departments 
themselves. 
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There can be no doubt that many problems were caused by lack of 
experience in the Departments concerned in dealing with the general 
public. Traditionally, service dependants were regarded as secondary to 
the men concerned. The responsibility of the War Office was towards the 
soldiers under their care, and the welfare of the families involved only 
concerned them in so far as it might affect the well being or effectiveness 
of the men concerned. The Army Morale Report for the period November 
1943 to January 1944 makes this position abundantly clear, stating that 
when a soldier's family are happy'he has something to fight for: if his 
family is in distress he cannot give his whole mind and heart to his 
soldiering. v153 Nevertheless, once the soldiers had been taken captive the 
War Office was then faced with the task of dealing direct with the families 
concerned and, very often, with families in a distressed state. As we have 
seen above, after a shaky start, the War Office did begin to tackle this 
problem by attempting to ensure that enquiries received intelligible and 
considerate replies. However, in addition to the issue of communication, 
more fundamental issues appear to stem from the whole attitude of the 
armed services to the question of prisoners of war in general. 
David Rolf suggests that the 'tardy realisation of new realities' which 
faced the government when large numbers of servicemen were taken 
prisoner, precluded the formulation of a coherent policy. ' 54 Despite this, 
there must remain some question as to whether or not this lack of 
foresight was the sole reason for the lack of a coherent policy. There can 
be no doubt that a reluctance existed on the part of the armed services to 
foster what could be seen as a defeatist attitudes amongst servicemen 
by encouraging them to consider the possibilities of capture. As we have 
already seen, the Treasury expressed themselves as reluctant to 
formulate policy on the 'assumption that the British Army habitually 
throws away its arms' and, by implication, is taken prisoner. 155 
Additionally, in the Far East, the likelihood of the Japanese attempting to 
take Singapore had been seen as a remote possibility at best. Both 
Winston Churchill and Leslie Hore-Belisha, dismissed the suggestion, 
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regarding the Japanese as too 'sensible' and 'prudent' to risk such a 
venture. ' 56 Similarly, servicemen themselves were not encouraged to 
consider the realities of being taken prisoner nor prepared for this 
eventuality. Vance, in his study of Canadian prisoners of war during the 
twentieth century, refers to a small amount of training provided for 
Canadian servicemen in Britain on how to avoid capture, conduct in 
captivity and techniques of escape. 157 However, those involved in the 
training recollect little time being spent on these issues and most 
servicemen 'never contemplated that they might fall into enemy 
hands'. 158 
In addition, although the British government professed itself to be keen to 
demonstrate to the Japanese in particular that British prisoners of war 
were not 'dishonoured men' some actions speak to the contrary. Alice 
Truman, the wife of a submariner taken prisoner after the loss of HMS 
Sea[ in 1940, apparently received a letter from the local authority in 
Gosport where she was resident stating 'We understand that your 
husband is in a prisoner of war camp and he is of no further use to the 
country for the war effort so we are going to requisition your house'. 159 
Mrs Trueman's testimony is taken from a taped interview held at the 
Imperial War Museum Sound Archive, consequently it has not been 
possible to check whether or not this is an accurate quote from the letter. 
But, whatever the actual wording, the impression she received from the 
letter was only too clear. If, as this account suggests, contradictions 
existed within government circles in attitudes towards the whole question 
of prisoners of war, it is not surprising that these tensions prevented the 
formulation of a coherent overall policy towards their families. 
The Phillimore Report, one of a series of works compiled on the authority 
of the Army Council, concludes that the problems experienced during 
WWI were not repeated because of the'close and excellent 
understanding' which existed between the War and Foreign Offices. 160 
However, the reliability of this particular report remains open to question 
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and there can be little doubt that the proliferation of responsibility for 
POW matters across a wide range of departments did cause serious 
confusion for the families of those taken captive. 161 In addition the report 
claims that, wherever possible, the public received the fullest information 
from the War Office but, as we have seen in the case of information 
regarding conditions in the Far East, this was demonstrably untrue. The 
fact that a newspaper article forced a government statement is 
conveniently avoided. 
Similarly, the sheer proliferation of local and 'self-help' POW committees, 
detailed in the next chapter, cannot be attributed solely to the desire of 
families to try to participate actively in helping their menfolk. The need for 
these committees and associations to exist as centres for the 
dissemination of information and to provide practical help to families 
argues all too clearly for a lack of information from, and confidence in, 
government sources. As does the evidence from those families who took 
comfort from 'unofficial' sources of information when 'official' sources 
failed them. For many, the lack of a coherent policy in the dissemination 
of information to next of kin and handling of enquiries led to a feeling of 
isolation and frustration. Many, as in the case of Mrs Buswell, mentioned 
above, 'just stayed at home and lived in the hope that he [her husband] 
would come back. '162 
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Chapter 6 
Unofficial sources of information, self-help and charities 
Not surprisingly, in the light of the shortcomings of official systems of 
notification detailed in the previous chapter, large numbers of prisoner of 
war families turned to charitable and 'self-help' groups for information 
and support. In general, all war charities were governed by the 
regulations laid down in the War Charities Act of 1916.1 However, 
although the Charity Commissioners also showed interest in other 
classes of charities such as societies incorporated under the Companies 
Act or by Royal Charter such as the Royal Patriotic Fund in World War 1, 
2 by and large local war charities were left to their own devices. In 
December 1938 a Standing Conference of Voluntary Organisation in 
Time of War was established to facilitate communications between 
voluntary organisations and the statutory authorities. 3 This Conference, 
incorporating 94 voluntary organisations concerned with a range of 
wartime voluntary efforts, also originally included SSAFA, but in February 
1941 The Charities Commissioners made the decision that SSAFA need 
not register under the War Charities Act as it was 'deemed not to be a 
4 
war charity'. Presumably the decision was made in the light of the fact 
that SSAFA continued its work in both peacetime and war. 
Of these national organisations, those concerned with prisoners of war 
focused their efforts almost exclusively on the needs of the captives 
themselves rather than those of the families concerned. For example the 
Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), which undertook a great 
deal of work in providing educational and recreational materials for 
prisoners, appears to have had little or no direct contact with their 
families. 5 Some national agencies found that, although they were open to 
queries of all types, service families made little use of their facilities. Most 
preferred to address their queries to specific agencies. In Norwich, for 
example, the Citizens'Advice Bureau (CAB), which opened in July 1943, 
reported that although the public generally came to regard it as 'a place 
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where every question however serious or however trivial, may first be 
asked', few specific queries relating to POW allowances came their way. 
The CAB, itself, saw this small number of queries as due to the fact that 
there were 'organisations in the city to deal with these specific 
7 
problems'. However, two major national charities did become involved 
with the needs of these families as well as those of the prisoners. 
SSAFA, as detailed in Chapter 1, had been closely involved with service 
family welfare since its inception in 1885. The Association continued to 
work at full stretch throughout the Second World War and beyond when, 
once again, their work proved to be vital to the well being, if not the 
actual survival of families. 8 Many testimonies exist to this effect from both 
families and servicemen alike. For example, an aircraftman, serving in 
the Outer Hebrides in 1942 wrote to the Association expressing his 
gratitude for the help and advice his family had received and saying that 
it had been 'a great relief to me to know that my family has someone to 
go to'. 9 The Association also saw their work of giving advice and support 
as being as important as providing actual financial relief. 10 Considering 
that the overarching aim of the Association was, and still is, to look after 
the families of all service personnel, it is perhaps not surprising that its 
archives show little provision of assistance specifically related to prisoner 
of war families. These families were visited in the normal course of 
events, as were all other service families in need of assistance. Those to 
whom assistance was given were dealt with strictly on the basis of need, 
regardless of the status of the serviceman involved. In this way, the case 
of the wife of a serviceman taken captive at Singapore, who arrived in 
England with three children, having lost all her possessions was dealt 
with in the same way as any other similarly destitute service family. " 
However, SSAFA was able to provide special assistance to prisoner of 
war families in one particular respect. The Chief Censor of the Prisoner 
of War Department of Postal and Telegraph Censorship called on the 
services of SSAFA to assist in dealing with mail which, for one reason or 
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another, was classified as 'undeliverable'. 12 As has been shown in the 
previous chapter, many problems were associated with the delivery of 
mail from enemy territories and these problems did not end once the mail 
reached British soil. Not only were prisoners of war themselves moved 
from one location to another but, with the increasing frequency of 
bombing raids on major British cities, many families were either 
evacuated or forced to move when their homes were destroyed. In fact, 
between 1939 and 1945, the Post Office recorded 60m changes of 
address in a total population of 40 million. 13 By late 1941, the Chief 
Censor had handed 2,200 letters to SSAFA which the Post Office 
regarded as undeliverable as the addressees had moved as a result of 
evacuation or bombing. 14 All such letters were carefully sorted by 
SSAFA and, where possible, then sent on to local representatives for 
delivery. However, in many cases the original address had become 
indecipherable because of subsequent re-directions, crossings out and 
various other marks and stamps. Using the services of a Mr Guerin, a 
well-known handwriting expert, the Association was able to employ 
infrared and other photographic techniques to expose the original 
address so that work on tracing the families concerned could begin from 
their last known address. 15 In all, SSAFA handled 5,500 such letters 
during the period of the war, of which they managed successfully to 
deliver 3,300.16 
Although the SSAFA archives provide little detail of work directly 
concerned with prisoner of war families as distinct from service families 
in general, this is not to suggest that they were not involved in providing 
support for these families. In December 1944, a letter to Major General, 
the Viscount Bridgeman in connection with visits to next-of-kin to offer 
advice on receiving homecoming prisoners of war makes this very 
clear. 17 The War Office had suggested that these families should only be 
visited once in this connection and that the British Red Cross (BRC) 
should make this visit. SSAFA felt that this would threaten links they had 
already established where they had 'given considerable help to the 
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families of prisoners of war, both in regard to their financial troubles and 
their private and domestic problems'. 18 A draft reply from the War Office 
stated that they were sure that the BRC would 'take into account any ties 
between particular families and the SSAFA. 19 It is clear, however, that 
the War Office did not intend to intervene in this matter. This does, 
however, raise the question of possible tensions between various 
charitable organisations each of which laid claim to being the 
organisation primarily concerned with the welfare of POW families. The 
War Office, however, appeared to be impartial in the matter favouring no 
one organisation above another as they turned to SSAFA rather than the 
BRC to obtain information regarding the family circumstances of 
dependants of soldiers missing in the Far East in 1943 . 
20 At the time they 
had assured SSAFA that the numbers of families involved would be 
A extremely small'- a serious miscalculation. 21 
Other correspondence within the SSAFA archive also indicates this 
possible tension between charitable organisations concerned with 
service family welfare in general, and prisoner of war families in 
particular. In May 1940, SSAFA had sent a resolution to the British 
Legion Whit Conference saying that they'felt obliged to register strong 
protest' that the Legion was widening its scope to include the 
dependants of servicemen and so causing an overlap of interests. 22 The 
Legion appear to have ignored this protest as SSAFA Council Minutes 
for the following month note that, at the Conference, the Legion had 
decided to include dependants in their field of interest. The Council noted 
that all branches were to be instructed that they 'must continue to co- 
operate'with the Legion. 23 Similarly, SSAFA Council Minutes in March 
1941 note that the Women's Voluntary Service was also 'overlapping' in 
the area of clothing distribution. 24 However, SSAFA, themselves, were 
not averse to promoting their own interests as the major provider of 
services to the families of those taken captive. Their services in tracing 
the next-of-kin of prisoners of war who had changed addresses, reported 
in SSAFA archives as the sole prerogative of SSAFA, were in fact also 
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carried out by the BRC. The Second Annual Report of the BRC War 
Organisation notes that they had been asked, by the POW Department 
at the War Office, to assist in tracing the whereabouts of next-of-kin who 
had failed to notify change of address and 'through the help of liaison 
25 
officers, this information was invariably obtained'. As we shall see later 
in this chapter, this tension between organisations was not limited to 
Britain. In Canada too various charitable organisations continually jostled 
for primacy in the field of prisoner of war family welfare. 
In terms of general involvement with prisoner of war families, such as 
dissemination of information and advice on sending parcels, the BRC 
was traditionally rather more intimately involved. At the beginning of the 
First World War, no overall organisation had existed to oversee the 
sending of food, clothing and 'comforts' to British prisoners although a 
number of unofficial local and regimental committees were engaged in 
this work. 26 This lack of overall organisation was perceived as creating 
inequalities whereby some prisoners received an abundance of parcels 
whilst others received none. To counteract this situation a Central POW 
Committee was established in the autumn of 1916 under the direction of 
the BRC to impose some degree of coherence. 27 Initially the decision to 
leave such work to charitable institutions was based on a fear that 
captors would confiscate such items if they were seen as originating from 
home governments. 28 Supplies from charitable organisations were 
regarded as being more likely to reach their intended destinations. In the 
light of this, the Belfield Report recommended that the Hague 
Convention of 1907 should be revised so that official consignments to 
prisoners of war would be protected from confiscation . 
29AIthough the 
Report also suggested that there had been some public dissatisfaction 
with the handling of parcels for prisoners of war the work received 
6 30 almost universal praise'. With the commencement of World War 11 and 
in the initial stages of the 'phoney war' in 1939, most of the immediate 
tasks relating to the welfare of British prisoners of war were again left to 
the Red Cross. This despite the fact that the Belfield Report had claimed 
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that there could be 'little doubt' that these responsibilities should have 
been undertaken by a government department, rather than being left to 
charitable organ isationS. 31 And despite the fact that no efforts had been 
made to establish whether or not the organisation could actually fulfil 
32 these responsibilities . As we have already seen in the previous chapter, 
with the loss of large numbers of men from the BEF in May 1940, the 
need for a separate Directorate of Prisoners of War was recognised. 
However, the continuing involvement of the BRC had the unfortunate 
corollary of providing the government with a convenient scapegoat for 
some of its own shortcomings. 
During the Second World War, every prisoner in Europe was entitled to 
receive an initial parcel when first captured; three food parcels per 
fortnight; medical comforts and one personal parcel, later known as next- 
33 of-kin parcels, every three months. Initially prisoners also received a 
bread parcel although this practice was discontinued after May 1940.34 
By the autumn of 1940, with large numbers of British prisoners in camps 
in Germany and relief routes through France and Belgium often closed, 
35 the situation regarding parcels became critical . The Sunday Express in 
conjunction with Mrs Coombe Tennant, whose own son was held 
prisoner in Oflag VIB, led a campaign which was highly critical of the 
work of the Red Cross in managing the forwarding of parcelS. 36 In fact, 
the Post Office, not the BRC, was largely responsible for the 
transmission of these parcels but it proved more convenient for the 
Government to allow the BRC to shoulder the lion's share of the blame. 37 
A subsequent enquiry, ordered by Sir Stafford Cripps, the Lord Privy 
Seal, under the chairmanship of the Solicitor General, Sir William Jowitt, 
was designed to allay any further public discussion of the matter. 38 
Although Irene Ward, MP for Wallsend, a consistent critic of the 
government, was promised that the results of the enquiry would be 
forwarded to the Secretary of State for War, the report, which was highly 
critical of the government's role in the matter, was largely suppressed. 
The then newly formed Prisoner of War Relatives Association (POWRA), 
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however, continued to pursue the matter causing Field Marshall Sir Philip 
Chetwode, Chairman of the BRC, to comment on the foolishness of their 
work - an attitude which characterised the relationship between the two 
organisations for the duration of the war . 
39 However, the persistent, and 
erroneous, view held by the general public that the BRC were to blame 
for these problems continued to serve the government well by deflecting 
criticism from its own ill-thought out provision. As the BRC Annual report 
of 1939-40 notes, the BRC War Organisation 
... allowed itself to be regarded by the public as being responsible for features of the service which were the responsibility of others 
who, not unnaturally, since they saw the Prisoners of War 
Department fighting their battles, did not themselves come 
forward at the time to declare their own accountabil ity. 40 
Indeed, the misapprehension was allowed to persist until July 1941 when 
it was finally admitted in the House that despatch of these parcels was 
outside the control of the BRC . 
41 As this admission was never made as 
an official public announcement, it may be assumed that large sectors of 
the British public continued to believe that the BRC was to blame. 
The question of next-of-kin parcels posed problems for many families as 
well as for the Red Cross. From October 1940 the War Organisation of 
the BRC had established a next-of-kin section at St. James' Palace. 
Here a card index was established bearing the name, camp address and 
Red Cross registration number of each prisoner of war, together with the 
name and address of their next-of-kin. 42 As each registration was made a 
next-of-kin label, two invoice sheets, an acknowledgement card and 
instructions were mailed to the relatives of the prisoner. 43 This paperwork 
initiated the process for sending parcels as the label entitled the next-of- 
kin to send their parcel to a Packing Centre whilst the invoice sheets 
were used for listing the contents of these parcels. From the beginning, 
strict censorship was exercised over the contents, partly for security 
reasons but also as enemy authorities prohibited a range of items as 
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diverse as nail files, glass mirrors and toilet paper. 44 Despite this, the 
BRC Second Annual Report of 1940-41, the BRC War Organisation 
recorded that 10% of all articles included in next-of-kin parcels had to be 
45 
removed as they fell into the range of prohibited items. Initially all 
parcels were forwarded to a central depot but, by 1941, local packing 
centres were established in many areas and members of local POW 
Committees often spent time working voluntarily in these centres. 46 
Although the parcels were regarded as of prime importance as, through 
them, prisoners would 'keep in touch with home and would not feel that 
they had been forgotten', their compilation caused serious financial 
worries for families of allied prisoners of war. 47 With the introduction of 
clothing rationing, next-of-kin were obliged to buy clothing for prisoners of 
48 
war using their own coupons which were then refunded . For many, the 
initial outlay of coupons caused considerable hardship, as they were 
then unable to purchase clothing for themselves or other family 
members. To offset this in Britain, the POW Department at the War 
Office issued 40 extra clothing coupons to next-of-kin . 
49 These coupons 
were sent in advance to allow purchases to be made in time to be 
included in parcels. In this respect the relatives of British prisoners of war 
fared better than their French counterparts. There, the Vichy government 
consistently refused to issue wives with additional textile points so that 
they could purchase clothing to send to their husbands. 50 For many 
wives of French prisoners of war the choice had to be made between 
clothing for themselves and their children or clothing for their husbands. 
In 1943, one woman wrote that she was still wearing her'old, shabby 
clothes from before the war' whilst another recorded that she had 'cut up 
a bed sheet to make blouses and dresses'. 51 
From early 1942, with the rationing of soap and chocolate in Britain, 
these items were held at parcel packing depots and added to parcels by 
the BRC if money was sent to cover the CoStS. 52 At a later date 
chocolate was added as a gift of the Red Cross War Organisation. 53 In 
193 
France, too, many wives, despite being given an extra two francs per day 
from May 1941 to pay for such items to be included in parcels, were 
54 forced to rely on the charity of the Red Cross. Fishman records that 
pressure was brought to bear not only on wives, but also on children, to 
make 'loving self-sacrificesto compile personal parcels by contributing 
their own chocolates or sweets, although this was not always done 
without resentment. 55 However, as Cambray and Briggs suggest, for 
many families 'the cost of the articles in a parcel, if it were to be worth 
sending, was beyond their meanS'. 56 In this context local POW 
Committees throughout Britain also stepped in to try to ensure that all 
families in their areas were able to provide their relatives with worthwhile 
next-of-kin parcels. For those prisoners whose records showed that they 
had not received any next-of-kin parcels, for whatever reason, the BRC 
either provided for them to be 'adopted' by local POW Committees or to 
be sent'gift' parcels provided by the Central Packing Centre or a BRC 
County Committee. 57 
Normally, the time from the receipt of a parcel at the Depot to the 
despatch of new labels and coupons to the next-of-kin for their next 
parcels was two days . 
58 The only exceptions to this were particularly 
busy periods, such as early 1943, when an average of 1,300 next-of-kin 
parcels were received per day at the Central Packing Depot. 59 By 
keeping within these limits it was hoped to ensure that relatives had 
sufficient time to make their purchases before the next parcel was due to 
be sent. 60 
In 1942, in conjunction with the Foreign Office, the BRC established a 
special Correspondence and Enquiry Section for the families of 
servicemen held prisoner. 61 When a serviceman was officially notified to 
his family as being in enemy hands, a file was opened in which all 
contacts with both the prisoner of war himself and his next-of-kin was 
62 recorded together with the relevant addresses. These files were kept 
up to date where possible, but with prisoners being moved from camp to 
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camp and families being frequently relocated due to evacuation, war 
damage and the demands of a war economy, this proved to be a major 
undertaking. Through the Section, next-of-kin were provided with 
information on how to communicate with prisoners of war and on how to 
63 send parcels. In addition, relatives were able to visit the Enquiry 
Section in person, a facility not readily provided by the Foreign Office. 
For many families, correspondence with the Enquiry Section lasted 
throughout the war from initial notification of POW status to repatriation 
at the end of hostilities. 64 
Following the fall of Singapore, a similar Far East Correspondence and 
Enquiry Section was opened to compile similar files on the next-of-kin for 
prisoners in this theatre of war. 65 Although the Section began with just six 
names, by September 1944 files were held on 47,000 captive 
servicemen. 66 This Section found information especially difficult to 
obtain and used such diverse sources as the International Red Cross, 
unofficial broadcasts and letters from prisoners written direct to the 
67 Section or to relatives in an attempt to keep the files up to date. In 
August 1943 alone, the Section received more than 220 personal callers. 
In September of the same year, 7,000 enquiries were received by mail. 68 
Small wonder then that, for many families, it was commonly assumed 
that the best way to obtain information was to 'ask the Red Cross about 
iti. 69 Similarly, many prisoners themselves contacted the Society 
expressing concerns for the safety of their families during intensive 
bombing campaigns on British cities. In all cases replies from the Society 
were 'as from one friend to another', in marked contrast to the official, if 
not officious, replies often received from government agencies. 70 
Cambray and Briggs, in their official history of the BRC, consider that 
these replies served to form a link between the prisoner and his next-of- 
kin 'devoid of official prejudices'. 71 
Tensions between the various agencies involved with POW family 
welfare were also manifest in other spheres, with each regarding itself as 
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the prime agency concerned. Following the intensive bombing o major 
British cities, Colonel Lord Nathan, Eastern Command Welfare Officer, 
was appointed to organise an enquiry bureau for all three services so 
that servicemen could obtain information regarding the safety of their 
families in Britain. 72 SSAFA archives suggest that SSAFA themselves, 
rather than the BRC, were involved in this facility, opening a special 
office to deal with these enquiries with financial support from the 
Treasury. The SSAFA Overseas Department opened in May 1941 and 
by November was dealing with 1,000 cases per month. 73 There is no 
doubt that both the BRC and SSAFA were involved in this service, but 
their individual records give no acknowledgement of any involvement by 
other organ isationS. 74 Rather they suggest that each organisation was 
the sole agency responsible. As with government agencies, this apparent 
lack of communication between charitable agencies involved in the 
welfare of prisoners of war and their families led to confusion and a less 
efficient service for families than would have been possible if all agencies 
had co-operated. 
In May 1942 a more immediate channel for maintaining contact between 
next-of-kin and those taken prisoner in Europe was established when the 
POW Department of the BRC released the first issue of the periodical 
The Prisoner of War. 75 This first issue contained an open letter from the 
Queen asserting that the next-of-kin of POWs, especially mothers, wives 
and sisters, were often in her thoughts plus the first instalment of an 
article by Winston Churchill entitled 'I Was A Prisoner once' relating his 
experiences during the Boer War. 76 The purpose of the magazine was 
'the enlightenment and guidance of next-of-kin' and a typical issue 
contained extracts from POW letters, photos from camps and summaries 
of reports on camps by the Protecting Power and summaries of reports 
on conditions in POW camps provided by the War Office. 77 Issues also 
contained suggestions as to what should and should not be included in 
letters. News to be ornitted included the loss of ration books, news of 
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78 having been ill and of bombing 'near misses' . Suggestions of news 
which should be sent included news of how money had been saved, 
things children had learnt and of films seen . 
79 An article entitled 'When 
You Write to Him', in a later issue, also contained the suggestion that 
wives should tell their husbands who they had been to see the film with - 
presumably to reassure him that this had not been another man. 80 
In addition to being sent to all next-of-kin, the periodical was also 
circulated to: public libraries, to any MPs who requested it in order to 
answer queries from their constituents and to Red Cross Societies in the 
Dominions for circulation to next-of-kin in their localities. 81 As a condition 
of its licence, the magazine was not allowed to carry any advertising, nor 
was it to be offered for sale. 82 Although the magazine deliberately 
included the 'unsatisfactory' side of camp life so that it could not be 
accused of only showing the brighter aspects, all such reports carried the 
note that, where poor conditions had been found, the Protecting Power 
83 had been called in to make representations to the authorities. In early 
1941, the USA, as the then Protecting Power for British interests, made 
44 protests of this nature to the German government. 84 However, like the 
government, they also came in for adverse criticism when information 
was delayed or incomplete. In July 1941, the Rochdale and District POW 
Committee learnt that British POWs were being forced to work in salt and 
coalmines in Germany. 85 In response they demanded that German 
prisoners should be made to carry out similar work in this country, 
disregarding or being unaware that complaints had already been made in 
respect of this ill treatment. 86 For the editors of The Prisoner of War, and 
later particularly for those involved in the production of Far East, it would 
always prove to be a difficult balancing act between being accused of not 
presenting a true picture of camp life and causing unnecessary distress 
to relatives. 
In 1943, discussions took place between relevant government 
departments and the BRC as to whether or not this periodical should 
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also be issued to the relatives of prisoners in the Far East. 87 The POW 
Department of the BRC expressed some concern that relatives might not 
fully appreciate the obstacles to their work in this area and so might feel 
that captives in the Far East were receiving less support, especially from 
the Red Cross, than those in Europe. 88 However, a letter in the Times, 
complaining that The Prisoner of War was not available to the relatives 
of those held captive in the Far East, was perceived as indicative of 
public feeling on the subjeCt. 89 As a result from February 1944 these 
relatives were instead issued with their own magazine entitled Far East. 90 
Issued initially at irregular intervals, Far East later became a monthly 
publication and, in the light of the particular problems surrounding the 
whole issue of notification from this area, was also issued to the next-of- 
kin of those men posted 'missing'. 91 
Cambray and Briggs claim that this journal was able to alleviate some of 
the anxieties of the families of those held captive in this area by providing 
them with details of camp life and information about what the Red Cross 
was doing for prisoners in this location. 92 Given the overall problems of 
communication in this area, the initial reservations of the Red Cross 
about how their work in the Far East would be viewed and the need to 
strike a balance between providing accurate information and causing 
undue worry, the quality and quantity of information released to families 
must be open to question. The first edition of Far East, in February 1944, 
contained a warning that 'we know nothing reliable about the cam PS%93 
The May 1944 issue, whilst containing an article 'Life in a Japanese 
Prison Camp' based on a broadcast made by Lieutenant J Lambert, an 
Artillery Officer held captive in Java, carried the reminder that 'it should 
be borne in mind that the script of the broadcast was censored by the 
Japanese authorities'. 94 For the families, however, any news was better 
than no information at all. The editorial of the final issue in December 
1945, suggested that, although hard news had been sparse, letters from 
95 relatives had made it clear that 'anything was better than silence' . 
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In addition to the Enquiry Centres and the two periodicals, the Red Cross 
also released a number of films to help inform families, and the general 
public, about conditions for prisoners of war. 'in Enemy Hands'was 
released for theatrical distribution in 1942 with the short silent films 'Until 
the Day' and 'A Bit of Home' being shown in non-theatrical locations in 
1942 and 1943 respectively. 96 In 1945 British Gaumont made the film 
'Prisoner of War' which they then presented to the War Organisation for 
general release. 97 
On a local level, BRC County Committees organised meetings for 
relatives in their areas to allow for the exchange of information between 
relatives and to help explain regulations and legal matters . 
98 The work of 
these Committees had began in the winter of 1939 as a result of the 
necessity to supplement official issues of hospital supplies during an 
outbreak of 'flu. 99 Although initially their only duty was to 'meet 
reasonable requests' for supplies for soldiers in inadequately equipped 
hospitals, they were later utilised for a wide variety of administrative 
tasks-100 The annual reports of three committees quoted in Cambray 
and Briggs show the diversity of their work. 101 In addition to hospital and 
medical services they were also involved in next-of-kin parcel packing 
centres, next-of-kin clubs, postal messages schemes, library services, 
cinema collections and flag days. 
The Legal Department, however, often proved itself to be more of a 
'friend' to prisoners of war themselves than to their families. By and large 
the Department refused to serve legal documents, usually divorce 
papers, on men held captive although they did undertake investigations 
on prisoners' wives. 102 In 1942 one prisoner of war received information 
that his wife had gone off with another man taking his small daughter 
with her. ' 03 He expressed concern for the welfare of the child and asked 
the Legal Section of the War Office to assist him in tracing his wife and 
instigating divorce proceedings. Although the War Office was unable to 
trace the wife, the Red Cross Legal Department, acting on a 'slender 
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clue', were able to help. 104 They then obtained proof of misconduct in the 
form of a birth certificate for an illegitimate child and not only assisted in 
the divorce proceedings, but also arranged to visit the wife and reported 
back to the husband that the daughter was well. 105 In other cases, such 
investigations had a happier outcome. Again in 1942, a prisoner received 
news, from his family, that his wife was behaving improperly and his child 
was being neglected and the Legal Department undertook to make 
investigations on the prisoner's behalf. 106 In this case, however, the 
reports were unfounded. Investigations showed that the wife did not get 
on well with her husband's family and the information had been 
malicious. In fact, the child was well looked after and there was no real 
reason to suspect the wife's behaviour. 107 
County Committees also organised 'prisoners' friends' who maintained 
contact directly with relatives through 'friendly calls', 'homely gatherings' 
and 'informing talks'. 108 From 1941 onwards, more general personal 
contact was established with next-of-kin when local parcel packing 
centres began to be established around the country. Although a range of 
volunteers often staffed many centres, including members of local POW 
committees all worked in close association with the national BRC. To aid 
the compiling of next-of-kin parcels the Board of Customs and Excise 
agreed that these centres should be provided with clothing and toilet 
articles free of purchase tax provided that they were not taken home by 
relatives but made up into parcels at the local packing centre. 109 
In an effort to supplement the information provided through both the 
Enquiry Centres and journals, meetings, organised by the BRC, were 
held at a variety of locations nation-wide where relatives could pool 
information and ask questions. 110 Although the actual number of such 
meetings is not recorded, Mr SG King, Controller of the Far East 
Section, personally addressed more than 150 where audiences varied 
between 30 and 3,000.111 One regular feature of these meetings was an 
open question and answer session where speakers attempted to cover a 
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wide variety of issues, many of them of a critical nature. In this way the 
BRC War Organisation hoped to ease'what might have developed into a 
difficult situation between the Government and relatives of prisoners' 
concerning lack of information and government action regarding 
conditions for those held captive in the Far East. 112 
Between 1 and 20 May 1944 the BRC, in conjunction with the qijily 
Teleqraph, held an exhibition in the grounds of Clarence House in 
London, to show the day to day life of prisoners of war. ' 13 The Red Cross 
felt this type of exhibition to be necessary to give POW relatives, as well 
as the general public, 'a closer insight into the lives of officers and other 
ranks held in German captivity'. ' 14 The exhibition was laid out in a 
number of 'huts' showing typical living quarters, examples of possible 
works of art or crafts undertaken, recreation, education, food, medical 
services and religious facilities. The 6d booklet, which accompanied the 
exhibition, also contained maps of all POW and civilian internment 
camps. In his introduction to the booklet, Field Marshall Sir Philip 
Chetwode, Chairman of the Joint War Executive Committee, expressed 
his belief that 'no subject has been of greater interest to the public or 
evoked more sympathy than the situation of British officers and men of 
all services in enemy hands. "15 However, although many people may 
have attended the exhibition, it remained located in London and so 
inaccessible for the great majority of prisoner of war relatives spread 
around the country. Similarly, although Sir Philip considered that captives 
in 'enemy hands', rather than just in German hands, were of great 
concern and interest to the public, no similar exhibition was suggested 
showing the daily lives of those held captive by the Japanese. ' 16 
Although it is possible that insufficient information was available, it 
seems more likely that the government felt it wiser not to draw any 
further attention to conditions in this area in case it further raised public 
discontent with the amount being done for these prisoners. Whereas the 
'German' exhibition could be utilised to show prisoners of war 
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maintaining their morale through sport and education and being gainfully 
employed in recreational activities, the same possibilities did not exist for 
an exhibition from the Far East. 
Overall, the work of the BRC in connection with POW families remains 
difficult to quantify. Although Cambray and Briggs record thatpages 
could be filled'with 'expressions of gratitude' received from relatives, 
they also admit that '-what the correspondence section did for next-of- 
kin and other relatives, and for the prisoners themselves, cannot be 
assessed in precise terms'. ' 17 No indication is given in their official 
history of the BRC during this period of numbers of relatives visited nor 
details of the scale of locally based activities. Similarly, the annual 
reports of the BRC War Organisation, although they do record the 
amount of correspondence received at certain times by the central 
offices, give no indication of numbers of families visited. As we shall see 
later in this chapter, local POW Committees also instigated similar 
activities and their existence must suggest that the cover provided by 
BRC schemes was patchy at best. 
As has already been shown, the relationship between the BRC and the 
War and Foreign Office was by no means straightforward. Whilst in 
some instances the relationship was essentially a symbiotic one with all 
those involved gaining some benefit, other examples have shown how 
Government departments were not above letting the Red Cross take the 
blame for actions which would have brought them into conflict with public 
opinion. At the same time however, these same departments proved to 
be protective of the Red Cross when it appeared that it was being 
criticised by others. A case in point is that of the Prisoner of War 
Relatives Association (POWRA), the only relatives group to operate on a 
national level. 
Details of exactly when and how the POWRA was founded have proved 
difficult to establish. Cambray and Briggs note that the War Organisation 
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of the BRC had assisted it financially to become established and 
provided it with office space in the belief that the Association might prove 
a valuable link between the War Organisation and relatives of POWs. 
118 
A POWRA newsheet of March 1943 makes it clear that the Association 
had been in existence at least since 1941.119 The Phillimore Report, 
however, refers to it having been established 'at a comparatively late 
stage in the war' and as a direct result of some of its members, 
supported by some Members of Parliament, disapproving of the BRC .1 
20 
The Association appears to have operated in two almost completely 
separate spheres. On a local level, many branches came into being 
largely, as the Foreign Office rather scathingly commented, 'presided 
over by ladies who are relatives of prisoners of war. '121 Reports appear 
from a number of sources of representatives from these branches 
speaking at local meetings of POW Committees. For example, in 1942 
Mrs Stewart, the Organising Secretary of the Association and a Mr 
Thorne from the Edinburgh Branch spoke to the Huddersfield POW 
Committee. 122 A note from the Colonial Office notes that Mrs Stewart 
regularly toured the country'frorn Scotland to Cornwall', speaking to well 
attended gatherings. 123 Although the content of these talks is rarely 
made explicit, the Colonial Office described some of her opinions as 
being 'wildly inaccurate' and determined to 'keep in touch' to correct 
these ideas. 124 
The Head Office of the Association, described by the Foreign Office as 
being 'inferior to its branch organisation' had, however, rather more 
specific interests . 
125 Throughout the course of the war, it campaigned 
continually at Ministerial level and through its spokesperson in the House 
of Commons, Miss Irene Ward, for the introduction of a single body to be 
responsible for all POW matters. 126 
Although the Belfield Report following the First World War, had been 
explicit in its recommendation that, in the case of a future war, 'the most 
practical course would be to establish at once an interdepartmental 
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committee'; as we have already seen in the previous chapter, this advice 
was disregarded. 127 A letter of October 1940 from the Foreign Office to 
the Earl of Galloway, apparently in response to an enquiry by him on this 
matter, stated that'it had not been found necessary'to set up such an 
independent department. 128 In January 1942, the matter was again 
raised by the Walsall and District Co-operative Society in a letter to 
William Adamson, the Labour MP for Cannock, which was subsequently 
passed first to the Foreign Secretary and then to the Prime Minister. 129 
The letter urged the government to take action 'for the welfare of British 
Prisoners of War' by setting up an interdepartmental committee. Eden 
replied, somewhat tersely, to the effect that, although this suggestion had 
been considered by the government, it was not prepared to adopt it and 
that he did not feel that he could add anything further on the matter. 130 
Lord Vansittart, temporary President of POWRA from 1942 following the 
resignation of Lord Ebbisham, instigated much of the discussion around 
this issue. 131 Even at this early stage, the Association appears to have 
been making enemies within government circles. Sir George Warner of 
Sutton Courtney House, Oxfordshire who was being suggested as the 
next president, was advised by Sir Harold Satow at the Foreign Office to 
$steer clear of the association. 132 Sir George was advised that'while their 
intentions are no doubt excellent they have fallen foul of the War Office 
and were aggressively inclined towards the Foreign Office'. 133 Sir Harold 
followed up these remarks with a later letter in which he suggested that 
whilst it [POWRA] is a reputable body it does not seem to be run by 
people of weight. 9134 However, whilst the Foreign Office might be 
dismissive of the ladies who presided over the branches of POWRA, it 
was rather more difficult for them to dismiss Robert, Lord Vansittart. In 
addition to having been a member of the POW Department during the 
First World War, Vansittart had also been personal secretary to both 
Stanley Baldwin and Ramsay Macdonald and, from 1930 to 1938, 
Permanent Under-secretary of State at the Foreign Office. 135 
Throughout the course of the war, whilst Lord Vansittart continued to act 
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as the main POWRA correspondent with the War and Foreign Offices, 
the matter of a single interdepartmental committee could not be 
dismissed out of hand. 
In May 1943 Eden again found it necessary to reply to enquiries from 
Lord Vansittart regarding the possibility of the appointment of a 
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Parliamentary Under-secretary of State to oversee POW matters . 
This time the reply was rather more conciliatory in tone, Sir Anthony 
suggesting that he would 'prefer to keep this very important subject 
under my own eye ....... and to answer myself in Parliament 
for its [POW 
Department] work' and hoping that Lord Vansittart and his 'friends' would 
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not press their idea. Vansittart replied that he felt Sir Anthony's letter 
might satisfy the 'strong desire for a whole-time Parliamentary Under- 
secretary' . 
138 However, his optimism appears to have been misplaced as 
the matter still remained unresolved in November of that year, when a 
deputation met with Rt. Hon. Richard K. Law, Minister of State at the 
Foreign Office. 139 
POWRA requests that a single organisation should be established to 
oversee POW matters were generally dealt with by the Foreign Office. By 
and large, the requests were dismissed with the suggestion that POWRA 
'either did not know or preferred to ignore that there was in fact a 
committee known as the Imperial Prisoners of War Committee which 
plays the part which they would wish to be played by the 
Interdepartmental Committee which they advocate' . 
140 This type of reply 
took no account of the fact that the Imperial POW Committee concerned 
itself with the welfare of POWs themselves and not with their next-of-kin 
and relatives in Britain. The Foreign Office also correctly suggested that 
the Newton Committee, which had operated during WWI, had not solved 
inter-departmental problems, as it had had no authority over the various 
departments involved. 141 Again, however, this suggestion is beside the 
point as POWRA were not suggesting such a committee. Rather they 
favoured a 'proper Prisoner of War Department' such as, they claimed, 
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had been established during World War I and of which Lord Vansittart 
had, for a short time, been head. 142 However, the veracity of these 
recollections must be open to some doubts as the letter in which these 
comments are made also goes on to suggest that this Department had 
been under the auspices of the Foreign Office. As we have seen in the 
previous chapter, and as a pencil marginalia to this letter confirms, the 
Foreign Office had, in fact, disowned the POW Department in 1916 and 
refused to accept any further responsibility for prisoners of war. 143 
The actual recommendations made by POWRA are also rather 
confused. Although their major campaign suggests that the focus of their 
attention was a separate Department to oversee all POW matters, other 
letters make reference to a desire for an interdepartmental committee, to 
include representatives of various charitable organisations and voluntary 
bodies interested in POW matters. 144 In fact, the suggestion of a 
separate Minister overseeing all matters relating to POWs was debated 
in the House of Commons in November 1944 and was rejected by the 
Government spokesman, Clement Attlee, Lord President of the 
Council. 145 
Although the Foreign Office considered that'better results were obtained 
by encouraging them [POWRA] along lines which agree with official 
policy rather than by snubbing them', by June 1943 the War Office had 
ceased to be in any way sympathetic. 146 To a large extent this hostility 
was attributed to what was seen as POWRA's 'constant and unfair' 
criticism of the BRC and a feeling that encouraging them would result in 
'real damage to the BRC's work and in diminished contributions to their 
fund S,. 147 Cambray and Briggs note that this criticism of the BRC actually 
took place whilst POWRA was benefiting from the use of their 
accommodation. 148 In a letter to MPs in March 1942, the Association 
voiced a lack of confidence in the BRC's POW Department and pressed 
for MPs'support in appointing a'first class' businessman as managing 
director. 149 This managing director was to be supported by a small 
committee of businessmen plus representatives of the POWRA to look 
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after the interests of next-of-kin. 150 This championing of the BRC may 
seem rather inconsistent on the part of the War Office, considering the 
way in which they had allowed them to take the blame for problems in 
distribution of parcels. In fact, the POW Department of the BRC was 
rather more stoical on the matter, seeing POWRA as'too unimportant to 
be able to do any harm' . 
151 A view which was echoed by the Phillimore 
Report, which concluded that the 'absence of any solid ground for this 
criticism' led to the Association soon ceasing 'to be of serious 
importance'. 152 
One government department did, however, manage to retain the 
semblance of a cordial relationship with the POWRA. From 1943 until 
the winding up of the Association in December 1945, a correspondence 
between the Organising Secretaries and Colonel SJ Cole at the Colonial 
Office, ensured a channel through which the POWRA could be 
monitored. 153 Starting from the standpoint that 
... the public must not be allowed to suffer through any internecine 
misunderstandings between those who have the duty, or have 
voluntarily undertaken a duty, of serving them. 154 
The Colonial Office maintained a watching brief on the activities of the 
Association by giving their speakers material to use on their tours and 
providing their own representatives to speak at POWRA meetings. Both 
Colonel Cole and Lord Vansittart spoke at a meeting at Caxton Hall in 
January 1944 for relatives and repatriated men. 155 However, Colonial 
Office correspondence suggests that the relationship, on their side at 
least, was opportune rather than truly warm. Letters from 1943 and 1944 
warn of 'having to be careful in dealing with her [Mrs Stewart]' and of the 
Association trying to involve the Colonial Office in 'jealousies' between 
themselves and the BRC. 156 Nevertheless, when Mrs Stewart retired, in 
May 1945, Colonel Cole wrote her a personal letter to which she sent a 
hand-written reply saying how pleased she was that her'puny efforts had 
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been of some material assistance'. 157 Similarly with the winding up of 
POWRA in December 1945, W Laing, the later Organising Secretary, 
wrote to Colonel Cole expressing thanks for the 'courtesy' which the 
Colonial Office had always shown the Association and Colonel Cole 
replied saying 
We have been helped and encouraged in our work by the 
ready and cordial co-operation which we have always met from 
the POWRA collectively and from each of you individually. You 
have done grand work. 158 
Although it is not clear that there were any direct links between Prisoner 
of War Relatives Associations in various countries, it is interesting to 
note that POWRA in Canada also proved to be a similar thorn in the 
flesh of government agencies. In Britain, the Colonial Office noted that 
9 any slip on the part of the BRC is like pennies from Heaven for Mrs 
Stewart [Organising Secretary of the POWRA]. 159 Similarly, Jonathan 
Vance records that the Canadian POWRA also came to 'resent the 
privileged status of the Red Cross' . 
160 This is not to suggest that all 
Prisoner of War Relatives Associations were waging an orchestrated 
campaign against the Red Cross in various Dominion countries, rather 
that national associations and committees run by relatives of prisoners of 
war often felt themselves best able to represent their own interests. A 
fact which is perhaps not surprising given the lack of coherent 
governmental policy. In Britain, POWRA was keen to stress that the 
constitution of the BRC provided for the assistance of prisoners whereas 
their organisation existed to help relatives to help prisoners. 161 However, 
although the Canadian government's provision for dealing with POW 
matters appears to have been as poorly organised and ill thought-out as 
that of the British government, the Canadian POWRA did not campaign 
to improve this. Instead they concentrated their efforts on establishing 
their claim to be the 'only registered war charity whose sole purpose was 
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the welfare of Canadian POWs' and their ascendancy over the Canadian 
Red Cross in these matters. 162 
In Britain, POWRA was not the only body to express dissatisfaction with 
the way that the government was handling POW matters. A letter from 
the Westminster Co-operative Party to Richard Law also expressed 
unease and requested information as to whether or not responsibility for 
these matters might be concentrated in the hands of one Minister. 163 Law 
replied expressing regret that there was still 'uneasiness' regarding the 
existing Ministerial and administrative arrangements for handling these 
matters. His letter concluded, 
It is necessary to remember that His Majesty's government, in 
endeavouring to secure proper treatment for our prisoners, have 
(sic) to surmount great difficulties arising out of the policy and 
mentality both of the Nazi regime in Germany and of those now in 
control of affairs in Japan. I can assure you that we are doing our 
utmost to overcome these difficulties. 164 
Although there were undoubtedly 'difficulties' of this nature, the question 
remains, however, as to how many of the obstacles for relatives, at least, 
would have been circumvented if a coherent policy towards prisoners of 
war and their families had been formulated at an earlier stage. Law's 
reply appears to miss the point of the Co-operative Party's query, which 
did not relate to the level of effort being expended by the Government on 
prisoner of war matters, but rather to the way in which this effort was 
administered and organised. David Rolf suggests that the'tardy 
realisation' by the Government of the 'new realities' it faced when large 
numbers of its servicemen fell into enemy hands largely precluded any 
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genuine thought as to how a coherent policy might be developed . 
Echoes can be heard here of the same complacent attitude, discussed in 
Chapter 2, which was shown by the service departments in the 1930s to 
the formulation of a coherent policy for allowances. 
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In many areas of Britain the work of national organisations was 
supplemented by the formation of local POW Committees and support 
groups. Often these committees were established in response to local 
need and as a direct result of local men having been taken prisoner. For 
many next-of-kin, lack of news of loved ones and a feeling of isolation led 
to a desire to pool such information as was available and to meet with 
others in a similar situation in an attempt to provide mutual comfort and 
support. In France too, Sarah Fishman, records that many wives 'agreed 
that loneliness was 'the hardest thing. 166 In response, French prisoner 
of war wives also created support groups to help deal with their particular 
problems and defend their interests such as the F6d6ration des 
associatfions de femmes de prisonniers in Lyons and the Femmes 
d'absents in Paris. 167 
In Britain, such groups tended to operate on very local levels, from the 
homes of their organisers or from local community centres. 
Consequently, although there is a great deal of circumstantial evidence 
for their existence, and many references to them in other archival 
sources such as local newspapers, little direct material has survived. 
Similarly, although the case of the Barnsley POW Fund, discussed later 
in this chapter, suggests that some such committees may have been 
continuations or reformations of committees established during the First 
World War, again there is little concrete evidence to substantiate this. 
Fishman reports a similar situation in France where, although such 
groups had proved invaluable in 'raising the consciousness' of prisoner 
of war wives, after the war they disappeared without trace. 168 As already 
recorded at the beginning of this chapter, the Norwich branch of the CAB 
referred to 'organisations within the city' dealing specifically with POW 
matters . 
169 However, no mention is made of what these organisations 
were and no further reference to them appears to exist in the Norwich 
archives. Often references to such committees occur in the pages of 
local newspapers, reporting fundraising events and activities. For 
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example, throughout the war the Henley Standard contained small news 
items on the work of the POW Fund, Henley and District Committee. 170 
This committee was founded in August 1940 with the stated aims of: 
raising funds for parcels and comforts; forming a register of all POWs in 
the district; ascertaining the interests of prisoners so that each prisoner 
could be supplied 'with matter to keep his mind occupied' and finally of 
furthering the interests of the POWs on their release, especially in terms 
of employment. 171 The average cost of a next-of-kin parcel was in the 
region of 16 shillings, well beyond the means of some families. 
Consequently, the suggestion was made that groups of people should 
join together and 'adopt' a local POW to ensure that all the men from the 
area received personal parcels. 172 Later reports suggest that this 
suggestion met with some success as, in July 1943, the Marsh Gibbon 
Women's Institute meeting included the reading of two letters from 
'adopted' pOWS. 173 By mid-September the Committee's fund had grown 
to E606 5s 5d although, in the later months of the year, fundraising for 
the cause was largely superseded by the local Spitfire Fund which raised 
a staggering P-4,915 5s 5d in four months. 174 The Committee also 
widened their remit to include providing information to relatives, as the 
Red Cross was 'under great pressure', and sending a letter of 
appreciation for'gallant conduct' to all local men taken captive. 175 In 
order to collate information regarding each prisoner, local groups were 
set up in the surrounding district, a practice which also seems to have 
been common in other areas of the country. 176 
On Thursday 12 June 1941 the Yorkshire Evening News reported that an 
informal meeting of wives and mothers of Leeds men who had been 
taken prisoner, had been held at the Briggate offices of the newspaper. 
At the meeting it was resolved to 'form a Leeds POW Club under the 
auspices of the newspaper. 177 All Leeds'women whose husbands or 
sons had been taken captive were to be invited to join and it was hoped 
to hold 'social gatherings' every month . 
178 From this beginning, the idea 
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spread throughout the area with branches of the Club being opened in 
Harrogate, Featherstone, Aireborough, Horsforth, Cleckheaton and 
Wakefield by early 1942.179 In July 1942 the Club took the innovative 
step of inaugurating the firstpacking centre on wheels'to make the 
sending of Red Cross next-of-kin parcels easier for those who could not 
get to packing centres sited in the main towns. 180 On its inaugural 
journey the mobile centre visited the Headquarters of the Spen Valley 
Club at Cleckheaton. 181 Reports of the various branches of the Club 
continued to appear in the 'It Happened in Yorkshire' section of the 
newspaper throughout the period but it has not proved possible to locate 
any further archival information even when the location of the meetings is 
known. For example the Wakefield Branch is known to have met every 
Wednesday at the Bull Hotel in Wakefield but no further information 
about this branch has come to light. 182 
The Barnsley POW Fund also provides a good example of this type of 
local committee. This Fund was originally founded in1918 to provide for 
British POWs from the Barnsley area in belligerent countries. 183 
Following World War 1, a trust was established to administer the letting of 
four houses to repatriated prisoners of war resident in the area and their 
dependants and other ex-servicemen. 184 However, the resources of the 
trust proved inadequate to maintain the houses, which were then sold 
and the income generated from the sale made available for grants or 
loans to ex-prisoners of war and their dependants resident in the 
Barnsley area. 185 The trust continues to meet twice yearly to the present 
day. 186 However, although the necessity for the keeping of minute books 
and books of accounts was formally laid down in the Trust Deed of 1918, 
no records survive from the period of the Second World War. Although 
repeated attempts have been made, with the help of the Barnsley 
Borough Secretary's Department, to establish contact with trust members 
who themselves were POWs during World War 11, these have proved 
fruitless. 
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One rare example of a largely intact archive from a Committee of this 
nature does, however, exist in the records of the Huddersfield Prisoners 
of War Committee held in the Kirklees Archive in Huddersfield. On 18 
May 1940, the Huddersfield Weekly Examiner contained a report headed 
'Huddersfield Men in Norway Fight'which gave the names of ten local 
men who had been taken prisoner in Norway. ' 87 Amongst these men 
was 2nd Lt. RB Smailes of the King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, the 
son of the Mayor, whose mother was instrumental in forming the 
Huddersfield POW Committee. The first meeting of the Committee was 
held in June 1940 when it was decided to hold regular meetings on the 
third Wednesday of every month . 
188 By August, 25 local men had been 
taken captive all of whom had already contacted their relatives. 189 By 
October, 72 families had been visited by members of the committee, all 
of whom were 'very grateful and cheerful'. 190 At Christmas of the same 
year a party was held for wives, mothers and children of prisoners of war 
with 99 people being entertained by a conjurer and films. 191 All children 
attending the party were given a cash gift of I shilling. This entertainment 
became an annual event continuing up to December 1944 when it had 
become so large that numbers from 'large' families were limited and two 
sittings were necessary for the food. 192 In the summer of 1941 a second 
annual event was added in the form of a Garden Party to which 
6 193 sweethearts' were invited in addition to wives, mothers and children . 
The original event, to which 103 people came, was held in the garden of 
a committee member but, by 1943, this event was attended by upwards 
of 300 people and had to be moved firstly to Ravensknowle Park and 
then, in 1944 to Greenhead School. 194 A third annual event was also 
added in October 1942 -a church service which was 'greatly appreciated 
and very well attended'. 195 
After September 1942 the number of prisoners of war from the 
Huddersfield area had risen to 210 and, in the light of these large 
numbers, the Committee made the decision to only make an initial visit to 
each family. ' 96 After this introductory meeting it was left to families to 
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contact the Committee if and when they needed help. In many cases the 
most immediate help required was with the preparing and packing of 
next-of-kin parcels which the Committee undertook in a room at the 
Women's War Time Bureau on Thursday afternoons. 197 Although some 
relatives initially preferred to manage parcels by themselves, the 
Committee noted that'in most cases they drift to us in the end'whether 
more for practical help or for moral support it remains impossible to 
tell. 198 Aside from help with parcels, the Committee provided a wide 
range of practical help. In February 1941, Mrs Firth, the mother of 
Trooper Arnold Firth of the Cavalry and Armoured Corps who was 
prisoner in Stalag XXA, was taken ill. 199 The minutes of the Committee 
Meeting of the time record that the Committee undertook to 'send her 
Ovaltine or something nutritious' . 
200 At the other end of the scale the 
Committee undertook to pay for boots for many local prisoners of war, as 
201 the expense of these was more than many wives could manage. The 
boots were to be paid for by chit provided by the Committee and 
redeemable at the local shoe shops, Stead and Simpsons and 
Timpsons, in Huddersfield. 202 
The Committee also responded to special cases of need. For example, 
through SSAFA they learned that a Mr Lindsay, probably the father of 
Private Jack Lindsay of the Gordon Highlanders, prisoner in Stalag XXB, 
was in need of a new suit of clothes. 203 The Committee undertook to do 
whatever was possible, not, however, because of Mr Lindsay's need, but 
because 'we should do all we can in so far as it would affect the peace of 
mind of a prisoner. 204 From this we must assume that the work of the 
Committee in overseeing prisoner of war families was at times 
incomplete. If Mr Lindsay had not written to his son making him aware of 
the situation the Committee would have either remained unaware of it or 
not done anything about it as the peace of mind of a prisoner of war 
himself would not have been concerned. In the event the suit was 
purchased jointly by the Committee and SSAFA with one of the 
of F1.205 Committee members making a personal donation In April of the 
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same year, the Committee was again contacted by SSAFA with regard to 
Mrs Lewis, the wife of William Lewis a Driver in the RASC captive in 
Singapore, who needed help with the purchase of spectacles. Although 
the Committee agreed to pay the whole amount, they were at pains to 
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point out that this was provided 'no precent (sic) should be so created' . 
It is difficult from these few examples to ascertain on what basis the 
Committee made their decisions with regard to such payments. Whether 
decisions were made solely on the basis of family need or on the degree 
of involvement of the serviceman concerned remains unclear. What is 
certain is that where financial assistance was required for goods to be 
sent to prisoners themselves, there was no hesitation. During the course 
of the war, the Committee donated E4,500 to the BRC for such goodS. 207 
In cases where the need was for financial assistance for items for the 
family there was rather more discussion and consideration of the 
individual merits of each case. 
By the spring of 1945, the work of the Committee in relation to relatives 
was beginning to lessen and the Garden Party of that year was 
cancelled. 208 Instead the Committee decided to make a donation of E5 to 
each returning prisoner, with the donation being given to relatives in the 
case of prisoners of war who had died in captivity. By July 1945,336 
local men had been welcomed back at 13 receptions and, in October 
1946, the Committee's final event, a Social Evening and Dance was 
held . 
209 A final 'winding up' meeting was held in November 1946 at 
which it was decided that the remaining funds should be distributed in 
gifts of: E8 to relatives of those servicemen who had died as a direct 
result of their imprisonment. 210 It was as a direct result of this decision 
that some of the most moving letters from next-of-kin were received. 
Mrs F. Hanson of Kirkheaton, the wife of Private Leslie Hanson who had 
been missing in the Far East since March 1942, wrote saying 'its (sic) 
been a comfort to know that someone thought about the one's (sic) that 
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are left' . 
21 1 E. Hall of Slaithwaite, possibly the wife of Leslie Hall believed 
to have been taken captive in Borneo, wrote in 1949 
It is nearly two years since my husband died and I cannot get my 
business straightened out with the RAF ... It makes me wonder why and for what our loves (sic) ones sacrificed there (sic) lives 
for, but someday we shall understand ... It will give me great pleasure and comfort to recieve (sic) such a large amount. 212 
As we saw with the case of Mrs Truman in the previous chapter, once 
the serviceman himself had ceased to be of further use to his country, 
the plight of his family often became unimportant to official agencies. 
Throughout this chapter we have seen a differentiation between two 
types of support agencies for prisoner of war families. On a local level, 
families tended to gravitate towards the support group, normally a local 
POW Committee, which had been established in their hometown and in 
direct response to the captivity of local men. Through these groups, 
families were assisted in a number of ways both financially, as we have 
seen in the case in Huddersfield where wives were helped to provide 
boots for their menfolk, and in terms of moral support through a network 
of visits, talks and shared information. Although there are some 
instances of relatives attending meetings in more diverse locales, the 
overall picture is that these occasions arose as a supplement to the 
immediate local provision or where other support groups provided more 
specialised information. The minutes of the Huddersfield POW 
Committee, for example, record that, in July 1945, a number of relatives 
of men held captive in Japanese hands had been attending meetings in 
Halifax where there were a greater number of families in the same 
situation. 213 Although there was some discussion as to whether or not 
monthly meetings should be held in Huddersfield for these families, the 
emphasis is clearly on meeting the needs of the families concerned. 
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With national charities, however, the picture is rather more complex. The 
British Red Cross, SSAFA and POWRA all seem to have been in 
competition to be recognised in their own right as the primary support 
agency for POW relatives. To some extent this perception is necessarily 
coloured by the sources themselves, none of which can be regarded as 
unbiased in this matter. The supposed public perception that the BRC 
were the agency to which the public turned is taken from Cambray and 
Briggs' sympathetic British Red Cross and St. John War Histo! y 1939- 
1947. The perception that SSAFA was the prime agency providing 
support to all service families is taken from 'The History of SSAFA', 
written for their own publication, SSAFA News. The authority of POWRA 
to speak for the vast majority of parents and wives of prisoners of war 
comes from their own correspondence. In this we see a parallel with the 
situation in both Canada and France. In Canada, the Red Cross Society, 
the Canadian POWRA and the War Prisoners Aid of the World Alliance 
of YMCAs all believed that they were the agency best suited to answer 
the needs of prisoners of war and their families. 214 Similarly, in France, 
the Famille du Prisonnier and the Commissariat General aux Prisonniers 
de Guerre Rapatries et aux Fammiles de Prisonniers de Guerre, both 
created specifically to provide moral and financial support for prisoners' 
wives, also competed to extend their respective power bases. 215 
In the cases of both Canada and Great Britain, governmental strategy for 
dealing with prisoner of war matters was not clearly defined. A number of 
government departments shared responsibility but there was no overall 
structure of responsibility. As we have already seen, this lack of 
coherence led to confusion amongst next-of-kin as to the best 
department to contact for advice and information. In the face of this lack 
of a clear lead from government, it is not surprising that other agencies 
should have attempted to fulfil this role. However, as no one government 
department held overall responsibility for deciding policy in these maters, 
all were free to deal with whichever charitable organisation suited their 
purpose at any particular moment. Hence the situation where, when 
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information needed to be provided to servicemen regarding their families 
following the bombing of London the War Office contacted SSAFA to 
supply this information but, with regard to contacting families regarding 
homecoming prisoners, the same government department contacted the 
Red Cross. This diversity may be regarded as giving government 
departments the flexibility to deal with whichever organisation was best 
suited for any particular task. For the families concerned, the lack of 
coherent policy and the competition for ascendancy between charitable 
organisations, can only have increased and mirrored the confusion 
caused by lack of an overall policy between government departments 
and motivated the desire to establish their own action groups. The lack of 
coherent policy regarding the dissemination of information, however, 
cannot totally explain the rapid proliferation of local POW committees 
and support groups. In France, where from the autumn of 1940 most 
families of prisoners were aware of their fate and had established postal 
contact, similar self-help groups also formed. Regional groups, such as 
the F6d6ration des Associations de Femmes de Prisonniers, were 
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supplemented by groups reflecting class or political divisions . Whilst 
communist women in the Resistance established their own POW wives' 
section, officers'wives in Paris, generally bourgeoises, formed the 
Femmes dAbsents. Regardless of the degree of official information 
available and the level of governmental support, prisoners'wives of all 
nations exhibited a natural need to meet other wives in a similar situation 
with whom to discuss their problems and from whom to gain mutual and 
personal support. 
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Chapter 7 
Post-war Service Allowances. 
As we have seen in earlier chapters, from early 1942 onwards regular 
reports were compiled relating to overall morale in the army and showing 
that throughout 1942,1943 and 1944, worries of soldiers focused mainly 
around such issues as allowances for families, how families were coping 
financially, family illness and the fidelity of wives. ' By early 1945, 
however, the concerns highlighted in these reports had turned more 
towards future reintegration into civilian life, employment and housing. 
The Morale Report of March to May 1945 reported that the reduction in 
the number of Allied and Dominion troops in the United Kingdom had led 
to reduced concerns amongst servicemen abroad regarding infidelity. 2 
Similarly, a report of late 1945 recorded that the issue of pay and 
allowances, which had been constantly present in these reports since 
their inception, was nowthe least cause of discontent to the troops'. 3 
For most servicemen, this change in priorities reflected an assumption 
that, on return to the United Kingdom, they would be demobilised from 
the services and resume their former employment or seek new civilian 
employment. For those concerned with manpower levels within the 
services, however, the situation was rather different. British post-war 
political aims included not only the occupation of Germany and the 
safeguarding of the Empire but also involvement in other international 
task forces to prevent threats to the peace of Europe. All these ambitions 
involved the maintenance of a military presence in a wide variety of 
locations. Additionally, during the war British military power had been 
largely overtaken by that of the United States and, to retain some 
semblance of a major international power, it was necessary that this 
imbalance should not be worsened. 4 This ambition was patently not 
achievable if large numbers of men immediately left the armed services 
for civilian employment. To this end it was necessary for action to be 
taken, largely by the War Office and Treasury, so that remaining in or 
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joining the Armed Services could be seen as an attractive career option. 
For the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force the problems of maintaining 
the requisite levels of recruitment were regarded as less severe. 5 Sir 
John Grigg at the War Office, writing to Sir John Anderson, Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, in February 1945 felt it unlikely that either of these 
services would 'find it difficult to fill their post-war complements'. 6 
The necessity to maintain a high military profile had not only political but 
also economic implications. In August 1945, John Maynard Keynes 
7 
warned that the country faced 'a financial Dunkirk'. In addition to 
financing the new welfare state, the Labour government elected in 1945 
also wished to maintain Britain's international role as a major political 
power. Although it may have been prepared to negotiate a withdrawal 
from some areas such as India and Palestine, it was by no means 
8 
prepared to relinquish all its colonies. Overseas development, 
particularly in Africa, was viewed as a means of aiding the recovery of 
the British economy but ensuring the security of these colonies required 
a military presence. In addition to these international concerns, the 
government was also faced with domestic pressures from a general 
population who expected that wartime sacrifices would now be rewarded 
by improved employment and housing conditions at the very least. 9 An 
expectation shared by those now preparing to leave the services. 
In fact, the problem of presenting a career in the services as an attractive 
option was not new to the post-war era. In 1937, Leslie Hore-Belisha, 
Secretary of State for War, considered that the army was suffering in the 
eyes of potential recruits as 'its officers were too old'. 10 Retirement pay 
for army officers at the time consisted of two elements - length of service 
and rank - and maximum retirement pay could not be attained unless a 
certain length of service was achieved. " A major, for example, could only 
attain maximum retirement pay if he had achieved a total of twenty-seven 
years of service, including ten years at the rank of major. Consequently, 
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many officers were reluctant to retire before absolutely necessary as 
potential retired pay continued to increase as long as they were in 
service. Effectively, this created a predominance of older officers, 
blocking promotion routes and making the army unattractive for those 
wishing to pursue a career in the services. 12 Hore-Belisha's aim was to 
ensure that there were no serving officers in the army over the age of 
fifty-five. 13 To achieve this, from August 1938, pensions were calculated 
by a combination of age and total length of service up to the rank of 
Colonel, after which a fixed rate applied for each rank. 14 
In 1945, however, the problems associated with retaining and recruiting 
soldiers incorporated a much wider range of issues than just pension 
levels. As we have already seen, the well being of families was a major 
concern for soldiers on active duty. However, improvements granted in 
the levels allowances mainly resulted from public interest in service 
families at any given time. In Chapters One and Two, we saw how the 
profile of service families could be raised by concerns over recruitment 
and conscription. In 1939, Hore-Belisha went as far as to suggest that 
the success of conscription would be 'made or marred' by the way in 
which the State treated the relatives of servicemen. 15 However, in 
peacetime, provision for service families had received little public 
attention, a fact recognised by the Army Council in 1944 who 
acknowledged that'past consideration of allowances questions had been 
characterised by cycles of opinion. 16 To retain and recruit personnel 
following the cessation of hostilities, this issue needed to be addressed, 
so that peacetime servicemen could be assured that, if their families 
were left behind whilst they served abroad, they would be adequately 
cared for. With the large numbers of servicemen who would regularly 
serve abroad in Germany and in parts of the Empire in the immediate 
post-war period, the matter now became one of some urgency. In this, 
the Army Council felt that they were to some extent fighting a losing 
battle as 'the position would never be really satisfactory until there were 
some prospects of soldiers having their families with them'. 17 
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In 1944, Fred Bellinger had referred to the 'chaotic maner(sic) ... in which 
18 the Army settles its pay rates'. An issue recognised by the War Office 
who, even before the end of hostilities, had begun to discuss the need for 
a simplified code for pay and allowances for the post-war army. 19 As we 
have already seen, during the course of the war, many financial problems 
had resulted from a misunderstanding of regulations governing the 
admission and payment of allowances. As a consequence, by April 1945, 
there was an expectation within the services that a full-scale 
governmental review of pay and allowances was called for and, in the 
light of this, the War Office formed a committee specifically charged with 
the task of devising a new pay code, which was 'simple to understand 
and operate. 20 
This Committee on the Post-war Emoluments of Army Officers 
established a number of general principles to be applied to any post-war 
pay code . 
21 Firstly, the code should be simple and easy to operate. 
Secondly, there should be close parity between the emoluments payable 
to fighting men and those employed in technical work. As a result, both 
technical and military qualifications should count towards pay 
22 
supplements. In previous pay codes, there had been a tendency for 
technical skills to be more highly prized in peacetime and military skills 
more in times of conflict. As a result of these recommendations, the 
Committee envisaged that any new pay code would apply equally to all 
service whether it was at home, on long-term overseas postings such as 
in Germany or the Dominions, or in times of war. 23 By establishing a 
'universal' pay and allowances code, some of the problems encountered 
by dependants during the Second World War, such as delays in 
obtaining allowances and problems with their administration, would be 
removed. 24 In addition, any new pay code was envisaged as carrying 
with it the expectation of a guaranteed career progression to the age of 
forty-seven, to encourage more men into the Army as a positive career 
move. 25 
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At the same time, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John Anderson, 
established an Inter-departmental Committee on Post-war Pay, 
Allowances and Pensions in the Armed Services (the Bridges 
Committee), under the Chairmanship of Sir Edward Bridges, Secretary of 
26 State at the Treasury. Starting from a similar standpoint to that of the 
War Office Committee, that existing arrangements for service pay and 
allowances were 'extremely complex', the Committee's first task was to 
have been to consider the gradual phasing out of special wartime 
considerations such as JCP and WSG. 27 However, with the sudden end 
of the war in the Far East which, as Sir Eric Speed, Joint Permanent 
Under-secretary of State for War, suggested had 'taken us by surprise in 
many respects', the problems before the Committee became more 
28 
urgent. Sir Eric felt that unless new terms were proposed to the existing 
troops 'pretty quickly', there 'wouldn't be any troops to put them before' 
as soldiers would have already been demobilised and returned to civilian 
occupations. 29 
In addition to a review of pay and conditions of service, the Bridges 
Committee also considered allowances to wives and dependants of 
servicemen . 
30 Between 1938 and 1945, the total cost of allowances had 
risen by 58% in the Navy and 63% in the Royal Air Force with an 
increase in total expenditure on Family Allowances of 213.5% from 
E937,000 in 1938 to just under E2 million in 1945 . 
31 Although these 
increases may appear substantial, a number of other factors need to be 
borne in mind. Firstly, the size of the services had also increased 
dramatically during the period of the war. The Navy, for example, had 
seen a rise in personnel of over 300%, whilst RAF personnel had risen 
by almost 400%. 32 Effectively, then, families in both these services were 
probably worse off than they had been at the commencement of the war. 
The disadvantage to service families becomes especially clear when the 
differential between the increases in their allowances and the increases 
in civilian wages is taken into consideration. In the engineering and 
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shipbuilding industries, average weekly earnings for men over the age of 
33 21 had increased by 76%. Although, as reserved occupations, few men 
were unlikely to have been conscripted from these trades so 
comparisons are not completely valid, men would, however, have been 
conscripted from the food, drink and tobacco trades. Here increases had 
been in the region of 70% and men were more able to make some 
comparison between the wages they earned as servicemen and those 
they would have earned in their normal, civilian occupationS. 34 
The Bridges Committee was asked to consider a number of specific 
issues in relation to allowances for the post-war services. 35 Firstly, it was 
asked to examine the advantages and disadvantages of paying both 
officers and men a salary or wage based on their conditions of service 
without consideration of their marital status. As an alternative, they were 
also requested to consider the implications of continuing to pay 
servicemen higher emoluments as a direct result of their marital status. 
Finally, they were asked to 'comment' on the desirability of making 
marriage allowance subject to income taX. 36 Although these 
considerations had implications for the services with regard to 
recruitment into the armed forces, the conflicting economic concerns of 
the Treasury can be seen throughout the discussions. Whilst on the one 
hand they were keen to create a pay and allowances structure which 
would present the Armed Forces as a viable career, on the other hand 
the economic implications of increased pay and allowances continued to 
weigh heavily. Consequently, even when faced with direct comparisons 
with civilian wages, they persisted in regarding the increased levels of 
allowances as generous and as having come about'as a result of special 
war conditions'. 37 In their view, the effects of these special conditions 
were not a satisfactory basis on which to establish post-war allowances. 
In addition, the investigations also had political implications. The 
Chancellor had already outlined as an aim of the Committee, the need to 
simplify the pay and allowance structure and, where possible, to apply 
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the same conditions to all three services. 38 In addition he had called for a 
pay code which was not only more easily understandable by the men 
concerned but also by the general public. From 1942 onwards, much 
discussion had arisen in reviews of service pay and allowances around 
the comparative levels of service and civilian pay. Both the government 
and the services regarded a great deal of this controversy as having 
been caused by the fact that, for the layman, any real comparison of the 
two systems was well nigh impossible . 
39 The vast range of allowances 
available to servicemen ranging from housing and fuel allowances 
through to allowances for children meant that the general public would 
not be able to translate service pay into a comparable civilian rate. 
The first interim report of the Committee makes it clear that, even within 
the services themselves, agreement on a common pay and allowance 
structure would not be an easy matter . 
40 The main problem arose from a 
fundamental difference between the War Office on one hand and the Air 
Ministry and Admiralty on the other as to the basis for the new pay 
structure. The Air Ministry wished to retain their existing system whereby 
other ranks were divided into five major pay groups according to degree 
of technical knowledge and skill. The Admiralty had in operation at the 
time a complicated system whereby pay was supplemented by additions 
in respect of certain qualifications but were already investigating the 
possibility of moving to a system very close to that of the RAF. The War 
Office, however, operated a system of different pay levels for four 
different trade groups together with a separate set of pay rates for non- 
tradesmen, i. e. fighting soldiers, up to the rank of sergeant. Above this 
rank, pay was only differentiated into that for tradesmen or non- 
tradesmen. Although the War Office too were considering changes to 
their existing code, what was proposed was a single pay code for 
tradesmen and non-tradesmen alike. This would allow all soldiers to 
attain the highest level of pay, subject to qualifications and experience, 
regardless of whether their expertise lay in a trade or in military skill. 
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Although the government had already outlined parity between fighting 
and technical skills as one means of helping to make the services a 
viable career option, the Admiralty and RAF could not be persuaded to 
agree. Their argument was that military skills could not be prized as 
highly as technical expertise under peacetime conditions, particularly as 
the latter normally entailed a long apprenticeship. This opinion was 
further supported by the assertion that prizing such technical skills was 
more in keeping with pay structure in civilian employment where skills 
gained through a long apprenticeship normally accrued higher rates of 
pay. The matter proved insoluble in Committee and was referred for 
ministerial decision . 
41 However, when the White Paper was presented to 
Parliament in December 1945, it was noted that it had not been possible 
to arrive at parity across the services in these matters although a 'close 
uniformity' had been attained. 42 Despite this professed 'uniformity', 
obvious differences were still clearly apparent, not least that the Army 
and RAF continued to refer to their allowances to married servicemen as 
'Family Allowance' whilst the Navy persisted with the term 'Marriage 
Allowance'. 43 
The second issue considered by the Committee was that of Children's 
Allowances. 44 One of the major anomalies of service allowances during 
the war period was that, unlike civilian families, service families actually 
benefited from having large families. Children's Allowances were 
normally paid to servicemen for each and every child in the family, a fact 
quoted by civilian workers to help refute the claims that their wages were 
much greater than those of servicemen during the 1942 campaign for 
increases in service allowances. 45 Although the public regarded the 
system as unfairly rewarding servicemen for having large families, these 
payments had, in fact, been introduced as part of a series of measures to 
compensate older men with existing families for the drop in remuneration 
they would inevitably experience as a result of conscription. 46 The 
government had always regarded these payments as 'not suitable' to 
form part of a pay code after the end of the war as they were at odds with 
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47 the established principle of paying the 'rate for the job'. Instead, it was 
envisaged that service Family Allowances in respect of children would be 
brought into line with Family Benefit available to civilian families. Under 
the 1943 Family Allowances Act, child benefit of 5 shillings per week 
would be paid for the second and all subsequent children of all families, 
regardless of whether civilian or service families. This allowance would 
be paid direct to mothers and, for service families, was not dependent on 
any prior contribution by the serviceman. All service families would 
receive a Family Allowance at a standard rate of 35 shillings per week, 
excluding qualifying allotment, regardless of family size replacing earlier 
allowances, which differed in relation to number of children . 
48 Based on 
the rates of allowances which had originally been proposed for the post 
war period, families with one child effectively lost 7 shillings per week; 
those with two children lost 13s 7d; those with three 19s Ild and those 
with four children lost El 5s 9d. 49 
An undated note from Sir Edward Bridges suggests that the introduction 
of Family Allowances in this form would 'leave responsibility for the 
maintenance of his family, ..., to the serviceman' . 
50 Although this would 
have the effect of bringing service pay and allowances more into line with 
civilian wages, it can also be seen as a retrograde step in relation to the 
administration of service allowances. As detailed in Chapter 1, before the 
First World War, the amount given by servicemen to their families had 
been left solely to their own discretion and the campaign to force the 
state to accept some responsibility for its soldiers' dependants had been 
long and difficult. From the 1920s onwards the State reluctantly accepted 
responsibility for the maintenance of these families through allowances 
for other ranks paid directly to the families concerned. As a result, men 
who joined up to escape family responsibilities no longer left families 
destitute. Now, this situation had been reversed with the decision again 
being devolved to the serviceman as to whether or not he actually made 
financial provision for his family. 
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Although for service families as a whole this was a retrograde step, for 
the families of some categories of prisoner of war the decision of the 
state to pay national Family Allowance to service families had an 
unforeseen benefit. As this allowance was paid directly to wives, the 
wives of officers who were taken captive and who had been unable to 
access their husband's bank account, would now have an allowance paid 
directly to them. Although this allowance alone would not be sufficient to 
maintain a family in the absence of any other income, it did provide a 
minimal constant income. In fact, the Bridges Committee also made 
further recommendations to address this particular problem by 
recommending that, during short peacetime separations and in times of 
war, payment of allowances should be made directly to the wives of other 
ranks . 
51 A similar recommendation that, in time of war only, allowances 
should be paid direct to the wives of officers resulted in considerable 
discussion across the services and, despite the fact that both the 
Treasury and War Office were in agreement that payments should be 
made in this way, the matter remained unresolved. 52 
In December 1950, this discussion was re-opened at which time all 
parties concerned agreed that, although cases of hardship might occur 
where the officer was posted abroad at short notice, allowances should 
remain payable to the officer rather than his family unless he elected to 
do otherwise. 53 To do otherwise was regarded as running the risk of 
appearing to doubt the officer's integrity and cases where the officer 
deliberately failed to make provision were regarded as being 'very 
rare'. 54 As, however, the services continued not to place any emphasis 
on preparing either men or officers for a time when they might be taken 
prisoner it seems unlikely that officers would place any priority on making 
arrangements for such an eventuality. Consequently, their families might 
still find themselves with no way of accessing funds. However, the Army 
Council continued to insist that 
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It was of paramount importance that officers should be treated as 
officers despite any administrative difficulties which might arise. It 
was also wrong to change the practice of previous wars merely 
because a small minority of officers had evaded their domestic 
responsibilities. 55 
The plight of families facing possible destitution was thereby reduced by 
iff CU Ity. 56 the service authorities to a mere 'administrative dI 
In addition to these questions on the administration of Family Allowances 
in time of war, the Committee also brought to light two further issues, 
which had proved problematic for the administration of allowances in 
1939. These issues were to be investigated by a Technical Sub- 
Committee on Financial Concessions Received by Service Personnel - 
The Wilson Smith Sub-Committee. 57 Firstly, the Committee requested 
58 
guidance on the issue of qualifying age for Marriage Allowance. At the 
start of the Second World War, as a result of the conscription of young 
married men, it was eventually agreed that all married servicemen would 
be eligible for Marriage Allowance regardless of age. Before this date the 
policy for career soldiers had largely been governed by the policy that 
'junior officers and short service other ranks were required as far as 
possible to be unmarried'. 59 Initially the Army Council now that eligibility 
for Marriage Allowance should begin at the age of 23 for other ranks and 
A about 25 or 26' for officers based on the rationale that, by this age, most 
servicemen would have completed their first overseas tour of d Uty. 60 
However, as the Working Party pointed out, in any post-war conscript 
army there were bound to be a number of younger married men and, 
from a political standpoint, it would be inadvisable to deny allowances to 
their families. This point is aptly illustrated by the case of a young man 
from Maling in Kent who married at the age of 19 and was subsequently 
called up for national service . 
61 Before his call up, the man had been 
earning in the region of E4 per week but, on entering the services, he 
was ineligible for Family Allowance because of his age. As a result, his 
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pregnant wife was left'absolutely penniless'. 62 This particular case was 
brought to the attention of SSAFA who subsequently passed the 
following resolution at their 1946 Branch Conference: 
We strongly recommend to the Service Authorities that payment of 
marriage allowance shall be made to the wife of any serving 
soldier, sailor or airman irrespective of age. 63 
The Bridges Committee was also aware that, if the government was 
determined to pursue a policy of increasing birth rate, it would be 
impossible to regard marriage 'solely from the aspect of military efficiency 
and administrative convenience. 64 To achieve the desired outcomes of 
government in relation to birth policy, the dictates of military efficiency 
and the economic concerns of the Treasury, a compromise would have 
to be reached. In the event, the War Office 'reluctantly agreed'that any 
new allowance system would have to be drawn up on the assumption 
that all marriages of both officers and men would be officially recognised 
for allowances. 65. 
Although the subject of a qualifying age for Marriage Allowance then 
disappears from the sources, it does not seem to have been settled for 
once and for all. In 1968, the Army was not recruiting married men and 
were not granting Marriage Allowance to other ranks under the age of 21 
or officers under the age of 25, suggesting that 'officers who marry at say 
20 are unlikely ever to learn their jobs properly'. 66 However, they were, 
apparently, under some pressure to change their thinking on this matter. 
Major-General HEN Bredin, Director of Volunteers, Territorials and 
Cadets at the Ministry of Defence felt that, as neither the Royal Air Force 
nor the Royal Navy applied such restrictions, the army were 'being 
dragged at the chariot wheels of the other two services'. 67 In what 
appears to be a change from the 1945 position on recruitment, he also 
suggests that if the Army is doing this 'to scrape up a few more recruits' 
then 'it was doubly wrong' . 
6' By 1968, the pressure on the government to 
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maintain an Imperial presence in diverse areas of the world had, 
presumably, decreased and they could afford to consider the prospect of 
a smaller army to meet decreased demands. A new line of argument was 
also introduced at this stage suggesting that it was not actually legal to 
forbid anyone to marry and that soldiers could not, in fact, be prevented 
from marrying if they wished to. 69 Presumably, however, the argument 
was not whether or not soldiers could be forbidden to marry but whether 
or not they should be granted Marriage Allowances if they later married in 
defiance of the conditions of service which they had agreed to abide by 
when enlisting. 
The second problematic issue faced by the Bridges Committee was the 
recurring problem of allowances for 'unmarried' wives . 
70 As we have 
already seen, throughout the late 1930s and early 1940s, problems 
occurred where servicemen claimed Family Allowance in respect of 
women with whom they were living but not married. Although the 
services were reluctant to make allowances to these women, the whole 
rationale for the granting of allowances was predicated on the 
assumption that they would be used to maintain the serviceman's home 
against his return. If, therefore, a serviceman had set up home with a 
woman to whom he was not married, this home would, nevertheless, be 
the one to which he would return and which should be maintained. 
Although a compromise position had been reached in cases where legal 
and 'u n married' wives made competing claims, no satisfactory general 
ruling had been agreed. Now the War Office made a recommendation 
designed to settle the matter once and for all by suggesting that: 
All officers and soldiers who are married, whether estranged from 
their families or not, should be entitled to a family allowance in 
respect of their wives, subject to liability to make a prescribed 
contribution to the family in the event of separation; that officers 
and soldiers should be entitled to an allowance in respect of their 
divorced wives only to the extent that they can prove they are 
legally liable to support such wives, and subject to the further 
conditions that the wife's allowance should be payable; and that 
they should be entitled to family allowance in respect of their and 
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their wife's legitimate children, and any other children living in their 
home unless the children are maintained without expense to the 
officer or man (e. g. in an institution). 71 
The Executive Committee of the Army Council endorsed this view, 
stating that Family Allowance should be payable to all officers and men 
with families 'whatever their situation vis-a-vis their families' and, as a 
result, Special Dependants Allowances for 'unmarried' wives were 
abolished. 72 
Finally, the Bridges Committee turned their attention to whether or not 
73 
service allowances should be made subject to income tax. This 
discussion hinged on two main issues: that, for civilian workers, all 
additions were subject to income tax and whether or not allowances 
could be counted as additions to pay. Within the services themselves, 
and especially in the RAF, exemption from tax on Family Allowance was 
regarded as part compensation for long periods of separation from their 
families. As a consequence the UAB, who were fully involved in these 
discussions, felt that to begin taxing such allowances would cause 
greater resentment than any other part of the new tax code. 74 The War 
Office, again mindful of possible effects on recruitment, was also against 
the introduction of this tax. 75 However, although this argument continued 
to inform many discussions on post-war pay and allowances, its actual 
validity must be open to question. A confidential letter from the RAF 
Technical Training Headquarters in Huntingdon to the Air Ministry 
asserted that 
A very large proportion of the airmen now serving are completely 
disinterested in the new pay proposals, as they only have one aim 
in view - to complete their RAF service as soon as possible and 
return to occupations in civilian life. 76 
In the event, Family Allowance across all three services became taxable 
from 1 April 1947.77 
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Three other forms of payment to servicemen and their families during the 
war also came under general consideration at this time. Dependants 
Allowances, which had been introduced as a result of conscription in 
1939, were now regarded by the Treasury as being 'inappropriate as part 
of a peacetime code of pay and allowances' . 
78 As such, they were 
discontinued for the dependants of all recruits after 1 January 1946 . 
79 No 
discussion has come to light regarding the possibility of allowances for 
men called up for national service although a number of families must 
have faced the same issues which resulted in the granting of these 
allowances in 1939. Similarly, despite the professed War Office intent of 
devising a code of pay and allowances equally applicable in times of both 
war and peace, there is no mention of how dependants were to be 
provided for in the event of a future war. However, in both cases, the 
advent of National Assistance may have alleviated the need to formulate 
specific policy. War Service Grant, which had been made to families of 
conscripted men to offset hardship resulting from loss of income following 
compulsory service, were also deemed inapplicable to new recruits. 
Grants already in existence were reviewed following the introduction of 
the new Pay Code in July 1946 and then again in July 1947.80 Japanese 
Campaign Pay, introduced in November 1944 was continued up to the 
first anniversary of VJ Day in August 1946 and then ended. 81 
Overall, the new rates of pay and allowances suggested in the White 
Paper were estimated to show a 61 % increase in costs from the 1938 
82 level. These figures are, however, based on the strength of the services 
in 1938 and the White Paper does point out that the figures do not 
'enable accurate conclusions to be drawn' because of unknown factors 
such as the comparative ages and ranks of servicemen pre- and post- 
war. 83 
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ARMY NAVY RAF OVERALL 
1938 RATE 11,473,000 11,279,500 6,511,000 29,263,500 
POST-WAR 19,308,000 17,842,000 9,789,000 47,025,000 
J%INCREASE 69 58 50 61 
Table showing changes in total amounts payable in service allowances 1938-1946 
based on 1938 strength. Figures taken from Interdepartmental Committee on Post-war 
Pay and Allowances. PRO/WO32/11565. 
It is difficult to imagine just what the Committee hoped to gain by 
presenting these figures. In terms of estimating future expenditure they 
were, by the Committees'own admission, of limited use. Not only was 
the future constituency of the services in terms of age, marital status and 
rank unknown, but also no adjustments had been made for the greatly 
increased size of the services as a whole -a factor which was likely to be 
perpetuated in the post-war era. If the figures were designed to 
demonstrate a generous increase in service allowances during the period 
of the war, they are misleading as they make no mention of the fact that 
these increases barely kept pace with increases in the cost of living 
during the same period. 84 Finally, although the White Paper on Post-war 
Pay and Allowances made it clear that these new rates of pay would be 
9 subject to review from time to time', it was also made clear that such 
reviews would only take place in the event of a 'marked alteration in 
circumstances'. 85 No suggestion was made that pay and allowances 
should be linked to the Cost of Living Index. In addition, no changes were 
proposed to the way in which service pay and allowances were 
negotiated. All discussion of changes still had to be negotiated through 
the floor of the House of Commons -a time consuming practice at best 
and directly at odds with the rational of bringing conditions surrounding 
service pay more in line with that of civilian workers. 
In fact, by mid-1946, the Ministry of Defence was already expressing 
doubts as to whether or not married men, especially those with families 
to maintain, would be able to cover their expenses within the existing 
rates of Family Allowance. 86 The War Office expressed similar concerns 
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although, in their case, concern was more directed towards possible 
effects on recruiting levels rather than the welfare of the families 
involved . 
87 As a result a Sub-Committee of the Bridges Committee, the 
Wilson-Smith Sub-Committee, proposed a range of increases to 
allowances ranging from 3 shillings for a Leading Seaman, Corporal or 
other rank below age 25 to 15 shillings for a Warrant Officer. 88 The 
Treasury also focused on the possible repercussions for recruitment 
rather than the welfare of the families. 89 Their argument was that 
recruitment was more likely to be affected by the fact that men had 
already been separated from their families for long periods of time. As a 
consequence, men now sought employment which would enable them to 
stay at home, regardless of comparative rates of remuneration. In their 
view, therefore, increasing rates of pay would not solve the recruitment 
problem and the thorny question of service pay would have been re- 
opened to no good effect. With the cessation of hostilities, service 
families had once again lost their high public and political profile. 
Increases in service pay and allowances would now be regarded purely 
in the light of comparative civilian employment rather than as a reward for 
service to king and country. 
In addition to the immediate financial considerations of pay and 
allowances, all three services also began to review their overall welfare 
provision for service families. As with new pay regulations, one of the 
underpinning concerns was to attempt to standardise, and possibly 
amalgamate, provision across all three services. 90 A report of May 1946 
from the Committee on the Organisation of Common Services, 
established specifically to investigate this matter, agreed that provision 
generally fell into two areas. 91 Firstly, each service, and particularly the 
commanding officers in each case, was regarded as being directly 
responsible for the welfare of men and women under their command. 
However, with the introduction of National Service and continuing high 
numbers of personnel in the services, it was noted by the War Office that 
the traditional role of the Regimental Officers in this respect was 
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becoming impossible. 92 The sheer weight of numbers involved meant 
that it was no longer feasible for every Regimental Officer to have 
detailed knowledge of every man under his command in terms of 
93 
personality, career and family matters. Many Regimental Officers, 
themselves recruited during the war, did not have the knowledge and had 
not had the time to gain the experience of welfare matters acquired by 
long-term career officers before the war. 94 All three services clearly felt 
that the traditional role of commanding officer as 'guide, philosopher and 
friend' had been eroded. 95 However, as large numbers of army 
personnel; at least, would remain overseas for some time, it was 
necessary to establish and maintain channels for dealing with personal 
and family problems. 
The nature of the required provision had also changed during the course 
of the war. Before 1939, service welfare had largely concerned itself with 
the needs of the soldier as most had either been unmarried or had had 
their families with them. During the war, however, a large number of men 
who were already married were drafted into the services. This, together 
with the separation of families as a consequence of the war, had resulted 
in both the Army and RAF welfare services beginning to deal with the 
welfare of the families concerned. The Committee on the Organisation of 
Common Services, in a meeting in June 1946 reported on the 
'considerable development' of this family welfare in response to the 
special needs of 'citizen forces, who had left families behind them . 
96 It is 
however, difficult to ascertain exactly where and how this 'considerable 
development' had taken place and charitable organisations, such as 
SSAFA, continued to play a crucial part in the well being of service 
families. In the Navy the picture was slightly different. 97 In theory at least, 
the existence of families in overseas naval bases before the war meant 
that Welfare Officers already existed to deal with family problems. In 
reality, most welfare outside of ships was, as in the cases of the Army 
and RAF, conducted through SSAFA or other voluntary organisations 
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whose work was regarded as both 'invaluable' and 'of an unfailingly high 
standard'. 98 
Partly as a result of this existing provision, all three services agreed that 
family welfare should continue to be the province of voluntary 
organisations and that a common policy should be established for 
dealing with these organ isations. 99 However, with the ending of hostilities 
the voluntary organisations were also beginning to limit their activities. 
From 1946 onwards SSAFA began gradually to close their overseas 
bureaux which had served the Navy so well, although one representative 
was retained in each major overseas command. 100 For SSAFA, the major 
problem, both in Britain and overseas, was one of diminishing funds. 10, 
The ending of the war meant that the welfare of service families once 
again ceased to be a matter of national concern and donations began to 
fall. Although the Association was invited to administer the balance of the 
Queen's Canadian Fund, which has been replenished by the Queen up 
to the present day, donations fell sharply after the war. 102 For example, 
in 1948 donations totalled El 27,547, by 1949 they had fallen to E94,573. 
As a result, by 1949, SSAFA had overspent its income by F-1 84,212 and 
the Association was reconsidering its role in post-war service welfare. 103 
The Branch Conference in October 1945 had already heard a report from 
the Chairman on the widely held belief that the work carried out during 
the war by SSAFA'should now be a government concern undertaken by 
a government department'. 104 Indeed, for many servicemen, this seemed 
a logical extension of the way in which the government had directed 
every part of their lives, and those of their families, during the war years. 
SSAFA, however, did not agree. The Committee saw their independent 
status as a guarantee of their ability to petition all government 
departments -a freedom they did not believe would be open to a 
governmentally funded and administered agency. 105 They also believed 
that their independence made them the best-equipped organisation to 
support and campaign for'special cases'. 106 The experience of World 
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War 11 had shown that it was almost impossible to legislate for all 
possible family circumstances in relation to allowances and an 
independent body willing to support those who had fallen outside the 
normal pattern had proved essential. SSAFA's last argument for their 
welfare work to remain independent of government is, however, rather 
more contentious. The Committee argued for continued independence on 
the grounds of the expense that would be incurred if this work were to be 
taken over by a government department. 107 Although SSAFA had not 
been directly instrumental in encouraging the state to accept its 
responsibility for the welfare of service families, to argue that the financial 
burden for this welfare should be now be taken back by charitable 
organisations as a money-saving measure seems a dangerous political 
argument. 
Whilst questions of future pay, allowances and welfare in the services 
occupied much of the thinking of the War Office, Air Ministry and 
Admiralty, for returning servicemen and especially for returning POWs 
and their families there were often more immediate concerns. As we 
have already seen, by March 1945,150,000 British servicemen were 
being held prisoner in both Europe and the Far East. The War Office 
considered that all men who had been held captive for longer than four 
years, the majority of those who had been held for over three years and 
20% of those who had been held for less than this period would require 
some degree of mental rehabilitation on their release. 108 A total of some 
71,000 men would, therefore, need support of some kind to facilitate their 
reintegration into civilian life. In fact, the War Office had been considering 
this question since October 1944 but, as had been the case with 
information and allowances for prisoner of war families, no coherent 
policy was formulated-109 Some within the War Office suggested that 
families should be sent a letter, possibly written by a repatriated POW, 
giving advice based on personal experience. Others felt that this might 
be seen as 'interfering in private lives' and wished to avoid any 
suggestion that ex-prisoners of war were 'peculiar' or would 'require 
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humouring by their relatives'. 110 In the event, although a pamphlet was 
distributed to all British Commonwealth personnel awaiting repatriation 
from POW camps in Germany, no specific advice was given to relatives 
beyond suggesting that personal or domestic problems could be referred 
to an Army Welfare Officer, SSAFA, CAB or BRC. 111 In many cases 
specific arrangements were left to local groups who, as was the case for 
the Huddersfield POW Committee, often appeared to consider their 
duties discharged or felt unqualified to assist further once the serviceman 
had been welcomed home. Perhaps more appropriate, but similarly 
uncoordinated, was the assistance provided by regiments such as the 
Cambridge and Isle of Ely Territorial Association, who regarded the 
provision of 'a friend from whom to seek advice' as a natural extension of 
the care which regiments offered to their servicemen and their families. ' 12 
The problems faced by returning prisoners of war and indeed 
servicemen in general, have been widely investigated in many studies 
from the 1940s to the present day. ' 13 For many, fears held during their 
absence, and recorded through the Army Morale Reports, of the infidelity 
of wives, in contemporary parlance 'drifting' proved only too real. 114 
Vivienne Chatfield, in her unpublished biography, notes that 
there were many unpleasant shocks for returning prisoners from 
the Far East. Many wives had remarried when their husbands 
were missing and others were living with other men 115 
By late 1945, the national divorce rate had risen 250% on the 1939 figure 
and, in contrast with the pre-war picture where most divorce petitions had 
been brought by wives, most petitions in that year were brought by 
husbands on the grounds of adultery. ' 16 Generally, women's magazines 
of the war period had advised women who had been unfaithful to wait 
until their husbands came home and 'were not taken up with the 
business of fighting for life' before breaking the news. ' 17 Consequently, 
many men were deprived of the support of their partners at the same 
time as having to adjust to civilian life. For wives who had become 
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pregnant, the advice was to 'tell him the truth and ask his forgiveness' 
and figures seem to suggest that a significant number of returning 
service men may have been faced with this 'truth'. ' 18 In 1945 illegitimate 
births made up 9.1 % of all total births and survey, conducted in 
Birmingham from 1944-45, showed that 18% of all illegitimate children in 
this area had been born to servicemen's wives. 119 
Even for those not faced with evidence of their wives' infidelity, 
readjusting to home and family life often proved problematic. Many men 
who had been taken prisoner were changed by their experiences either 
irrevocably or in ways that called for long periods of readjustment. 
Similarly, many women had also changed through the experience of 
having to take complete responsibility for their families and through 
working outside the home, perhaps for the first time. For both parties, the 
reality of their reunion often failed to live up to their expectations. Turner 
and Rendell cite the case of a returning prisoner of war who had been in 
a prison hospital for nearly four years. 120 All through his time in hospital 
he had imagined his wife and family in their home, as he had left them. In 
reality, the wife had had to leave her home and put the children into a 
nursery so that she could take a part-time factory job to make ends meet. 
She, in turn, had dreamt of her husband returning and taking all the cares 
from her shoulders. Inevitably their reunion was a disappointment for 
both parties and they subsequently divorced. 121 
This example also serves to highlight the problems faced by servicemen 
coming home to Britain and to a civilian population which had also 
suffered deprivation and hardship. Reese, in Homecoming Heroes, 
suggests that the general public in Britain was less likely to be 
sgenerous' to returning prisoners of war than in the USA and Canada 
because although 'no doubt many prisoners of war had suffered terribly, 
so had Mrs Jones'. 122 To prepare returning prisoners of war for this 
eventuality, the DPW in September 1944 had suggested they should be 
provided with information on conditions at home before they were 
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actually repatriated. 123 This information was to include: the part played by 
industry 'so that he learns to appreciate the civilian workman's point of 
view'; the work of the Home Guard 'so that he appreciates the civilian's 
point of view'; the part played by women 'so that he appreciates the 
women's point of view'; accommodation problems 'so that he does not 
imagine that his difficulties are unique'; and wartime restrictions such as 
coupons and rationing 'so as to give him a balanced picture of England in 
wartime'. 124 No information has been located to suggest that this 
recommendation was acted on and, as a result, both returning 
servicemen and their families often felt that they were not accorded the 
recognition of their suffering they deserved thereby making readjustment 
that much harder. In contrast to the British attitude, Canadian ex- 
prisoners of war and civilians alike were issued with a pamphlet of almost 
40 pages, Back to Civil Life, giving general information on repatriation 
issues. 125 This pamphlet proved so popular that, by August 1945, it was 
already in its second edition. 126 
Servicemen had also changed in ways not directly engendered by their 
experience of combat or imprisonment. Army education, begun with the 
objective of motivating troops and alleviating boredom, had also taken on 
the task of educating servicemen to be better informed in current affairs 
and more responsible citizens. 127 As a result, demobilised servicemen 
had not only gained in maturity and experience during the course of the 
war but also in political awareness. For many returning to their pre-war 
employment only led to frustration and restlessness . 
128 A situation 
worsened by the failure of the Government Training Scheme which, from 
the outset, was problematic in that it required mature experienced 
servicemen to undergo an 'apprenticeship' which many felt to be 
humiliating . 
129 Even for those who did qualify in a trade, employment was 
often hard to come by, especially within the building trade. An official 
report of 1948, on ex-service employment reports that the Government 
Training Scheme had failed 'because they have trained men in such 
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trades as plastering and bricklaying and now there was no work for 
130 them'. 
Many of the sources dealing with repatriation issues, however, rely 
largely on evidence from the returning servicemen themselves or the 
memories of their children. There is little direct testimony from the wives 
of returning prisoners of war regarding their own readjustment. Many 
speak of 'just doing what any loving mother would do' and 'keeping the 
home together for when they came home' but, by and large, their own 
support networks of POW Committees and Relatives Associations ended 
with the return of their husbands and sons. 131 Although the Barnsley 
POW Fund continues to operate to the present day, what evidence is 
available suggests that many more local committees followed the 
example of the Huddersfield Committee and wound up their affairs 
following the repatriation of local prisoners of war. 
For some families, however, there was neither the joy occasioned by the 
return of family members nor the comfort provided by the gifts and 
thoughts of local support groups. Following the general repatriation of 
POWs, a number of men who, although they were 'not missing in the 
proper sense of the word', failed to return home. 132 From the Army, eight 
officers and three hundred and sixty two other ranks apparently chose 
not to return, whilst seven men from both the Navy and the RAF 
remained unaccounted for. 133 Of the sailors who did not return, at least 
three had married foreign nationals and were awaiting permission to 
bring their wives home to Britain. 134 It would seem reasonable to assume 
that such cases also existed within the other branches of the services, 
although no direct evidence for this has been located. However, there 
can be no doubt that some men, although they had survived captivity, 
chose not to return to their families in Britain. For example, Leading- 
Stoker 
TH Barker, who was captured after the loss of S/M Saracen in August 
1943, was known to have been released from captivity in Italy but failed 
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to return to his family in Britain or to make contact with them in any 
way. 135 Richard Lamb records that, when the war ended, more than two 
thousand prisoners of war were missing a proportion of whom were 
'living happily with Italian families and did not want to return to their 
homeland,. 136 Similarly, Ministry of Pensions files contain a number of 
case studies of men who had disappeared at the end of the war, some of 
whom were known to have 'made arrangements to meet other women' in 
France and India. 137 
In all such cases the Interdepartmental POW Co-ordinating Committee 
(Finance) decided that allowances should only continue for thirteen 
weeks after commanders from the various locations reported that there 
were no POWs remaining in their area 'so far as they could trace'. 138 
When questioned by the Air Ministry as to why these allowances were 
not continued for the more normal twenty-six week period, the Chairman 
of the Committee replied that this was accepted as an 'appropriate' 
length of time for families to 'reasonably adjust their standard of living'. 139 
For the families of all those who had been held captive in Europe, this 
decision was implemented by October 1945 - the date by which the War 
Office considered that all ex-prisoners of war had had sufficient time to 
contact some authority representing the British government. 140 In all, a 
total of three hundred and eighty one families were accorded a scant 
thirteen weeks to come to terms with the fact that their loved ones had 
chosen not to return to them and to adjust their lives accordingly. For the 
Treasury, this callous decision resulted in a saving in the region of 
E9,000. A minuscule amount in an overall expenditure on service 
allowances in excess of E42 million. 141 
What this decision suggests is that, despite the professed intention of the 
War Office, in particular, to attempt to promote the Army as an attractive 
post-war career option, other factors militated against this. Following the 
1945 election, Hugh Dalton, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, inherited 
major economic problems. 142 Britain's exports stood at only 46% of their 
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1938 level due largely to the diversion of resources into war production 
and the country's liabilities had risen to E3,500 million. 143 Not surprisingly, 
the Treasury was keen to economise wherever and whenever possible 
resulting in a conflict between the aims of maintaining Britain as a major 
military presence overseas and concentrating all possible resources on 
rebuilding the national economy. 
For service families, this tension often resulted in allowances which 
continued to be issued at levels below that necessary to maintain an 
adequate standard of living. Five years after the end of World War 11, 
Ellen Porter, the wife of a rifleman in the Royal Eniskillen Fusiliers was 
still struggling to keep her family on a meagre service allowance. 144 Her 
husband, who had been held captive in Germany for five years during the 
Second World War, was recalled for service in Korea in August 1950 with 
just 21 days of his time as a reservist left. Mrs Porter received an 
allowance of just E2 12s 6d for herself and two small children, which she 
supplemented by working. When her third child was born handicapped in 
May 1951, she was no longer able to work and had to support the whole 
family on just F-3 1 Os Od per week. 145 
What Mrs Porter's case suggests is that the problems associated with 
service allowances apparent throughout the whole of the Second World 
War were not addressed by the subsequent post-war strategy. Despite 
the professed intent of the War Office, Admiralty and Air Ministry to 
simplify allowances and to make the services an attractive post-war 
career, overall economic factors linked to post-war reconstruction 
militated against this. Coupled with a lowering in the public profile of 
service families once hostilities had ended, these factors led to a 
continuation of allowances at a level barely above that sufficient to 
ensure survival which persisted up to the outbreak of war in Korea. 
Although Ferguson and Fitzgerald, in their official history of the Second 
World War volume on the Social Services, claim that the war'brought 
about a remarkable development of the Welfare organisations of all three 
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Services' they cite no specific examples of this development. 146 In the 
light of the continued problems of service families demonstrated in this 
chapter, it is difficult to see how such a claim can be justified. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The findings of this study lead to a number of conclusions for both 
service families in general and prisoner of war families in particular. 
Firstly, the experiences of World War One in relation to both service 
allowances and prisoner of war matters were largely ignored by 
government agencies. During this war, many service families had 
suffered financial hardship because of delays in payment of both Family 
and Dependants' Allowances. Despite the fact that this issue was drawn 
to the attention of the War Office and Treasury by SSAFA in 1924, no 
action was taken to devise a better system to operate in the event of 
future wars. In fact, both the Treasury and the War Office were unwilling 
to admit that such a problem existed. The War Office, with what proved 
to be unwarranted complacency, took the view that their own machinery 
for the administration of allowances was already perfectly adequate. The 
Treasury, with their mind on national economic problems, took the view 
that, as Marriage Allowance was now issued as the norm, the 
mechanisms for payment were already in place and would merely be 
extended in the event of future conflicts. In this they completely 
overlooked the problems that might be caused by a decision to issue 
Dependants' Allowances, payable in time of war only, to other 
dependants such as parents who were not eligible for Family Allowances. 
An equally serious oversight was the fact that both the War Office and 
Treasury appeared to ignore the possible effects of mass conscription. 
Leaving aside particular problems posed by the enforced service of a 
broad section of young men, some of whom were married but below the 
age at which Family Allowance was normally issued to servicemen, the 
sheer weight of numbers of those immediately eligible to apply for 
allowances was bound to stretch any system to breaking point. Between 
the outbreak of war in September and November 1939,300,000 Family 
Allowances alone were granted as men conscripted into the services 
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claimed allowances for their wives and children. ' Figures for Dependants' 
Allowances during the same period are not available but by March 1941, 
well after the first major influx of applications from conscripts, new 
applications for these allowances were still running at 4,500 per week. 2 
These allowances posed particular problems as, in each and every case, 
the exact level of prior dependency had to be established -a sensitive 
and time-consuming exercise. 
Similarly, no action was taken in the aftermath of the First World War to 
ensure better provision in the event of a future conflict for the families of 
those taken captive. Despite the fact that the Belfield Report had 
highlighted a number of areas of dissatisfaction, and proposed a number 
of concrete measures to prevent these problems surfacing again in future 
conflicts, no measures were instigated to implement these 
recommendations. Many of the problems identified, such as an 
uncertainty as to which authority held ultimate responsibility for prisoner 
of war matters and where to apply for information, resurfaced 
immediately following the first capture of large numbers of men from the 
BEF in May 1940. A problem which was exacerbated by the fall of 
Singapore and Hong Kong and the subsequent lack of notification by the 
Japanese of the status of British servicemen. 
Gillian Thomas, in the conclusions to her study of separation allowances 
and pensions during the First World War, opts for a feminist reading of 
government action in relation to service allowances following the First 
World War. However, by suggesting that allowances were used largely 
as a means of controlling social behaviour and participation in 
employment, Thomas overlooks a wider historical perspective on the 
perceived national importance of service allowances. The cyclical pattern 
by which soldiers, and all matters affecting them, attain a high political 
profile in times of war and then disappear from the political agenda in 
times of peace was already well established. The pattern of soldiers 
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being reviled in times of peace and revered in times of war was already 
enshrined in popular literature by 1890: 
For it's Tommy this, an' Tommy that, an' 'Chuck him out, the 
brute! ' 
But it's 'Saviour of 'is country' when the guns begin to shoot. 3 
This perception clearly informed discussions relating to service pay in 
times of war as is evidenced by the level of popular campaigning for 
increased allowances in the press. In addition, the role of families in 
influencing the willingness of men to enlist and their effectiveness in 
action was also widely acknowledged. In 1939, Leslie Hore-Belisha, 
Secretary of State for War, wrote, 'to send a soldier to fight knowing that 
those whom he leaves behind are in want may well endanger his morale 
4 and reduce his value as a soldier. Thus the government, and the nation 
as a whole, had a duty to maintain a soldier's family whilst he fought to 
protect the national 'family'. From 1942 onwards, the reports of the War 
Office Morale Committee emphasised the role families, and the 
knowledge of their well being, played in maintaining the morale and 
effectiveness of soldiers. 5 Towards the end of the Second World War, a 
further dimension was added to these concerns of government. The 
imminence of a general election following the ending of the war provided 
servicemen with an immediate means of registering protest if they felt 
that the government had not fulfilled its responsibility to their families. 
As Thomas suggests, once hostilities ended, the upkeep of their families 
reverted to being the responsibility of the individual serviceman. 6 
However, rather than viewing this as a deliberate measure by the 
government to reinforce traditional family values and the economic 
dependence of women, it seems more likely to be indicative of an overall 
lessening of interest in service issues as a whole. As the need to provide 
for service families in order to bolster the morale and effectiveness of 
soldiers decreased, so the whole subject of service pay and allowances 
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slipped from the national agenda and administrative procedures reverted 
to their pre-war practice. 
Generally, the re-emergence of issues highlighted from the experience of 
World War 1, once again failed to result in the framing of long term policy 
to address these issues. Although some short-term solutions were 
advanced these were, by and large, only effective 'for the duration'. 
Qualifying age for marriage allowance proves a case in point here. The 
introduction of conscription in April 1939 had led to protracted 
discussions on the topic of the eligibility of conscripted soldiers, under the 
normal qualifying age for marriage allowance, to claim these allowances. 
As a result this qualifying age was suspended during the period of the 
war. However, no lasting decisions were made regarding the eligibility of 
men who married before undertaking involuntary service in the armed 
forces. Consequently, despite the fact that the National Services Acts of 
1948 demanded that all men over the age of 18 served in the armed 
forces for eighteen months, no provision was made for allowances to be 
paid to the wives of men who married before being conscripted into 
National Service. During discussions in 1939 prior to the introduction of 
conscription, the service hierarchy had argued that men choosing to 
serve in the armed forces, as a career, did so knowing that they would 
not be eligible for allowances before a certain age. 7 Presumably the 
government now felt that, as men knew they would be called up for 
national service, they should not undertake the financial responsibilities 
of marriage before this was completed. The subject was still proving to 
be a contentious matter within the services in the late 1960s when the 
War Office was arguing for a retention of qualifying ages of 21 for other 
ranks and 25 for officers whilst the Navy and Royal Air Force favoured a 
reduction in these ages. 8 
Perhaps more importantly, given post-war attempts to promote the 
services as an attractive career, no changes were made as a result of 
World War 11 to the way in which increases to service pay and allowances 
260 
were negotiated. No formal channels were developed through which 
servicemen could campaign for pay increases nor were any prescribed 
links forged whereby service pay would automatically increase in 
response to inflation or rises in the cost of living. Throughout the course 
of the war and in the post-war period, all changes to service pay and 
allowances continued to be negotiated through the floor of the House of 
Commons, a cumbersome and time consuming exercise. The high public 
profile achieved by servicemen and their families during the war did not 
immediately translate into a governmental concern to ensure that service 
families received adequate financial provision. Indeed, in some respects 
the professed concern of the nation and government in this respect made 
the situation even more difficult. Servicemen, despite the fact that they 
had first-hand knowledge from their families of financial hardship, were 
not in a position to campaign themselves for increased allowances when 
the vaunted national care of their families proved inadequate. To do so 
would have suggested disloyalty to their country and may, during a time 
of war, have appeared akin to blackmail. 
To effect any increases to service pay and allowances necessitated a 
concerted campaign to engage the attention of MPs so that the matter 
would be raised and debated in the House of Commons. This was no 
easy matter when the attention of the nation was focused on the 
business of waging war and particularly when many of the general public 
must have believed that the matter was already being adequately dealt 
with by the government. Campaigns for increases in service pay and 
allowances were, therefore, left to the vagaries of public opinion. 
Pressure for such increases normally followed a pattern of MP's attention 
being drawn to the plight of a local group of service wives and so 
generating publicity through the local press. This, in turn, led to interest 
from national groups such as SSAFA and POWRA who together with 
local MPs acted to increase national interest and publicity in the subject. 
From this increased national interest, sufficient momentum was 
generated for the matter to be raised in the House of Commons. 
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Generally, with the exception of continual campaigning by POWRA over 
specific POW issues, these campaigns remained uncoordinated. 
Although national figures such as Sylvia Pankhurst and Eleanor 
Rathbone figured prominently in a number of campaigns, at no time did a 
popular champion of service families come forward. Possibly as a result 
of this lack of a national pressure group, increases in service pay and 
allowances failed to attain a formal, timebound review system during the 
course of the war. With the cessation of hostilities, public interest in 
levels of service pay waned and no pressure was brought to bear on the 
government to adopt a negotiating structure for pay increases more 
closely aligned to that operating in industry. 
To some extent this lack of a co-ordinated pay review system seems 
surprising as one concern of the services towards the end of the war and 
in the immediate post-war period was to attempt to make the armed 
service appear an attractive career. In both 1942 and 1944, campaigns 
for increases in service pay had utilised unfavourable comparisons 
between service and civilian pay as an argument for increasing service 
pay and a more transparent pay scheme for servicemen was viewed by 
the services as one means of highlighting career prospects. 9 However, in 
the immediate post-war period, the two ways in which the government 
acted to make the systems more comparable were both detrimental to 
service families. 
Children's Allowances had traditionally been granted for all children 
within a serviceman's family in addition to other allowances such as 
Marriage or Family Allowance. In contrast, civilian workers had not 
received any extra allowances for their children. During the course of the 
war, campaigners had argued that civilian wages were much greater than 
those payable to servicemen. The Treasury, however, had claimed that 
to calculate the full extent of service pay, all allowances including those 
made for children, needed to be included in the calculations. The actual 
'pay' component of service pay was argued as being the equivalent of 
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the disposable income left to civilians after all financial commitments had 
been met - effectively 'spending money'. With the introduction of the 
1945 Family Allowances Act, Children's Allowances to service families 
were abolished being replaced by the national allowance of 5 shillings 
per week for the second and every subsequent child in a family. Some 
commentators such as Braybon and Surnmerfield have argued, with 
justification, that, from a feminist standpoint, this change proved to be a 
beneficial move. 10 Whereas service Children's Allowance, for other 
ranks, was only paid directly to the women involved in times of war, 
Family Allowance was as a matter of course paid to mothers. However, 
although the gross financial implications of this are impossible to 
calculate, there can be no doubt that this measure effected a substantial 
saving to the Treasury in service spending. " A combination of 
diminishing public interest in service matters after the cessation of 
hostilities and the preoccupation of government, including MPs, with both 
social and economic reconstruction, meant that no agency existed to 
safeguard the interests of service families in this matter. Without exciting 
any public debate on the issue, by changing families from service 
Children's Allowances to national Family Allowance, the Treasury were 
able to effect a saving in the region of E700 per annum in allowances 
paid to each service family with two children. 12 
In a further move designed to increase parity between service pay and its 
civilian equivalent, the Treasury, through the medium of the Bridges 
Committee, began discussions on the introduction of income tax to 
service allowances. Previously service allowances had remained exempt 
from tax whilst additions for civilian workers were taxed. Despite 
resistance from the War Office in particular, the Treasury view prevailed 
and income tax on service Family Allowances was introduced from April 
1947. Again, actual figures for the income the Treasury generated by this 
move are impossible to calculate. However, some estimates can be 
made. In June 1945, the total strength of the armed forces stood at 
4,653 '000.13 If even two thirds of these servicemen were married and 
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claiming Family Allowance, then close to F-2.5 million in service 
allowances instantly became subject to income tax. In both of these 
instances, issues raised as arguments for increasing service pay and 
allowances during the course of the war were used to effectively 
decrease the value of service pay after its conclusion. The diminishing 
public interest in service matters after the conclusion of the war meant 
that such changes, presented to the general public as a means of 
establishing parity between service and civilian pay, were unlikely to 
generate debate. 
For prisoner of war families, a similar lack of change can be identified in 
the particular administrative problems associated with their allowances. 
In these instances, however, this inertia resulted from military policy 
rather than from the cyclical nature of public interest in service matters. 
For the families of officers taken prisoner, especially those captured in 
the Far East, particular problems had arisen during the course of the war 
around their ability to access funds. The wives of ordinary soldiers who 
were captured continued to be able to draw their allowances by means of 
the books of drafts issued directly to them. Officers' allowances, 
however, were issued to the men themselves together with their pay, and 
often paid direct into their bank accounts. All three services stressed that 
they encouraged their officers to make arrangements for their families to 
be able to access these funds before they were posted overseas and 
faced the possibility of being taken prisoner. At the same time, however 
all three also exhibited a reluctance to interfere directly in the family life of 
their officers. Instead they chose to believe that they had played their 
part by suggesting that financial provision should be made and that 
officers would, naturally look after the best interests of their families. The 
actual level of encouragement to make this provision must, however, be 
open to doubt. In military terms, any discussion of the possibility of 
capture was seen as defeatist and, as a result, men were provided with 
only minimal training on how to prepare for capture and how conduct 
themselves if capture occurred. If men were not encouraged to consider 
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this eventuality, then it was unlikely that they would recognise the 
importance of making such provision for their families. 
Although this matter was the subject of some discussion in the wake of 
the Second World War, little concern was shown by the services for 
families. Instead, attention once again focused on respecting the integrity 
of the officers involved. Similarly, post-war official histories concerned 
with prisoner of war matters, such as Cambray and Briggs' Red Cross 
and St. John War Histo and Satow and See's 'The Work of the 
Prisoners of War Department During the Second World War, failed to 
address the problem. Only the Phillimore Report mentions the topic and 
then solely in connection with the RAF - the only one of the services to 
have existing provision to order all or part of an officer's pay and 
allowances to be paid directly to his wife to prevent hardship. In his 
summary of the provisions made by the other two services, Colonel 
Phillimore does not raise the issue. Instead he merely reiterates the 
suggestion that officers should make such provision for their families and 
proposes that, in cases where this has not happened, the officer could 
subsequently rectify the situation by sending a letter to his bank 
manager. 14 Although this possibility did exist for officers held prisoner in 
Europe, such a solution was patently not possible for those held prisoner 
in the Far East. In fact, the whole question of service training for the 
eventuality of capture changed not as a result of World War 11, but with 
the later experience of the Korean War. Reports on prisoner of war 
conduct after capture between 1951 and 1953 were clear in their 
conclusions that increased training was necessary to help servicemen to 
prepare for the possibility of ill-treatment, including interrogation. 15 
Although these changes were driven by military necessity rather than 
concern for family welfare, it seems likely that an increased awareness of 
the realities of capture would have encouraged soldiers to ensure that 
they had made adequate provision for their families. 
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Similarly the administration of allowances for the families of servicemen 
who were reported 'missing in action' but whose ultimate fate was not 
known was not altered as a result of the war. Throughout World War 11, 
families of those reported missing were allocated 'missing' allowances for 
a specified time after the serviceman went missing. If no word was 
received of prisoner of war status within that period, the serviceman was 
presumed to be dead and allowances reduced to pension rates. 
However, after the fall of Singapore in 1942 and other actions in the Far 
East, it became clear that the Japanese authorities would not forward 
notification of capture within the set time and as a consequence 
allowances were extended until notification could be received. In many 
cases this notification was never forthcoming and allowances were 
extended in three-month periods for the duration of the war. At no time 
during World War 11 did the government seem to consider the possibility 
of implementing a new category, already adopted by the Indian 
government, of 'Missing, believed POW'. Nor is there any suggestion that 
the possibility of a 'holding' category was discussed in the post war 
years. Again, changes to this policy only resulted from the experience of 
the Korean War. 16 Even then the changes remained superficial and in 
reaction to an international initiative rather than through the government 
responding to the needs of service families. During the course of the 
Korean War, the British Repatriated POW Interrogation Unit with the 
Headquarters of UN Command established the use of this category of 
missing personal, largely in response to the testimony of repatriated 
POWs on the status of their companions still in ca PtiVity. 17 Even then, the 
services were keen to make it clear to relatives that this was a 'limited' 
category. The men involved were still officially posted missing and their 
allowances calculated accordingly. 
Finally, the government in the Second World War, as during the First, 
failed to ensure an adequately clear channel of communication through 
which prisoner of war families could make enquiries and seek advice. 
Sources suggest that, throughout the war, the War Office in particular 
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were at best uncomfortable dealing directly with a civilian population and 
at times openly inconsiderate in their dealings with these families. An 
Enquiry Centre for the relatives of those missing or held captive in the 
Far East was only established in response to persistent campaigns by 
relatives supported by both MPs and POWRA. Even then, for many 
families, the Enquiry Centre proved to be only the first stage in their 
quest for information. Few enquiries were dealt with direct and the 
majority of families were merely directed to one of eleven further possible 
sources of information. 
Following the war, the Phillimore Report, noted the resistance of both the 
Foreign and War Offices to the proposal to establish a separate Minister 
for Prisoner of War matters. 18 However, in its analysis of the pros and 
cons of the argument the Report argues purely from the standpoint of 
what would be best for the government departments concerned rather 
than for prisoners of war themselves or their families. For example, the 
Report acknowledges that delays in information had occurred but views 
the importance of these as being that they resulted in 'a storm of public 
indignation' which had serious results for the 'standing of the 
government' rather than the worry that they caused for the families 
concerned. 19 The stated objective of the report'to preserve the 
experience gained during the Second World War, -, in selected fields of 
military staff work and administration' is then utilised solely to suggest 
changes which would benefit the Service Departments in general, and 
the War Office in particular, rather than to highlight ways in which the 
services could improve their administrative systems to benefit prisoners 
of war and their families. 20 
Again, changes to the provision of information to families only resulted as 
a by-product of changes to military strategy in the wake of the Korean 
War. Once the decision had been taken to increase the amount of 
training on conduct and possible treatment after capture, a decision was 
also taken to increase the amount of information provided to relatives. 21 
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During the Second World War the British government had withheld 
information regarding the possible mistreatment of prisoners by the 
Japanese from the general public. In the late 1950s, however, the 
American government made the decision that publicising Communist 
treatment of prisoners of war was an effective propaganda tool. 22 In 
addition, they hoped that acknowledging this possible mistreatment 
linked with the fact that servicemen were now being trained to cope with 
this eventuality would minimise the fears of families. In this the British 
government followed suit. However, although this may have gone some 
way towards allaying fears, problems associated with lack of notification 
of status remained. Later studies on American prisoner of war families 
show that many wives during the Vietnam War were dissatisfied with the 
level of information provided. 23 As a result they, like their British 
counterparts before them, often participated in both local and national 
initiatives to clarify their husbands' status. What these studies also show, 
however, is the importance of such clarification for the adjustment and 
coping strategies of the families involved. Whilst the families of all 
servicemen may experience hardship in adjusting to long term 
separation, for the families of those whose status remains unknown the 
burden is doubled. Families are faced with the necessity to plan both for 
the eventual return of their husbands and fathers and for the possible 
confirmation of their death. For the families of British prisoners of war 
during the Second World War, the administrative systems adopted by the 
Services made no concessions towards helping families cope with these 
stresses. 
In general, comparatives for this study have proved almost impossible to 
locate. Although Sarah Fishman's study We Will Wait also deals with 
prisoner of war wives during the Second World War, it is written from a 
different perspective. Whilst this study concentrates on governmental 
treatment of and reaction to service families and prisoner of war families 
in particular using evidence taken largely from official, written sources, 
Fishman's study is written from the standpoint of the testimony of the 
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wives themselves and relies largely on oral testimony. The two 
investigations, therefore, provide different perspectives on similar 
problems. The whole political context of the experience of French 
prisoner of war families is also markedly different from that of families in 
England. The expectations of British families of a government negotiating 
the treatment of those held captive in enemy hands was markedly 
different from French expectations of the Vichy government. In addition, 
French families did not experience to the same degree the problems of 
British families in connection with lack of information regarding their 
menfolk. For French families, the longest delay in notification of capture 
was in the region of twelve weeks whilst some British families were 
without news for upward of three years. Allowances too, although often 
similarly inadequate, posed different problems for French and British 
families. The families of British officers experienced problems accessing 
allowances whilst their husbands were captive in the Far East, whereas 
French wives, by and large, were generally in contact with their husbands 
and so were able to overcome problems of this nature. 
In one respect, however, there do seem to have been great similarities. 
Although not the focus of this study, the effect that the experience of 
being the wife of a prisoner of war had on the lives of the women 
involved needs some consideration. In We Will Wait, Fishman reports 
that, following the repatriation of their husbands, most wives resumed 
their interrupted domestic roles and relinquished the public roles they had 
assumed in local and national associations. Incidental information 
gleaned during the course of this study suggests a similar pattern for 
British prisoner of war wives. As local committees and national 
organisations such as POWRA were wound up, so the women involved 
resumed their domestic spheres. A number of wives, interviewed by the 
IWIVI, described their wartime activities in terms of preserving home and 
family. Alice Truman, mentioned earlier in connection with the requisition 
of her house, had fought a long campaign with her local authority to be 
allowed to return home, even to the extent of involving the Home 
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Secretary in her campaign. However, after her husband returned home 
she described her actions as 'just doing what any loving mother would do 
24 for her children'. Whilst this may well be true, any lasting effects of her 
action, such as increased self-confidence in dealing with authority or 
ability in dealing with financial matters, appear to be discounted. 
Although such considerations may well have affected subsequent 
resumption of married life, the women concerned generally discount their 
own experiences choosing instead to allow their husbands and their 
experiences to claim priority. In this they were generally following the 
advice provided to them by both government and services but it is difficult 
to imagine that their experiences did not colour their subsequent lives. 
Whilst some wives may have been happy to relinquish the responsibility 
involved in being 'head' of the family, many must surely have resented 
their displacement and their loss of influence within the family sphere. 
Despite the fact that TH Marshall considers that the experience of total 
war is 'bound to have an effect on both the principles of social policy and 
the methods of social administration', the direct impact of the Second 
World War on British government and Service Departments' policies 
towards service families in general and prisoner of war families in 
25 particular, was minimal. During the course of the war, action by service 
families had succeeded in drawing attention to the low levels of service 
allowances and the differential between service allowances and civilian 
pay. Although in 1942 and 1944 this action had resulted in increases to 
service pay and allowances, in the post-war years, this comparison 
worked to their detriment. In their attempt to present service pay and 
allowances in a way in which both servicemen and the general public 
could make comparisons between the different pay structures, the 
Government implemented changes which actually decreased the level of 
payments to service families. Income tax was introduced on Marriage 
Allowance and Children's Allowances were discontinued in favour of 
national Family Allowances. As had been the previously established 
pattern, once the actual conflict had ended the welfare service families 
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again faded into the background. The cumbersome machinery by which 
pay and allowances were negotiated remained unchanged and the lack 
of coherent policy for the payment of allowances to the families of those 
believed to have been taken captive remained unaltered. Any momentum 
which campaigns for improved conditions might have gained whilst the 
need to maximise the effectiveness of soldiers remained a political issue 
was once again lost. However, for service families generally there had 
been at least some attempt to devise a coherent and comprehensible 
policy, albeit that the result of this was to the detriment of the families 
concerned. For prisoner of war families the situation proved even more 
complex. At the outset of this study, there was an expectation that 
systems for administering allowances and disseminating information to 
prisoner of war families might well have been altered by the experience 
of World War 11, particularly in the light of the experience of the families of 
those held captive in the Far East. It had seemed possible that the 
problems faced by these families might have informed post-war 
discussions and contributed to the development of more efficient 
mechanisms for dealing with families undergoing these particular 
problems. What has actually emerged, however, is that the treatment of 
these families was not an issue that the services were actually able to 
deal with directly. There was, in fact, a 'missing link', which made it 
impossible for them to devise such a policy until it had been resolved. 
During the Second World War, no coherent policy existed within the 
services for preparing men for the eventuality of capture and 
consequently, despite the professed encouragement of service 
departments, many men failed to make adequate preparations for their 
families to be provided for in this eventuality. For whatever reason, a 
specific policy was not devised to deal with these issues, and this lack 
resulted in an inability to devise lasting solutions to particular problems, 
such as those of extending allowances for families whose menfolk were 
missing but likely to prove to have been taken captive. All action to 
address the problems was devised in a reactive basis and only as 
presented short-term solutions. Until the services faced the fact that a 
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policy towards educating men in preparing for the possibility of capture 
and more comprehensive education on behaviour after capture were 
needed, then suffering of the families concerned was bound to continue. 
Although the behaviour of the Japanese should have suggested the need 
to address the problems of capture by enemies who were not party to the 
Geneva Convention for implementation in the event of a future conflict, 
no action was taken. As a result servicemen, and their families, were 
similarly unprepared for the experience of capture in Korea. When 
changes to policy did come these were largely as a result of pressure 
being brought to bear on the British government through the actions of 
other agencies such as the United Nations. Although further investigation 
is obviously needed into the policy of the British government towards 
preparing their servicemen for the possibilities of capture in the 1950s, 
this is beyond the scope of the current study. However, what these initial 
findings do suggest is that the government continued to formulate policy 
towards prisoners of war and their families reactively. Furthermore, 
neither the decision to implement the informal category of 'missing 
believed prisoner of war', nor the action in publicising possible 
communist treatment of prisoners of war was developed in response to 
the concerns or needs of the men and families concerned. Instead both 
resulted from action by outside agencies and in response to military 
need. 
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